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I present a theory about Plato's views on knowledge in his earliest
dialogues and use that theory to provide a philosophical interpretation
of the second half of the dialogue on sophrosyne, the Charmides . I
begin with a discussion of Plato's motives for writing the Charmides
and present a general interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. In
Chapter III I present a number of general principles about the nature
of knowledge and justify the attribution of these principles to Plato
at the time that he wrote the Charmides . In Chapter IV I use these
principles to present a formal analysis of Socrates' arguments in
the latter part of the Charmides
,
l6?B - 175D. I argue that Socrates'
arguments are valid and comprise a rational inquiry into philosophical
problems that are important for Plato. In Chapter V I critically
examine the views on these matters expressed in John Gould's The
Development of Plato* s Ethics .
I argue that Plato held that there are many different kinds of
knowledge and that each kind of knowledge is a faculty (dynamis) that
has a pair of contrary qualities as its objects. A person knows a pair
of qualities if and only if he has the faculty of knowledge that has
Vthese qualities as its objects. For example, someone knows health
and disease just in case he has the faculty of medical knowledge.
If a person has a facility of knowledge he is able to recognize the
presence or absence of the objects of that faculty wherever they
might occur. Persons who have faculties of knowledge are consist-
ently able to speak and act correctly in matters pertaining to the
objects of their knowledge. Each kind of knowledge has a beneficial
result, and possessors of that kind of knowledge are able to produce
that result. Persons who know a pair of qualities, and only these
persons, are able to recognize whether or not someone knows these
qualities. Finally, persons who have a faculty of knowledge have moral
authority over others in matters pertaining to the objects of that
faculty.
I argue that the philosophical purpose and structure of Charmides
167B - 175D are functions of four things: Plato's desire to find a
kind of knowledge that would properly order the state, the idea that
a faculty of knowledge that has knowledge and ignorance as its objects
might be such a kind of knowledge, views of Plato's about kinds of
faculties other than faculties of knowledge, and Plato's acceptance
of the principles about knowledge presented in Chapter III. The
idea under examination in this passage is that a person with a faculty
of knowledge that had knowledge as its object would be able to
distinguish persons who know particular objects from those who do not.
Such a person would be in a position to ensure that each task of
importance to the state would be performed only by those persons who
vi
had the appropriate kind of knowledge. On the basis of views about
Kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge. Socrates validly
argues at 16?B - I69A that it is doubtful that there can be such a
faculty as knowledge of knowledge. On the basis of some of the
principles presented in Chapter III, Socrates validly argues at
170A - 171E that a person with knowledge of knowledge will not be
able to distinguish knowers from non-knowers in a way that will enable
him to properly order the state. At 171D - 175D Socrates assumes that
the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will have the abilities that
the arguments at 170A - 171E have proven that he does not have, and
argues that there are yet further reasons for believing that he cannot
bring about an ideal state. Consequently we are able to see why the
idea examined in the latter part of the Charmides was attractive to
Plato, and what his reasons were for rejecting it. Since there is
ample evidence that the Guardians of the Republic have seme sort
of knowledge of knowledge, my concluding chapter contains a brief dis-
cussion about what sorts of assumptions made about the hypothetical
possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides are not made about
the Guardians.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I shall present a theory about Plato's views on knowledge in
his earliest dialogues and use that theory to provide a philosophical
interpretation of the second half of the dialogue on sophrosyne, the
Charmides
. I begin with a discussion of Plato's motives for writing
the Charmides and present a general interpretation of the dialogue as
a whole. In Chapter III I present a number of general principles
about the nature of knowledge and justify the attribution of these
principles to Plato at the time that he wrote the Charmides . In
Chapter IV I use these principles to present a formal analysis of
Socrates' arguments in the latter part of the Charmides
, 167B - 1?5D.
I argue that Socrates' arguments are valid and comprise a rational
inquiry into philosophical problems that are important for Plato.
Since Plato* s views on knowledge are among the most important
and influential doctrines developed in the history of philosophy, it
is remarkable that his earliest sustained discussion of a topic in
epistemology has rarely been examined in detail by students of Plato’
s
thought. Books devoted to the entirety of Plato's work set forth
brief synopses of the Charmides , discursively comment upon particular
passages, speculate upon the purpose of the dialogue, and hurry on to
discuss the major dialogues of Plato's middle and later periods."1'
Contemporary work on Plato's theory of knowledge virtually ignores
the Charmides.
2
T. G. Tuckey's essay,. Plato's Charmides is a
detailed passage by passage commentary upon the dialogue. However
,
perhaps because Tuckey was killed before he completed the manuscript,
his essay does not contain a theoretical explanation of the
philosophical doctrines examined in the Channides
. Thus one may read
for pages in his book, noting comments on particular passages that
one agrees or disagrees with, and not find a sustained defense of a
general claim about the philosophical nature of the dialogue. Although
his comments are often interesting, Tuckey does not present any
general position that would be appropriate to evaluate in this
dissertation. In The Development of Plato* s Ethics John Gould
presents a theory of knowledge which he attributes to Socrates and
argues that the Charmides is Plato's examination of that theory. In
Chapter V I critically examine Gould's views. Two recent papers on
passages in the Charmides by Thomas Rosenmeyer and Robert Wellman are
discussed in Chapter IV.
My aim is not to record and comment upon statements made in the
texts I shall examine, but to understand the way in which Plato thought
about the nature of knowledge. It seems to me that modern readers
cannot acquire such an understanding merely by reading the dialogues;
we find statements about knowledge that seem to us to be paradoxical
or plainly false and we do not find passages that readily explain why
Plato would assert such statements. There are a number of statements
that are asserted as if they are obviously true that do not seem
obviously true to us. Still other statements are asserted as if they
had been proven while we look in vain for premises that entail them.
Since it is unreasonable to suppose that the dialogues Plato authored
are collections of random remarks that are made without reason or
3rational purpose, we must assume that these superficially inexplicable
statements are consequences of unstated beliefs and conceptual pre-
suppositions that differ from our own ways of thinking about knowledge.
In Chapter III I formulate into general principles the beliefs and
presuppositions which I believe underly Plato's statements about
knowledge in the early dialogues.' In the succeeding chapter I show
how the statements about knowledge in the Charmides can be seen as
logical consequences of these general principles.
I shall argue that Plato held that there are many different kinds
of knowledge and that each kind of knowledge is a faculty (dynamis) that
has a pair of contrary qualities as its objects. A person knows a
pair of qualities if and only if he has the faculty of knowledge that
has these qualities as its objects. For example, someone knows health
and disease just in case he has the faculty of medical knowledge. If
a person has a faculty of knowledge he is able to recognize the
presence or absence of the objects of that faculty wherever they might
occur. Persons who have faculties of knowledge are consistently able
to speak and act correctly in matters pertaining to the objects of their
knowledge. Each kind of knowledge has a beneficial result, and
possessors of that kind of knowledge are able to produce that result.
Persons who know a pair of qualities, and only these persons, are able
to recognize whether or not someone knows these qualities. Finally,
persons who have a faculty of knowledge have moral authority over others
in matters pertaining to the objects of that faculty.
In Chapter IV I argue that the philosophical purpose and structure
hof Charmides 167B - 175D are functions of four things: Plato's desire
to find a kind of knowledge that would properly order the 3tate, the
3dea that a faculty of knowledge that has knowledge and ignorance as
its objects might be such a kind of knowledge, views of Plato's about
kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, and Plato's
acceptance of the principles about knowledge presented in Chapter
HI* 7116 Wea under examination in this passage is that a person with
a faculty of knowledge that had knowledge as its object would be able
to distinguish persons who know particular objects from those who do
not. Such a person would be in a position to ensure that each task of
importance to the state would be performed only by those persons who
had the appropriate kind of knowledge. On the basis of views about
kinds of faculties other than faculties of knowledge, Socrates validly
argues at 167B - 169A that it is doubtful that there can be such a
faculty as knowledge of knowledge. On the basis of some of the
principles presented in Chapter III, Socrates validly argues at 170A -
171C that a person with knowledge of knowledge will not be able to
distinguish knowers from non-tknowers in a way that will enable him to
properly order the state. At 171D - 175D Socrates assumes that the
possessor of knowledge of knowledge will have the abilities that the
arguments at 170A - 171C have proven that he does not have, and argues
that there are yet further reasons for believing that he cannot bring
about an ideal state. Consequently we are able to see why the idea
examined in the latter part of the Charmides was attractive to Plato,
and what his reasons were for rejecting it. Since there is ample
5evidence that the Guardians of the Republic have some sort of
knowledge of knowledge, my concluding chapter contains a brief
discussion about what sorts of assumptions made about the hypothetical
possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the Charaides are not made about
the Guardians.^
6Footnotes to Chapter I
F. Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato;
A. E. Taylor, Plato i The Man and His Work
, p. £6-57; PauT'shorey, What
Plato Said
, p, 100-105; George Grote, Plato and Other Companions of
Socrates
,
Vol. I, p. 482-501; T. Goraperz, The Greek Thinkers
, VolT‘2,
p. 300-307; Paul Friedlander, Plato , Vol. 2, p7 67-81; Constantin
Ritter, The Essence of Plato* s Philosophy, p. 45-46; I. M. Crcmbie,
An Examination of Platons Doctrines
, Vol. 1, p. 211-214.
Non-philosophical aspects of the Charmides have been the subjeot
of many illuminating discussions and comments. Throughout the secondary
literature on the dialogue one may find insightful suggestions about
its dramatic structure and Plato's characterizations of the three
principal speakers. Several classics scholars have presented valuable
accounts of the concepts of sophrosyne and episteme in the writings of
Plato, his predecessors, and contemporaries. For these matters see
Helen North, Sophrosyne ; Tuckey; Gould; Friedlander; and Paul Desjardln,
unpublished ms. on the Charmides . When work on my dissertation was
nearly completed I discovered j". C. B. Gosling's Plato , which contains
a clear and interesting discussion on the differences between the Greek
'episteme' and the English 'knowledge'.
O
See, for example, the books and articles cited in Plato : A
Collection of Critical Essays , Vol. 1, Gregory Vlastos (ed.); and Jaakko
Hintiklca, 1 JT[* Professor Hintikka's latest paper on Greek epistemology,
; 3 , notes the importance of the principle employed at Charmides 170A.
^Questions about the chronological order in which the dialogues
were written are an intractable problem that confronts any attempt to
understand Plato's thought. Although my views do not deviate signif-
icantly from the usually accepted opinions, they ought to be stated
Since they have influenced my reconstruction of Plato's early views
on knowledge. I chronologically order the dialogues prior to the
middle period in this sequence;
ii/charSles , Laches , Lysis , Crito , Ion , Euthyphro , Hippias
Minor .
iii. Meno , Gorgias , Protagoras , Euthydemus .
I do not assume any particular order for the dialogues in the
latter two
groups. Except for a few references to Hippias Major and Alcibiades
Minor, I shall not refer to dialogues of doubtful or confirmed
7inauthenticity
.
I thank the members of my dissertation committee, Chairman
John Brentlinger, Vere Chappell, Gareth Matthews and Robert Dyer,
for their many helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of
this dissertation. I also wish to acknowledge a debt of personal
gratitude to Rosemary Danner and Edward Hougen.
8CHAPTER II
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF CHARMIDES
In this chapter I discuss Plato's motives for writing the CharmIdes .
I briefly mention some of his reasons for writing a dialogue on sophro-
syne, for choosing the particular persons who participate in the
dialogue, and for choosing the first five things sophrosyne is defined
as. My remarks are confined to motives that are peculiar to the
Charmides
,
and not to motives that are common to dialogues of this period.
I also present a paradox concerning the dialogue's interpretation.
Finally, I offer an explanation for the last two definitions of sophrosyne.
I explain why Plato chose those two definitions and why he examines than
in the way that he does. My purposes in this chapter are to introduce
and explain some general features of the Charmides that distinguish it
from other dialogues of Plato's early work and to set forth and explain
my own position on the dialogue's general interpretation.
The Platonic corpus is an inquiry into the good for human beings. I
understand Plato's principal goal to be to answer the question Socrates
poses in Book I of the Republic ! "What is the right way to live?" Plato
believed that a philosophical understanding of sophrosyne would contribute
considerably to this goal. He says in the Charmides ,
sophrosyne must be a good if it makes those good
in whom it is present, and makes bad those in whom
it is not. (161A. As the Republic and the Laws
indicate, Plato valued sophrosyne highly through
out his life.
)
Helen North has shown in her splended book ( Sophrosyne: Self-
9Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature ) that authors of
Plato's cultural heritage universally regarded sophrosyne as a
desirable human quality. It is unfortunate that Vta/<f>y»ovvv** has
no equivalent in English, since the virtue this word names is surely
remarkable. Its original or basic meaning is soundness or healthi-
ness of mind, and Plato's predecessors (see North, Ch. 1-3) included
as part of its meaning such things as self-knowledge, self-control,
modesty, shame, not exceeding the boundary between gods and men,
endurance of hardship, good order in the community, and the avoidance
of unsuitable conduct. Heraclitus held that sophrosyne was the greatest
virtue. (Fragment 112 , 0K ). Xenophon tells us that Socrates not
only inquired into the nature of sophrosyne, but also that he exempli-
fied and encouraged others to exemplify the virtue. (Memorabilia :
Bk. I, ch. 1-3; Bk. IV, ch. 3)» As North argues,
It would be possible to show that [_ Socrates j is for
Plato an exemplar of all four cardinal virtues; but
there can be little doubt which virtue is most
"Socratic,” and the recognition of Socrates as
the is often vitally important to
the total impact of a dialogue* notably the Channides ,
Symposium , and Phaedrus . Socratic sophrosyne has
three principal facets; self-knowledge, the sophron
eros, and what Socrates' admirers called enkrateia
("self-control") or autorkeia ("self-sufficiency,
independence” )
.
(P. 152-3)
Since Socrates, Plato's predecessors and contemporaries, and Plato
himself all regarded sophrosyne as a highly prized moral virtue, it
is natural that Plato should regard it as a proper object of philosoph-
ical inquiry.
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Although I do not believe that we may determine exactly what
they were, Plato must have had specific reasons for choosing '
Chaerephon, Charmides, and Critias as the persons Socrates talks
with in the dialogue. Chaerephon was apparently notable for lacking
sophrosyne, or at least certain aspects of it. At Apology 21A,
Socrates describes him as 'g This is correctly translated as
impetuous, though it also carries the suggestions of violence and
excessiveness. At Charmides 153B, Socrates describes him as ' <*viwo<?,
a term used by Xenophon as the antithesis of sophrosyne. (Man
,
Bk. I,
Ch. 1.). At Charmides 15?D Critias tells Socrates that Charmides excels
all other young men in temperance. At ta., Bk III, Ch. 7, Xenophon
reports a conversation (presumably at a time later than the dramatic
date of the Charmides ) in which Socrates says that Charmides is a man
of worth and it is foolish for him to be ashamed to speak in public. 2
Both Charmides and Critias were members of the group who seized power
during the reign of the Thirty, and both fell in battle when the
democrats returned in They are surely among those relatives of
Plato' s whose political behavior is repudiated in Letter VII . It is
likely that as a youth Charmides exemplified the immature form of
sophrosyne mentioned at Laws 710A, and that he failed to have the
virtue as an adult.
Xenophon claimed (Mem. , Bk. I, Ch. 2) that Critias was able to
control his immoral inclinations for as long as he associated with
Socrates, and became thoroughly intemperate only after they were no
longer companions. Their relationship then became strained; Socrates
11
publicly "observed that 'Critias seemed to him to have some feeling
like that of a pig, as he wished to rub against Euthydemus as swine
against stones*", and Critias tried to legally prohibit Socrates
from discussing philosophy with the young. (Mm,
, Bk. I, Ch. II,
29-38). Philostratus (Lives of the Sophists
. Bk. I, 16; see also
^2) says of Critias, "In cruelty and in blood-thirsti-
ness he outdid the Thirty. ... it seems to me that he is the worst
of all the men who have gained a reputation for wickedness," Critias
wrote a great deal, little of which is preserved. In one noteworthy
fragment, he praises Spartan youth for their temperate drinking
habits. (The Older Sophists , edited by R. K. Sprague, p. 251-2)
From what little is known about the lives of the three men
Socrates talks with in the Charmides
, it is evident that they lacked
aspects of sophrosyne which Socrates exemplified. Consequently, we
must assume that Plato intentionally chose them to be speakers in the
dialogue for dramatic purposes. Some of these purposes are obvious.
The opposition of temperate and intemperate men lends itself wall to
the dialogue form, and Charmides personally exemplifies the character-
istics he falsely identifies with sophrosyne. However, there is one
feature of the Charmides that I find completely puzzling. Plato does
not use the Charmides to disassociate emphatically and unambiguously
the moral decline of Critias and Charmides from their relationships with
Socrates early in their lives. Since it is generally accepted that
one of Plato's intentions in the early dialogues is to defend Socrates'
character and actions, the emission of such a defense in the Charmides
12
is certainly a paradox."7
Each of the first three definitions Plato considers; quietness*
modesty, and minding one's own business; were qualities traditionally
4
associated with sophrosyne. As such, it is not surprising that Plato
should choose to examine them. The motives for tho fourth definition,
sophrosyne is the doing of good things, are more complex. While Plato
and other writers of his tradition would hardly deny that the
temperate man will do good things, this definition does not single
out sophrosyne from other moral virtues or from accidentally or non-
morally doing good things. Socrates' objection, that Critias has left
out the fact that the temperate man will know that he is acting
temperately (and, in a sense, know himself), brings the discussion
back to a traditional conception of sophrosyne that Plato wants to
analyse in detail.
At 164D Critias claims that the inscription at Delphi,
' y V UJ
» is ^ injunction to be temperate, and identifies
knowing oneself with sophrosyne. Under Socrates' questioning, the
definition changes from self-knowledge to the knowledge that knows
itself and the other knowledges (knowledge of knowledge). Socrates and
Critias then agree that the man who has knowledge of knowledge
will know himself and will be able to examine what
he knows and does not know, and in the same way
he will be able to inspect other people to see when
a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks
he knows, and when again he does not know what he
thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to
do this. And being temperate and temperance and
knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what
one knows and does not know. (167A)
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Plato's acceptance of Socrates' doctrine that virtue is knowledge
is surely part of his motivation for considering definitions of
sophrosyne that claim it is a kind of knowledge. The fifth
definition, self-knowledge, is again something traditionally
associated with sophrosyne. However, at 166e and l6?A the sixth and
seventh definitions introduce novel concepts that are not to be found
in the writings of Plato's predecessors. It seems to me that these
definitions may be traced to four sources* Plato's desire to find
the philosophical foundations for the ideal community, some of Plato's
theoretical beliefs about the nature of knowledge, Plato's appreciation
of Socrates' ability to recognize ignorance, and Plato’s acceptance
of a version of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge. This is the
version that Nicias says he has often heard Socrates say,
Everyone of us is good with respect to that in which
he is wise and bad in respect to that in which he is
ignorant, (Laches 194D).
I suggest that the reason Plato examines the last two things sophrosyne
is defined as is that he thought that they might be kinds of knowledge
which would enable their possessor to govern states properly. I suggest
that it seemed initially plausible to him that a person with knowledge
of knowledge would be able to order the state properly, and that upon
dose examination he determined that the idea would not work out.
At Charmides 1?1D Socrates says
If, as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate
man knew what he knew and what he did not know
(and that he knows the former but not the latter) and
were able to investigate another man who was in the
same situation, then it would be of the greatest
benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us
who had temperance would live lives free from error and
so would all those under our rule. Neither would we
Ih
ourselves be attempting to do things we did not
understand-rather we would find those who did
understand and turn the matter over to tham-
nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do
anything except what they would do correctly, and
this would-be that of which they possessed the
knowledge. And thus, by means of temperance,
every household would be well-run, and every city
well-governed.
This passage implies that a necessary condition for a well-governed
state is that each person act only in accordance with knowledge and
does not act on the basis of ignorance. It would be a fallacy of
composition to say that this is implied by the passage quoted from
the Laches
,
but it is a view that that passage surely suggests.
Socrates says that a person who knows what he and other people do and
do not know will be able to order his state so that it satisfies this
condition. Here there are a number of unstated and undefended pre-
suppositions that must hold if Socrates' claim is to be correct.
However, the claim is partially justified by two of Plato's theoretical
views about knowledge (see Chapter 1): knowers act rightly and have
moral authority in matters that they have knowledge of. I believe that
Plato's appreciation of Socrates' abilities at exposing ignorance led
him to think that it was possible for there to be a kind of knowledge
which was capable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance. Two of
his other theoretical views, each kind of knowledge has a pair of
opposite qualities as its objects and knowers can determine if the objects
of their knowledge are present or absent in things they may inhere in,
suggested to him that knowledge of knowledge and ignorance would have
this ability. I suggest that this is why Plato desired to examine
is
knowledge of knowledge
, and why he has Socrates say that knowledge of
knowledge entails knowing what people do and do not know. This kind
of knowledge may with some plausibility be linked to sophrosyne, since
its possessor will have some self-knowledge and, in a reasonable sense,
mind his own business.
The often noted parallels in Plato's writings between medical
knowledge and moral and political knowledge are present in the
Charmides . At 15&E - 157C Socrates reports with approval the medical
theory of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis. This theory not only holds
that the health of a person's soul is a necessary condition for the
health of the whole person, but that proper treatment of any diseased
part of the body also requires treatment of the soul. I suggest that
Plato used several features of this theory of medical knowledge in
formulating the conceptions of political knowledge that Socrates
n
discusses at the end of the Charmides .
I suggest that Plato thought that just as the doctor's knowledge
of the health of the vital parts of the body enables him to produce
the health of the whole person, the possessor of knowledge of knowledge
would be able to use his knowledge of the vital parts of the community,
the individuals who possess different kinds of knowledge, to produce
the well-being of the whole community.
At Charmides I67B - 175D Plato critically examines this idea. He
argues for three conclusions which each entail that knowledge of knowledge
will not be able to bring about an ideal community. He argues that
knowledge of knowledge is not possible, that it does not entail that
16
its possessor has the ability to know what he and other people do and
do not know, and that it will not produce happiness. Most of my
dissertation is devoted to articulating Plato's arguments for these
three conclusions, especially the second. In Chapter 4 I shall argue
that these are arguments succeed j on the basis of theoretical principles
he held, Plato was justified in drawing the conclusions that he does.
In this chapter I have offered explanations for general features
of the Chamides that distinguish it from other dialogues of Plato's
early period and have presented my own views on the dialogue's general
interpretation. In the next chapter I shall try to articulate the way
in which Plato thought about knowledge at the time that he wrote the
Charmides by attributing to him a number of epistemological principles.
17
Footnotes to Chapter II
In this chapter I follow the popular belief that dialogues such
as the Charmides consist of the examination of a specific number of
discreet definitions. In fact some definitions are offered as
alternative or more fully developed versions of earlier definitions,
and some definitions are formulated by a variety of different expressions,
(cf. Charmides 164D - 167B)
2
This aspect of Charmides' personal character is certainly being
represented in the Charmides when Socrates refutes his second definition,
"temperance seems to me to make people ashamed and bashful, and so
I think modesty must be what temperance really is." (160E - l6lE).
Charmides is a participant in Xenophon's Symposium (see IV, 29-33)
and at Symposium 222B Alcibiades says that Chaimides tried to make
Socrates his beloved.
3
"Xenophon, with considerable detail, defended Socrates against
the accusation that he had corrupted Critias (Hem . , Bk. I, Ch. 2).
There is a passage at Charmides 157E - 158B where Socrates glowingly
describes the virtues of Charmides' ancestors. Since these persons
were also the ancestors of Plato and Critias, it may be that Plato's
treatment of the principal speakers of the Charmides was affected by
family loyalties. If this is so, then his loyalties must have changed
by the time he wrote Letter VII .
4
See North, Arthur Adkins: Merit and Responsibility , and Victor
Ehrenberg: "Polypragm ,syne: A Study in Greek Politics."
^Though they are not so distinguished in the text, for the
purposes of this chapter I shall consider self-knowledge, knowledge
of knowledge, and knowing what you and others do and do not know, as
separate definitions of sophrosyne.
^Here and elsewhere I have used "knowledge" to translate
" L7T>.<rr- >.<) " in those places where Sprague uses "science."
Although this sometimes leads to awkward English, it is more uniform
and accurate. In several places, which I have usually noted and
explained, I have altered her translation to eliminate misleading
expressions and one or two significant errors. I would like to thank
Professor Sprague for sending me a prepublication copy of her new
translation of the Chamides and Laches . It is much more accurate
than the translations of Lamb and Jowett, and several of the references
in her footnotes to the text were quite helpful.
?I want only to claim that there is a parallel between these two
kinds of knowledge, not to claim that a theoretical conception of one
18
chronologically preceded and influenced the development of the theo-
retical conception of the other. Since apparently nothing else is
known about the persons Socrates refers to at I56E, it may be that the
views Socrates expresses are of Plato's own invention. A discussion
of the relationship between ancient medical theory and ancient
philosophy, which argues that philosophical theories influenced
medicine and not vice versa, may be found in Ludwig adelstein'
s
"Ancient Philosophy of Medicine." ( Ancient Medicine 1 Selected
Papers of Ludwig Edel stein ) Edelstein does not refer to the Charmides .
19
CHAPTER III
PLATO'S EARLY THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
During my initial studies of the Charmides my reaction was similar
to that of most modem students of the dialogue? Socrates' arguments
about knowledge of knowledge from 167B to 175D seemed to be bewilder-
ing and paradoxical . I did not understand why Plato was presenting
these arguments, what the premises and conclusions meant, why he
thought the premises were true, and why he thought the premises
supported the conclusions he asserted. Since I was certain that the
Charmides must not only have made sense to Plato, but also that Plato
must have thought that the issues discussed in the dialogue were
important, I was faced with the task of reconstructing certain aspects
of the way in which Plato thought when he wrote the dialogue. It
seemed to me that by carefully studying the Charmides and Plato's
other early dialogues I might be able to articulate a number of
general principles which are such that if one assumes that Plato held
these principles, then one can see the Charmides as a rational inquiry
into important philosophical problems.
In this chapter I present the principles about knowledge that I
use in my attempt to explain the Charmides . I offer textual evidence
to justify the attribution of those principles to Plato. In the next
chapter, especially sections 3 and 4, I present a number of valid
formal arguments which have as their conclusions each of the claims about
knowledge that Socrates asserts in the text* The premises oi these
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arguments consist of general premises introduced in this chapter,
further principles that may be derived from those principles,
particular premises that Socrates assumes in the course of his
arguments, and previously proven conclusions. If we assume that a
conceptual framework may be at least partially represented by a
collection of general principles, then there is a conceptual frame-
work from which Socrates' conclusions can be seen to be natural
consequences. Since there is, as I shall argue in this chapter, a
good deal of evidence to show that Plato subscribed to this collection
of principles, the attribution of these principles to Plato enables
us to have some understanding of why the Charmides is the way that it
is.
It is important to note that the relationship between the principles
attributed to Plato in this chapter and the evidence that I offer for
them is not that of a deductive argument. Many commentators have said
that some of the forms of inference I employ in this chapter are
fallacious. Calling them "forms of misinterpretation," Richard
Robinson has named, clearly stated, and criticized two forms of infer-
ence that I employ j
, . .
misinterpretation by abstraction t Your author mentions
X, and X appears to you to be a case of Yj and on the
strength of that you say that your author ’was well aware
of Y', ...Because you have abstracted Y from X, you assume
that your author did so too. . . . insinuating the future , that
is to say, of reading into your author doctrines that did
not become explicit until later. (Plato* s Earlier
Dialectic
,
p. 2-3. In the discussion of the second form of
inference Robinson refers only to cases of reading into an
author doctrines that are explicit in a subsequent author,
but Robinson's remarks on p. 5 indicate that his criticisms
are to apply also to inferences made^from Plato's later
dialogues to his earlier dialogues.
)
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Instances of the argument forms Robinson discusses are correctly
criticized if they are intended to be deductive arguments. However,
some instances of these argument forms may be such that the premises
inductively justify the conclusions. To put it in a very crude and
oversimplified schema, I claim that sets of premises such as
1. In his early period Plato asserted of several F*s that
they are G.
2. In his early period Plato did not assert of some F
that it was not G.
3. In his middle period Plato asserted that all F’s are G.
inductively justify claims such as
4. In his early period Plato accepted the view that all F*s
are G.
Moreover, sets of premises like the above are not the only sort of
non-deductive justification that claims such as 4. may have. Propo-
sitions may also be justified by their explanatory power. If a set
of propositions enables us to give a rational explanation for something
that has previously been unexplained , or enables us to give a better
explanation than has previously been given, then that fact is some
evidence for accepting that set of propositions. In Chapter IV I
argue that the principles I attribute to Plato enables us to have a
detailed, precise, and coherent explanation of a passage in the
Charmides that has not been previously so explained. When this claim
is added to sets of premises such as 1. - 3» » the arguments in favor
of claims such as 4. become much stronger. It seems to me that such
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arguments become strong enough to warrant tentative acceptance of
their conclusions.
It is appropriate to remark here that the standards Plato thought
we should employ in evaluating the truth of philosophical claims may
differ in some respects from those of contemporary philosophers. At
Hippias Minor 366B Socrates says
And every man has power who does that which he wishes at
the time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special
case in which he is prevented by disease or something of
that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of
you that you are able to write my name if you like.
Several of the principles I attribute to Plato appear to be open to
obvious counterexamples. A shoemaker whose tongue has been cut out
does not have the power to utter true statements about the objects of
his knowledge. Socrates' remark in the Hippias Minor suggests that
these principles are not intended to apply to persons who have been
disabled by natural causes.
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Section 1
In this section I try to explain what Plato thought knowledge was
when he wrote the early dialogues. I shall begin by discussing those
aspects of this topic that I believe are relatively clear, and conclude
by proposing hypotheses to explain aspects that seem to me to be
relatively obscure.
Knowledge is knowledge of something. There are many different kinds
of knowledge, and that which each of them is of I shall call the object
of that kind of knowledge. Each object known is known by one and only
one kind of knowledge. Each kind of knowledge knows one and only one
2
object. A person knows an object if and only if he has the kind of
knowledge which has that object as its object. We may formulate these
views by means of the following principles.
la. For any object x, there is one and only one kind of
knowledge k which has x as its object.
lb. For any kind of knowledge k, there is one and only one
object x which is the object of k.
lc. For any person p and any object x, p knows x if and
only if there is a kind of knowledge k which has x as
its object and p has k.
At Chairoides 165C, Socrates says to Critias
...if knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly
must be seme sort of knowledge (£>v ; Vf ) and
must be of something, isn't that so?
Yes - of oneself, he said.
Then medicine, too, I said, is a knowledge and is of
health?
At 166A Socrates continues
2h
I can point, out. "to you in th© case of each on© of
these knowledges what it is a knowledge of, this
being distinct from th© knowledge itself. For
instance, the art of calculation, of course, is
of the odd and even*... And again, th© art of
weighing is an art concerned with the heavier
and lighter, (see also Charmides 168b, 168D,
171A, Laches 194E, Euthydqnus 295B» Republic 476e)
From these passages it is evident that when he wrote the early
dialogues that Plato believed that each kind of knowledge was of
something. His belief in the one to one correlation of kinds of
knowledge and their objects is evident in these passages,
...he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by
temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by
temperance, and housebuilding by that art, but not
by temperance, and so on, ( Charmides 170C)
Each separate art, then, has had assigned to it by
the deity the power of knowing a particular occupation
(spy v )? I take it that what we know by the pilot's
art we do not know by the art of medicine as well....
And what we know by the medical art we do not know by
the builder's art as well... and so it is with all the
arts? What we know by one of them, we do not know by
another ( Ion 537C-D, see also Charmides 175A, Ion 53&A,
Republic W?C, 473b)
Now with me the mark of differentiation is that one art
means the knowledge of one kind of thing, another art the
knowledge of another, and so I give them their respective
names... Does that seem true to you of all the arts—-that,
necessarily, the same art makes us know the same, another
art not the same, but if it really is another art, it must
make us know something else? ( Ion 537D, 538A. These
principles are employed at Charmides 170C, 170E. See also
Republic 438C-3, 477C, Wk. These principles also seem to
underlie the discussion at Gorgias 449D-451D.
)
Knowledge exists in the souls of knowers. At Charmides 157A
Socrates says, "It is a result of such words that temperance | later
said to be a kind of knowledge j arises in the soul and when the soul
acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both
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for tho head and for the rest of the body. " At Euthydemus 295E,
Dionysodorus and Socrates have this exchange, "Do you know what you
know by means of something, or not? I know it by means of the soul,
I said." (See also Hippias Minor 373A, 375E - 376, and Protagoras
314B).
What are the natures of the different kinds of knowledge and of
their objects? Since my dissertation is on knowledge, I shall not
deal with the metaphysical issues this question raises. The usual
view that metaphysical doctrines do not appear in Plato's writings
until the middle dialogues, or at least until the dialogues I have
placed at the end of the early period, cannot easily be reconciled
with such passages as Charmides 158E-159A, 161A809, 168B2-4, 168D1-3,
168E3-7* 168EL0-11, Laches 191D-192B, 198D-199B, Lysis 217C-E,
Buthyphro 5D, 6d, 6e, 11A, and Hippias Minor 375D-E. R.E. Allen has
argued that some of these passages indicate that Plato held a primitive
version of the theory of Forms. John Brentlinger has argued that some
of these passages show that Plato was influenced by the Anaxagorean
3doctrine of immanent Properties.
Passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics (987B, 1078B, 1086B) suggest
that Socrates held metaphysical doctrines which differed from those of
Plato's mature thought. If this is correct, then it is possible that
some of the passages I cited may be attributable to metaphysical views
of Socrates or to an acceptance of those views by Plato in his youth.
Because these issues are complicated and important, an adequate
discussion of them requires a study of dissertation length. Consequently
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I shall avoid these issues as much as possible. The concept that the
theory I propose relies on in a metaphysical way is that of $ u /-; •>
This concept is the subject of J. Souilhe's book, Etude sur le teme
A dans les dialogues de Plato a A discussion of dynamis
which contains a summary of Souilhe's work may be found in F.M.
Comford's Plato's Theory of Knowledge
, pp. 234-8.
Each kind of knowledge has a faculty (tfvvfyits ) which is of some
object or set of objects. Plato's belief in this is evident in the
Charmides and Laches , suggested in Hippies Minor and Ion , and explicitly
asserted in the Republic . At Charmides 167C - 169A Socrates attempts
to prove that a knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges
cannot exist. In the course of the argument he asserts the following
two claims.
is this knowledge a knowledge of something and does it
have a certain faculty of being something?
[Critias] : Yes it does. (168c)
the very thing which has its own faculty applied to
itself will have to have that nature towards which the
faculty was directed, won't it? (l68D, See also 168E, 169A)
Since Socrates applies these principles to a wide variety of
relations besides knowledge of knowledge, it seems evident that he
held a general principle to effect that anything that is of something
has a dynamis which enables it to be of that thing. To use one of
Socrates' examples (l68B), the greater has a certain faculty of being
greater than something - presumably than something less. Because Plato
seems to have held this principle in a general fom, and because he
applies it to knowledge of knowledge, it is reasonable to assume
that
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Plato believed that every kind of knowledge has a faculty which is
of the objects of that kind of knowledge. He certainly holds this view
in the Republic
,
We ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is
different from the others because its power or function
is different? (346a)
Shall we say that faculties, powers, abilities, are a
class of entities by virtue of which we and all other
things are able to do what we or they are able to do?
... In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or
similar mark such as those on which in many other cases
I fix my eyes in discriminating in my thought one thing
from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to
one thing only-that to which it is related and what it
effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each
one of them a faculty, and that which is related to the
same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the
same faculty, and that to another I call other. ...To
return, then, my friend, said I, to science or true
knowledge, do we say that it is a faculty and a power,
or in what class do you put it?
Into this, he said, the most potent of all faculties.
(477C-D, see also 438C-E.
)
This also seems to be the view of the Laches .
At 192B Socrates asks,
what facility is it which, because it is the same in
pleasure and in pain and in all the other cases in
which we were just now saying it occured, is therefore
called courage? (See also Hippias Minor 375D and Ion
532C)
In the Republic it is quite clear that the only thing that
distinguishes different faculties of knowledge is that they are of
different objects. Considered only in themselves and not as they are
related to their respective objects, or in terms of the effects that
they produce, different faculties of knowledge are indistinguishable.
I believe that this is also the view of the Chamides ,
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the temperate man will know that the doctor has some
knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what sort it
is, won't he have to examine what it is of? Because
each knowledge has been defined, not just as knowledge,
but also by that which it is of?
By that, certainly.
Now medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges
by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and
disease. (171A)
Here it is evident that Socrates is claiming that what distinguishes
different kinds of knowledge are their different objects.
Hence, each instance of each kind of knowledge has a dynamis that
is related to certain objects. At this point a question arises about
the coherence of Plato's views. If each dynamis that knows objects is
indistinguishable from every other dynamis that knows objects, why is
medical knowledge of different objects than musical knowledge? If the
faculty, considered in itself, is the same in both cases, how can the
two faculties be of different objects? Moreover, Socrates' remarks
at Republic 477C suggest that every sort of faculty, and not just
faculties of knowledge, are indistinguishable when they are considered
in themselves. Why then should the faculties and of greaterness be of
different objects? There are several ways to resolve this difficulty;
argue that Plato did not hold that indiscemables are identical, argue
that faculties and their objects are conceptually indissoluable
complexes, or argue that faculties have individuating qualities that
humans are incapable of recognizing. Although the first two suggestions
may be true, I shall argue for the latter since it has some direct
textual justification. At Republic 438c Socrates says,
29
I only moan that as knowledge becomes the knowledge not ofjust the thing of which knowledge is but of some particular
kind of thing
, namely* health and disease* the result was
that it itself became some kind of knowledge and this
caused it to be no longer simply knowledge but, with
the addition of the particular kind, medical knowledge.
(See also Ion 537C.
)
Socrates' remarks here indicate a way of resolving the problem so that
Plato's views may be given a coherent interpretation. I suggest that
we construe knowledge as being a kind of faculty that is distinct from
other kinds of faculties, and each kind of knowledge as having a
distinct property that human beings are not capable of recognizing.
The faculties of greatomess, medical knowledge, and musical knowledge
will all be distinct* but human beings will be able to distinguish
between these faculties only if they determine that they are related to
different objects. In the cases of faculties that accomplish something
(which may include every kind of faculty), they may also need to
distinguish between the effects of those faculties. It seems to me
that the most natural thing to do is to assume that each kind of faculty
has seme individuating quality. The faculty of medical knowledge, for
example, has the quality medicalness.
I have attributed to Plato the view that someone can recognize that
something is or is not a particular kind of faculty only if that person
can recognize what the objects of that faculty are. Thus, recognizing
that someone has or lacks a particular kind of knowledge requires that
one bear some epistemological relation to the objects of that kind of
knowledge. The evidence of the Charmides indicates that the only person
who can have this relation to those objects is the person who has the
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kind of knowledge that is of those objects. At CharmIdes 171 Socrates
considers how someone is to be tested to see if they have medical
knowledge or nots
It follows that the man who wants to examine medicine should
look for it where it is to be found, because I don't suppose
he will discover it where it is not to be found, .. .Then the
man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the
doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely
health and disease. •• .And he will look into the manner of
his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken
and what he does is correctly done. ...But without the
medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of
these things? [Critias replies 1 ' Certainly not.
Earlier in this section I attributed to Plato the view that a person had
a particular kind of knowledge just in case he knew the object of that
kind of knowledge. In section three of this chapter I shall argue that
a person knows an object just in case he has the ability to recognize
the presence or absence of that object wherever it might occur.
Consequently we may formulate the view I wish to attribute to Plato
by the principle 1
Id. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k, if
someone is such that p knows whether or not he has
k, then any object of k is such that for any thing
p examines, p will know whether or not that thing
has that object.
Formally
»
(x)(y) j[Kx & Py & (Ez)(yK( zHx) v yK(*Lx))]>(w|wQx^(u)CyEu>(yK(uHw) v yK(uLw))I
Characterizing the nature of the objects of knowledge is as
uncertain a task as characterizing knowledge itself. (My remarks here
also apply to knowledge insofar as it is an object of knowledge. ) It
seems to me that the objects of knowledge can also be viewed as instances
of the concept of dynamis. The concept may not only be used in the sense
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of being a faculty of something* but also in the sense of causal
power. A man is healthy if he has the quality health. The view
that qualities are understood as causal entities in the early dialogues
is held by many different authors, (see Allen, Brentlinger, Teloh.
)
The principal evidence is Lysis 21?D, where Socrates argues that white
things are white because of the presence of whiteness. Additional
evidence is at Charmides l6lA* where Socrates says ,,Temperance must
be good if it makes those good in whom it is present and makes bad
those in whom it is not." (See also Critias* speech at 169E).
There are two problems encountered in trying to specify the objects
of the different kinds of knowledge. First, are the objects of knowledge
a single quality, the presence and absence of a single quality, a pair
r\
of opposites, or, in some cases, more than two qualities. There is
textual evidence to support each interpretation. At Charmides 168d
Socrates says,
the very thing which has its own faculty applied to
itself will have to have that nature (r«^v ou<n>v )
towards which the faculty was directed, won't it? I
mean something like thisi in the case of hearing don't
we say that hearing is of nothing else than sound?
Here, and in passing in many other passages (for example, Charmides
170C), Socrates speaks of faculties in general, or of particular kinds
of knowledge, as being of a single quality. In other passages he
includes the non-presence of the quality!
would it then, I said also be a knowledge of the absence
of knowledge ( kv£.77<r * ) if it is knowledge
of knowledge.
Of course, he said. ( Charmides 166e)
The objects of knowledge are frequently specified as a pair of
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opposites, “medicine is distinguished from the other knowledge by-
virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and disease."
Charmides
, 1?1A, see Gorgias 495E-496C, Republic 438E) Finally,
at Crito 47C there is a contextual implication that moral knowledge
may have more than two objects, "in questions of justice and injustice,
and of the base and the honorable, and of good and evil, which we are
examining, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear that,
or the opinion of the one man who understands the matters," (see also
Crito 48A).
I do not see how one could determine with certainty what Plato's
views were on this matter. He may have held that there is no single
way of specifying the objects of knowledge, or he may have held that
one of the first three mentioned is the literal truth and that the
other ways of speaking about the objects of knowledge are reducible to
that one. Though my reasons are hardly compelling, I shall adopt the
view that each kind of knowledge is related to a single pair of
opposites. It is surely reasonable to view Socrates' remarks in the
Crito as being a consequence of his doctrines that virtue is knowledge
and all the virtues are one. If a man cannot have one virtue without
having them all, then the man who has the knowledge that is of justice
and injustice will also have the kinds of knowledge that know good, evil,
the base, and the honorable. Although I shall often refer to knowledge
as having a single object as a matter of convenience and brevity, I
prefer the view that knowledge has two objects on the grounds that
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Socrates frequently and firmly asserts this of particular kinds of
knowledge. Correlatively
,
I suggest that his frequent mention of
only one object is done so for purposes of brevity. It is for reasons
of ontological parsimony that I do not adopt the view that the
presence and non-presence of a quality are the objects of knowledge.
It just seems to me that the non-presence of something is something
that does not exist. When the doctor recognizes the non-presence of
health in Charmides' head, he does not recognize the presence of the
quality of the non-presence of health, he just recognizes that health is
not present. (I do not wish to identify the recognition of the non-
presence of a quality with the recognition of its opposite. At Lysis
216d Socrates says that some things are neither good nor evil. Presum-
ably the possessor of moral knowledge is able to recognize the non-
presence of both good and evil in these things.
)
In the case of arts such as the herdsman's it might be argued that
its objects are cattle, not qualities. Passages such as Euthyphre 13A-C
surely suggest this. But here we must distinguish between the things
upon which some kinds of knowledge bestow care, and the things towards
which those faculties of knowledge are directed. Medicine has health
and disease as its objects; and cares for the body because that is the
thing in which these qualities inhere. If this distinction were not
made, then we would have to say that the art of doctor and the arts of
trainers were identical since they would have the same object. In
such cases the distinction may be preserved by saying that each of
these arts cares for the body, but the objects known by the trainers
are qualities such as strength and weakness or swiftness and slowness.
(Dialogues that repeatedly discuss medical knowledge, Charmides and
Lasches, discuss the arts of the trainers separately, cf. Laches
I85B and Charmides 159C)
Section 2
1 attribute to Plato the principles
2a. Each kind of knowledge has a product.
2b. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k, if
p has k then there is a product e which is the
product of k and p is able to produce e.
I use the term product in a very broad sense: anything that might
benefit anyone. Examples of products mentioned in the early dialogues
include such things as houses, food, health, strength, safety at sea,
victory at war, the well-being of animals, the well-ordering of cities
and households, the excellence of men and citizens, the well-being of
souls, works of art, and perhaps memories and well-formed sentences.
(respectively, Euthyphro 13B, 14A, 13D, Gorgias 452B, Charmides 173B,
Euthyphro 14A, 13B, Charmides 171E, Apology 20B, Crito 47D, Protagoras
313D, Hippias Minor 3&9A, and Charmides 159A. ) There is considerable
evidence that indicates that Plato held this view. In speaking of arts
that care for animals, Socrates says,
Well, then, has not all care the same object? Is it not
for the good and benefit of that on which it is
bestowed? For instance, you see that horses are benefit-
ted and improved when they are cared for by the art
which is concerned with them. (Euthyphro 13B)
After naming the results produced by the doctor, shipwright, and
builder, Socrates demands that Euthyphro tell him what result is
produced by the art that serves the gods. (13E) At Euthydemus 291E
he names the results of medicine- and farming, and asks Crito to name
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the result of the kingly art. The way in which Socrates makes these
demands indicates he is appealing to the general principle that each
kind of knowledge has a product. Plato explicitly affirms this
principle in the Republic :
And does not each art also yield us benefit that is
peculiar to itself and not general, as for example
medicine health, the pilots art safety at sea, and the other
arts similarly? (3*+6a)
However, a passage in the Charmides suggests that Plato may not have
held the principle in his earliest dialogues. After pointing out that
medicine, housebuilding, and the other arts each have a product,
Socrates says
So you ought to give an answer on behalf of temperance,
since you say it is a science of self, in case you should
be asked, 'Critias, since temperance is a science of self,
what fine result does it produce which is worthy of the
name?' Come along, tell me.
Critias: But, Socrates, he said, you are not conducting
the investigation in the right way. This science does not
have the same nature as the rest, anymore than they have
the same nature as each other, but you are carrying on
the investigation as though they were all the same. For
instance, he said, in the arts of calculation and geometry,
tell me what is the product corresponding to the house in
the house-building and the cloak in the case of weaving
and so on-one could give many instances from many arts.
You ought to point out to me a similar product in these
cases, but you won*t be able to do it.
Socrates i And I said, you are right.... (165E)
Elsewhere I shall argue that Plato did not intend the reader to accept
Critias' claim that temperance has no fine result. (Chapter 5» p.^tO
But Socrates apparently accepts Critias' claim that calculation and
geometry do not have a product. A few sentences later Socrates mentions
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the art of weighing, which is simitar to the mathematical arts in that
it does not seem to have a product. My opinion is tint Plato did hold
the principle that each kind of knowledge has a product in spite of
these apparent counterexamples. Unfortunately, there is no evidence
in the earliest dialogues to indicate that Plato held the view he held
in the Republic : the mathematical arts produce certain virtues in
the soul (572). The view of the Republic is suggested at Protagoras
35&D and Gorgias 508A, and at Euthydemus 290C. Socrates says that
mathematicians are like hunters: they capture or discover things. It
is surely possible that when he wrote the Charmides Plato either did
not believe that the mathematical arts had a product or that he
suspended judgement on the matter. At any rate, for someone who does
not share my opinion, the evidence I have cited surely supports the
restricted principle
2c. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k, if k
is not one of the mathematical arts and p has k,
then there is a product e which is the product of
k and p produces e.
It is clear that Plato did not hold the principle
Every product is the result of some kind of knowledge.
At Apology 22B Socrates says "So I soon found that it is not by
wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain instinctive
inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets, who say many fine things,
but understand nothing of what they say
.
"
At Republic Socrates says
And does not each art yield us benefit that is peculiar to
itself and not general, as for example medicine health, the
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pilot’s art safety at sea» and the other arts
similarly? (See also 47?C)
There seems to be no evidence that Plato did not hold this view in
earlier dialogues* and a good deal of inductive evidence to indicate
that he did hold this view in those dialogues. Consequently, we may
tentatively attribute to Plato the principle
2d. Each kind of knowledge has a product had by no
other kind of knowledge.
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Section 3
I attribute the following principle to Plato,
3a. For any person p and any object x, any y is such that
if p examines y then if y has x, p knows y has x» and
if y does not have x, p knows y does not have x; if
and only if there is a kind of knowledge k which has
x as its object and p has k.
Formally:
(x)(y| Px & 0y)^|(z^cE2^[(zHy>xK(2Hy)) & (zLy%K(zLy) ) ^(Ew) (Kw &
The clearest instance of this principle is at Charmides 170A,
Supposing that there is a knowledge of knowledge, will
be anything more than the ability to divide things and
that one is knowledge and the other not?
7
No, it amounts to this.
Another example of it is at Gorgias 464A,
Well* is there such a thing as a condition which seems to
be good, but really isn't? Here's an illustration of what I
mean: there are many people who seem to be in such good
health that it isn't easy for anyone except a physician or
a trainer to perceive that they are not.
An example of knowers who know what they know and what they do not know
in a sense different than that discussed in the Chamldss is at
Republic 37&.
This is another trait that you will see in the dog. It is
really remarkable how the creature gets angry at the mere
sight of a stranger and welcomes anyone he knows, though
he may never have been treated unkindly by the one or
kindly by the other. ..the only mark by which he distinguishes
a friendly and an unfriendly face is that he knows the one and
does not know the other;
I believe that the principle is a presupposition behind some of
Socrates' remarks in the Euthyphro
yOw & xHv)i
it
say
Socrates: And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you
think that you understand divine things and piety and
isxpiety so accurately that, in a case such as you have
stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear
that you yourself may be doing something impious?
Euthyphro : If I did not understand all these matters
accurately, Socrates, I should not be worth much—
Euthyphro would not be any better than other men. (4d)
Socrates: ...I want to know what is characteristic of
piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I
think, that there is one characteristic which makes all
pious actions, and another characteristic which makes all
impious actions impious. (6d)
I take it that Socrates' presupposition is that a person who has
knowledge of piety is able to determine whether something has piety
or does not have piety, and this person can do this because he can
recognize that the thing has or lacks some characteristic. The watch-
dogs can determine who is the friend and who is the stranger because
they recognize that the first is known to them and the second is not.
After asking La ches to tell him what constitutes courage wherever it
might occur (Laches 191D) , Socrates says
if someone should ask me 'Socrates, what do you say it is
which you call swiftness in all these cases,' I would
answer him that what I call swiftness is the power
(Suvc*u(V ) of accomplishing a great deal in a short
time, whether in speech or in running or in all other
cases. (192A-B)
In these passages Socrates relies on the principle that those who know
something (Laches says that he knows what virtue is at 190C) are able
to discern the presence of that thing wherever it occurs. There is
also the suggestion that the knower bears this relation to the object
known because the knower knows that each thing which has the object has
a power ) of a particular sort and the knower can recognize
this
power. Thus it suggests that health, and perhaps disease also, is a
dynamis of a particular sort. (It may be thought that it is difficult
to conceive of the quality the watchdogs recognize, "being a person
unknown to me" as a power, but the concept of dynamis includes both
passive and active qualities of a thing, cf. Republic 507C8 Hence
the description of the watchdogs is not incompatible with this
suggestion.
)
Although this principle easily fits arts like medicine, music,
and mathematics, it is not clear how it applies to arts like house-
building or weaving. Being able to distinguish houses from non-houses
is not an ability that is peculiar to the housebuilder. Socrates does
say that the knower will be able to distinguish good and bad actions
in matters pertaining to the objects of his knowledge, ( Ion 538A, 5^D-E,
Charmides 171B) but doctors have this ability in addition to their
ability to distinguish health from disease. It may be that the house-
builder, perhaps like modern building inspectors, has the ability to
distinguish the well-built house from the poorly built house. This
distinction between the two sorts of houses is made at Gorgias 51^
,
but the ability to draw the distinction is not there said to be
peculiar to the house-builder.
Section 4
I attribute to Plato the principle
4a. For any person p and any object x, if there is a
kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and p
has k, then p is able to utter consistently true
statements about matters pertaining to x.
Charmides 1?1B says that if we test someone for knowledge in a given
subject, we should see if they speak truly about that subject.
then the men who conduct the examination correctly will
examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a
medical man, namely health and disease. .. .And he will
look into the manner of his words and actions to see if
what he says is truly spoken and what he does is
correctly done,
At Hippias Minor 366D, Socrates and Hippias agree that the wisest is
best able to tell truths,
Socrates; And being as you are the wisest and ablest of
men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the
best?
Hippias; To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.
Socrates; And, therefore, you would be the most able to tell
the truth about these matters, would you not?
Hippias; Yes, I should.
And at Gorgias 450A Socrates says that "the art of medicine make s men
capable of comprehending and speaking about the sick. At Charmides
166C-D, Socrates says to Critias
how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute
everything you say, I would be doing it for any other
reason then the one I would give for a thorough investigation
of my own statsments-the fear of unconsciously thinking I
know something when I do not.
I take it that Socrates is assuming that if his statements are
refuted,
then he does not have knowledge. At Gorgias 506a he warns his
listeners
if anyone of you thinks that any statement of mine is
contrary to the truth* he should take issue with me and
refute it. For it is by no means from any real
knowledge that I make my statements a it is, rather,
a search in common with the rest of you, so that if my
opponent's objection has any force, I shall be the first
to admit it.
Finally, at Laches 190C Socrates says "And what we know, we must, I
suppose, be able to state?"
Perhaps because Plato thought it was obviously true, there is
not a great deal of explicit textual evidence for the interpretation
that the knower speak truths consistently . Nevertheless, at Hippias
Minor 366E Socrates says
would you not be the best and most consistent teller of
a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely
as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters,
if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly?
Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood
in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose?
Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he
wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas
you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie
would always and consistently lie?
Socrates argues that just as the knower is best able to speak truly
voluntarily, he is also best able to speak falsely voluntarily. He
further argues that the knower will be best able to lie consistently;
unlike the ignorant, he is not likely to accidentally tell the truth.
Since Socrates parallels the powers of speaking truly and speaking
falsely, I assume that he would also claim that the knower is best able
to speak truly consistently. This claim is not in the text, but I cannot
imagine why Plato would deny it.
It may be that in the early dialogues Plato did not hold that
the ability to utter truths consistently is a sufficient condition
for knowledge. The view that poets, rhapsodes, prophets, and the
priests and priestesses of religious oracles utter truths without
knowledge is most explicitly stated in the Mono
,
Socrates i ... diviners and prophets say many things truly,
but they do not know what they say.
Meno: So I believe.
Socrates: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men
"divine" who, having no understanding, yet succeed in
many a grand deed and word?
Mono : Certainly.
Socrates: then we shall also be right in calling divine
those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and
prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. (99C)
At Apology 21B Socrates says "When I heard of the oracle I began to
reflect: what can the god mean by this riddle?. ... It cannot be that
he is speaking falsely, for he is a god and cannot lie. " And at
22A "So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create
their works, but by a certain instinctive inspiration, like sooth-
sayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but understand nothing
of what they say." (The Ion is not, as is commonly supposed, a simple
and straight-forward development of this view. There Socrates applies
this view not only to poets and rhapsodes but also to Ion's abilities
to speak about both Homer as poet and Homer as a speaker of truths about
the things known by particular kinds of knowledge. ) It is not clear If
hs
Plato thought that such people uttered truths consistently (although
Euthyphro claims that everything he has foretold has come true,
Euthyphro 3C. )
,
but there does not seem to be anything that rules out
this possibility. Hence, it is questionable if we may take the utter-
ance of truths to be a sufficient condition for knowledge. (In two
dialogues, the Charmides and the Laches
, seers are spoken of as if
they had knowledge. In the Charmides Socrates introduces it as hypo-
thetical assumption (173C) to advance the discussion and does not assert
that seers have knowledge. In the Laches Nicias asserts that the seers
have knowledge. Since Plato's Athenian readers would know that Nicias'
reliance on seers was partly responsible for the failure of the
expedition to Sicily, we cannot assume that Nicias' assertion is
Plato's as well.)
In the dialogues of the middle period Plato says things about the
abilities of knowers to speak about the objects of their knowledge which
would distinguish what they say from the mere utterance of true state-
ments about these objects. At Phaedo 76B Simmias affirmatively answers
Socrates' question "Can a person who knows a subject thoroughly explain
what he knows?" (see also Republic 531E. ) That knowers have the
ability to give rational accounts of what they know is suggested by
Socrates* report of Zalmoxis' medical theory ( Charmides 156D-157C) and
his criticisms of the poets at Apology 22B. Perhaps Plato held in the
dialogues that the ability to utter true statements of this sort was a
sufficient condition for knowledge. This seems to be the position taken
in the Gorgias t
I say that cooking is not an art, but a knack, because
it is unable to give an account of the nature of the
methods it applies and so cannot tell the cause of each
of them. (465A)
Tentatively, I attribute this principle to Plato
4-b. For any person p and any object x, if p is able
to give a rational account of matters pertaining
to x, then p knows x.
Section 5
In this section I justify the attribution of the following
principle to Plato:
5a. For any person p and any object x, if there is a
kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and
p has k, then p consistently acts rightly in matters
pertaining to x.
I shall cite those passages to support the general claim that knowledge
implies right action, justify the inclusion of consistency condition,
explain why the converse of this principle may not hold, and then give
a partial account of what ’’acts rightly" means.
At Charmides 171B Socrates makes these remarks:
Socrates: then the man who conducts the examination correctly
will examine the person who is alleged to be a doctor in
those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health
and disease,
Critias: So it seems.
Socrates: And he will look into the manner of his words
and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what
he does correctly done?
Critias: Necessarily.
According to Socrates, the man who conducts the examination correctly
will rely upon the principle
If a man has the faculty of medical knowledge then he will
speak truly and act correctly with respect to health and
disease.
Since Socrates is using medicine merely as an example to make a general
claim about tests for the presence of any kind of knowledge, and since
P implies both Q and R implies that P implies Q, we may infer,
for any person p and any object x, if p has the
facility of knowledge which has x as its object, then
p acts correctly in matters pertaining to x.
Another example of this principle is in the Hippias Minor :
Socrates: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skillful
calculator and arithmetician?
Hippias » Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.
Socrates: And if someone were to ask you what is the sum of
3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer, in
a moment, if you pleased.
Hippias: Certainly I should. ( 366c)
Socrates and Hippias would assent to the principle:
If someone has the faculty of calculation, then he can
calculate numbers correctly.
Finally, at Buthyphro 13C Socrates says:
...you see that horses are benefitted and improved when
they are cared for by the art which is concerned with
them. ...And dogs are benefitted and improved by the
huntsman's art and cattle by the herdsman's.
Presumably, these animals are benefitted because their caretakers, who
each have a kind of knowledge, act correctly.
The view that the knower acts rightly with consistency is explicit
at Buthydemus 230A:
Socrates: So wisdom makes men fortunate in every case,
since I don't suppose she would ever make any sort of
mistake but must necessarily do right and be lucky-
otherwise she would no longer be wisdom.
We finally agreed (I don't quite know how) that, in
sum, the situation was this: if a man had wisdom he had
no need of any good fortune in addition.
This view is implicit in the Crito. At 44D Socrates says of the
multitude that "they act wholly at random. " Later Socrates asks Crito
of the man who is in training, "But if he.
. .respects.
. .what the many
say, who understand nothing of the matter, will he not suffer for it?"
He and Crito agree that the man's body would be disabled. Since this
is contrasted with strict adherence to the advice of the expert, we
may presume that actions in accordance with his advice are not random
and are consistently correct.
I believe that this last passage indicates that Plato may not have
held the principle:
For any person p and any object x, if p consistently acts
rightly in matters pertaining to x, then there is a
faculty of knowledge k which has x as its object and p
has k.
Socrates says that the man who is in training "must act and exercise,
and eat and drink in whatever way the one man who is his director,
and who understands the matter, tells him; not as others tell him."
(46B) If the athlete follows his trainer's advice, he will consistently
act rightly with respect to health, disease, strength, and weakness,
without having the faculties which know those objects. This indicates
that Plato did hold that:
5b. For any person p and any object x, if p consistently
acts rightly in matters pertaining to x, then there is
a kind of knowledge k and there is a person q which
are such that x is the object of k and q has k and
p follows the advice of q in matters pertaining to x.
In the cases where the knower and the actor are the same person, we
may say that a man is following his own advice.
What does "acts rightly in matters pertaining to x" mean? One
thing that is clear is that it does not entail acting rightly in the
,J
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broad senses of actions that are morally right or actions that are
beneficial on the whole. Nicias mentions cases in which such an
inference would not hold, and a vivid particular example is given in
the Republic .
Nicias j ...Do you suppose, Laches, that when a man's
recovery is more to be feared than his illness, the
doctors know this? Or don't you think there are many
cases in which it would be better not to get up from an
illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases
to live is preferable? In many cases, is it not better to
die?
Laches j Well I agree with you on this point at heart.
(Laches 195C; cf. Gorgias 511E-512A)
Socrates: ...until the time of Herodicus, the sons of
Ascl epius had no use for the modem coddling treatment
of disease. But Herodicus, who was a gymnastic master
and lost his health, combined training and doctoring
in such a way as to become a plague to himself first
and foremost and to many others after him.
Glaucon: How?
Socrates: By lingering out his death. He had a mortal
disease, and he spent all his life at its beck and call,
with no hope of a cure and no time for anything but
doctoring himself. Every departure from his fixed regimen
was a torment; and his skill only enabled him to reach old
age in a prolonged death struggle. (Republic *K)6)
Without his knowledge Herodicus would not have been able to prolong
his life. Hence, in some sense, his actions were right actions.
However, it is clear that they were not right in the sense that they
were beneficial on the whole. It is not so clear that his actions ware
morally wrong, at least in the sense that a doctor might use his
knowledge to murder a patient. (Plato may be referring to this at
Statesman 209B. ) However, Plato surely thought that Herodicus was
capable of acting otherwise, and praises Asclepius for acting in
accordance with the view that "Treatment would be wasted on a man who
could not live in his ordinary round of duties and was consequently
useless to himself and to society." ( Republic *407) I am not sure if
we should attribute to Plato the view that doctors who coddle patients
because they are ignorant of this are committing actions that are
morally wrong. If Plato did hold this view, or if he equated moral
rightness with that which benefits on the whole, then a man may act
rightly on the basis of knowledge without acting in a way that is
morally right. But, the available evidence does not enable us to
determine this point with certainty.
I think that the best way to interpret the notion of right action
that is common to the actions performed on the basis of knowledge is to
say that an action is right insofar as it is conducive to bringing about
a certain end. We might formulate the relevant principle as*
5c. For any person p and any object x, p acts rightly
in matters pertaining to x if and only if there is a
kind of knowledge k which has x as its object and
there is a product e which is the product of k and
p's actions are conducive to bringing about e.
A passage from the Gorgias indicates that Plato did hold this principle*
Socrates* Consider* will a good man, whose speeches are for
the maximum improvement of his fellows, say anything at
random? Will he not always have some definite end in view?
Just as all other craftsmen keep their eye on the task at
hand and select and apply nothing at random, but only such
things as may bring about the special form he is bent upon
effecting. Consider, if you like, painters and architects
and shipwrights and any other craftsman you please;
each one of them disposes every element of his task
in a fixed order and adjusts the parts in a suitable
and harmonious scheme until the whole has been
constituted as a regularized and well-ordered object.
And so it is also, of course, with the rest of the
craftsmen, including those we just mentioned, who
occupy themselves with the human body, trainers and
physicians; they too, I presume, direct their efforts
towards regularizing and harmonizing the body.
(Gorgias 503E - 504. ) (This view of actions performed
on the basis of knowledge is suggested in Socrates'
report of Zalmoxis' criticism, "this... is the very
reason why most diseases are beyond Greek doctor, that
they do not pay attention to the whole as they ought
to do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it
is impossible that the part should be. " Charmides 156E.
)
Given these remarks, I believe that Socrates would hold that the
craftsmen' s actions in matters pertaining to their trade are right
if they serve to bring about the product of their trade, and wrong
if they do not do so. As I have formulated it, the principle does
not say that only persons who have knowledge may act rightly, since
the Crito indicates that non-knowledgeable persons under the command
of a knower may act rightly.
There is an additional feature of Plato's views on knowledge that
I have been -unable to assimilate very well into the theory presented
in this chapter. As the textual references noted below bear out, Plato
often distinguishes (and not always in the same way) between persons who
have superlative knowledge in a certain area and persons who have an
inferior sort of knowledge in the same area. The theory I have presented
is incomplete in that I only note this distinction and do not present
an explanatory account of it. One way in which the distinction might
be marked off is by the following principle;
5d. For any person p and any kind of knowledge k, if p has k, then
p non-defectively has k if and only if p acts in
accordance with certain part-whole causal principles
to produce k's product.
I have used the expression "non-defectively has k" to distinguish
the superlative sort of knowledge from the inferior sort. Plato
mentions this distinction frequently in the late dialogues (Phaedrus
268-71, Laws 720B, 857c, 902D, 903C, perhaps at Timaeus 88D, see also
Philebus 55C ff.
,
and Republic 44-3-4.), it has an important role in the
Gorgias (465A, 503E, 506E, 503A) and is the basis of the discussion of
Greek medicine at Charmides I56B - 157C. It is evident from the latter
passage that the better sort of doctor knows the causal relations that
the health of the parts of the person bear to the health of the other
parts of the person and to the health of the whole man. This view is
extended to other kinds of knowledge at Gorgias 503E. Although
remarks in the Phaedrus suggest that the piecemeal sort of knowledge is
not knowledge at all, Plato elsewhere (Laws 720B and 857C) accords it
some status, as he does to the doctors that are the subject of Zalmoxis'
criticism.
It would be nice if I could provide some explanatory account of
the knowers' knowledge of the relevant part-whole relations, but I do
not see how this can be done. I conjecture that the distinction between
these two kinds of knowledge, as well as the distinction between
knowledge and ignorance, is an instance of a distinction Plato draws in
the Timaeus ,
... a distinction should be made between those causes which
are endowed with mind and are workers of things fair and
good, and those which are deprived of intelligence and
always produce chance effects without order or design. ( 46e)
Non-defective knowledge, as a causal power, consistently and rationally
acts rightly and speaks truly to produce its beneficial results.
Piecemeal knowledge and ignorance act randomly and produce beneficial
results by chance.
Cc'
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Section 6
In this section I shall argue that Plato held the principle
6a. For any person p and any object x, p knows x if and
only if any person q is such that if p examines q,
then p knows whether or not q knows x.
Charmides 171B - C is the principal evidence for this claim. In the
course of an argument which proves that the man who has knowledge of
knowledge will not be able to distinguish the true doctor from the
pretender, Socrates says,
Then the man who conducts the examination correctly will
examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical
man, namely health and disease.
So it seems.
And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to
see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does is
correctly done?
Necessarily.
But without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow
up either of these things?
Certainly not.
No one, could do this, it seams, except the doctor-not even
the temperate man himself. If he could, he would be a doctor
in addition to his temperance.
At 171C Socrates concludes by saying that the temperate man will not be
able to "recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the
man in his own field, the way other craftsmen do." Socrates says that
knowers, and only knowers, can recognize when another person has the
same kind of knowledge they have. In this passage Socrates does not
explicitly say that knowers will be able to recognize when someone
does not. have the kind of knowledge they have. However, there are
two good reasons for believing that he holds this also. The first
is that he subsequently gives two accounts of what benefits would
follow if knowledge of knowledge did have the abilities he has proven
it does not have, and in both of them he indicates that ignorant
pretenders would be recognized.
If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define
it, surely everything would be done according to knowledge:
neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is not)
deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else
pretending to know what he did not escape our notice.
(173A-B, see also 171D.)
Secondly, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates says that they have
agreed to this position even though they have not discussed it:
we made this concession in the most prodigal manner, quite
overlooking the impossibility that a person should in
some fashion know that he does not know at all - because
our agreement amounts to saying that he knows things he
does not know. And yet, I think, there could be nothing
more irrational than this. (175C)
I should note one problem with the attribution of this principle
to Plato. It is possible to interpret the early dialogues in a way
that attributes to Plato the following three propositions:
1. Anyone is such that if Socrates examines him and he does
not know the objects of moral knowledge, then Socrates
knows that he is ignorant of those things.
2. Socrates does not have moral knowledge.
3. No one has moral knowledge.
The principle I have attributed to Plato is incompatible with the
conjunction of these three statements. My own view is that it is
incorrect to attribute 2., and consequently 3» also, to Plato. This
':1
controversy is both interesting and notorious, but since an adequate
discussion of it would be very length y, I shall not enter into it here.
The passage quoted from the Charmides indicates how knowers
determine if other people know or do not know the same things that they
know. The doctor determines if another man has medical knowledge by
seeing if the man speaks truly and acts rightly with respect to health
and disease. The same view is held in the Ion
. (See 531D-E, 538A,
540D-E. ) We may formulate this position by means of the following
three principles!
6b. For any person p and any object x, p knows x if and
only if any person q is such that if p examines q,
then p knows whether or not q acts rightly and speaks
truly in matters pertaining to x.
6c, For any object x, any two persons p and q are such
that p knows that q knows x if and only if p knows
that q acts rightly and speaks truly in matters
pertaining to x.
6d. For any object x, any two persons p and q are such that
p knows that q does not know x if and only if p knows
that q neither speaks truly nor acts rightly in matters
pertaining to x.
At the end of this section is a proof that the principle I attributed
to Plato at the beginning of this section follows from the above three
principles.
A passage from the Republic indicates how it is that knowers are
able to determine if someone speaks truly and acts rightly.
Consider then with regard to all forms of knowledge and
ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose
to do or say other or more than what another who knows would
do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in
the same action. (350A)
It may be that Plato thought that the examiner tests for truth and
right action by seeing if the examinee says and does the same things
he would say and do.
We now encounter a difficulty with Plato’s theory, as I have
presented it. Each of the above principles may be counterexample J if
we assume that there are persons, such as poets and those who act on
the advice of experts, who lack knowledge and yet consistently speak
truly or act rightly. It seems to me that we should assume that
Plato believed that examining experts would be able to distinguish
between such persons and fellow experts. It seems clear that the
distinguishing mark is the ability to offer an explanation. At Apology
22B Socrates says
So I took up the poems on which I thought that they had
spent the most pains
,
and asked them what they meant, hoping
at the same time to learn something from them. I am
ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends* but I must say
it. Almost any one of the bystanders could have talked
about the works of these poets better than the poets
themselves. So I soon found that it is not by wisdom
that the poets create their works but by a certain
instinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets
who also say many fine things, but understand nothing
of what they say.
A plausible model for such an explanation may be found in Socrates'
report of Zalmoxis' medical theory. Zalmoxis is unlike the poets and
the athletes mentioned in the Crito in that he can explain why he says
and does certain things in matters pertaining to health and disease.
He can explain how the health of a part of the body is dependent upon
the health of other parts of the body and upon the health of the whole
person (he is said to have explained this to Socrates) and presumably
he can also explain how the things he says and does fit in with his
medical theory. It would seem that being able to offer explanations
of this sort is a sufficient condition for knowledge; a condition
that cannot be met by a person whose speech is inspired or whose
actions are directed by an expert. Consequently, the notions of true
speech and right action employed in the above principles should be
given a strong interpretation so that they include the ability to
explain what one says and does.
There is one passage in the Laches and one in the Gorgias which
appear to contradict the views of the Charmides and the Ion . In both
passages there is contextual presupposition that non-experts, namely
the participants in the discussion, could recognize that other people
had certain kinds of knowledge.
Socrates i Then, in keeping with what I said just now, how
would we investigate if we wanted to find out which of us
was the most expert with regard to gymnastics? Wouldn't it
be the man who had studied and practiced the art and who had
had good teachers in that particular subject?
Melesiasi I should think so.
Lachesi What's that Socrates? Haven't you ever noticed that
in some matters people become more expert without teachers
than with them?
Socrates i Yes, I have Laches, but you would not want to trust
them when they said they were good craftsmen unless they
should have some well-executed product to show you—and not
just one but more than one. (185B, £• See also Gorgias 51^A-L.
)
In the passages from the Laches and the Gorgias Socrates does not mention
examining the person's words or actions* he says that we would determine
that the person had knowledge by assessing their teachers, training, and
products. He also presupposes that non-experts may properly make
such assessments. Although these passages do represent a prima facie
contradiction to the views of the Ion and the Charmides
.
it seems to
me that there is a reasonable way to explain away the difficulty. I
suggest that in the Gorgias and the Laches that Socrates is speaking
informally, and yielding to the popular view so that he may proceed
to discuss other matters. Correlatively, in the theoretical discussions
of the Charmides and the Ion
, I suggest that Socrates is saying what
Plato literally believes: only experts can recognize other experts.
In the theory I have presented I have not incorporated the additional
methods one may use to recognize experts that Socrates mentions in the
Laches . I have not done this merely because they are not mentioned in
the Charmides
.
I do not want to deny that Plato thought that an expert
might assess another person’s teachers, training, and products when he
tries to determine if that person is a fellow expert.
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Section 7
I believe that Plato accepted the principles:
7a. For any person p and any object x, it is legitimate
for p to exercise power over others in matters
pertaining to x if and only if p has the kind of
knowledge which has x as its object.
and 7b, For any person p, and any object x, it is rational
for someone to accept the authority of p in matters
pertaining to x if and only if p hasothe kind of
knowledge which has x as its object.
At Crito 47 Socrates says:
Does a man who is in training* and who is serious about
it* pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of
all men, or only of the one man who is a doctor or
trainer?
Crito: He pays attention only to the opinion of the one
man.
Socrates* ...And Crito, to be brief, is it not the same
in everything? And, therefore, in questions of justice
and injustice, and of the base and the honorable, and
of good and evil, which we are now examining, ought we
follow the opinion of the many and fear that, or the
opinion of the one man who understands these matters
(if we can find him), and feel more shame and fear before
him than before all other men? For if we do not follow
him, we shall corrupt and maim that part of us which, we
used to say, is improved by justice and disabled by
injustice.
and then goes on to deny that Mlife is worth living when that part of
us which is maimed by injustice and is benefitted by justice is
corrupt." It is clear from this passage that we should accept the
authority of those who know. (See also Euthyphre 5A» Charmides 171D,
and Euthydemus 291C. ) That we should not accept the authority
of those who do not- know* at, least- in morals* is a conclusion Socrates
is trying to establish. A premise of the argument for this conclusion
is that we should not follow the advice of those who do not have
medical knowledge. It does not follow as a matter of logic that ho
holds this view of every kind of knowledge. However, I do not see
why he would reject parallel arguments about the arts of the general,
the pilot, the shipwright, and many others. In each case, following
the opinions of the ignorant may cause us harm, and hence ought to be
avoided.
At Lysis 209B-D there is this exchange,
In these matters, then you [ Lysis are allowed to do as you
please; you may write whichever letter you like first, and
whichever you like second. And in reading you enjoy the
same liberty. And when you take up the lyre; neither
father nor mother, I imagine, hinders you from tightening
or loosening such strings as you choose, or from playing
with your fingers or stick, as you may think proper. Or
do they hinder you in such matters?
Oh dear, not
What in the world, then, can be the reason, Lysis, that in
these matters they don't hinder you, while in the former
mule-driving, charioteering, spinning wool / they do?
I suppose it is, Socrates, because I understand the one
and don't understand the former.
Oh! That's it, is it, my fine fellow? It is not, then,
for you to be old enough that your father is waiting in all
these cases, but on the very day that he thinks you are
wiser than he is, he will hand over to you himself and his
property.
And the Athenians? Will they, do you imagine, hand over to
you their matters directly they perceive that you are wise
enough to manage them?
Yes, I expect so.
If Lysis does not have knowledge of charioteering, it is not right for
him to take the reins during the race. If he has knowledge of house-
holds, it is right for him to assume authority over his father’s
property. That the legitimacy of this authority extends to persons
as well is evident from Socrates' claim that Lysis' father will
put himself under his son' s control.
Examples of the principles attributed to Plato in this chapter:
la. Harmony is the object of one and only one kind of knowledge.
lb. Musical knowledge has one and only one object.
lc. Zalmoxis knows health just in case he has the kind of knowledge
that has health as its object.
ld. If Zalmoxis knows whether or not someone has medical knowledge,
then anything Zalmoxis examines is such that Zalmoxis knows
whether or not that thing has the object of medical knowledge.
2a. Carpentry has a product.
2b. If Zalmoxis has medical knowledge, then he is able to produce the
product of medical knowledge.
2c. If Critias has a kind of knowledge that is not one of the
mathematical arts, then Critias is able to produce the product
of that kind of knowledge.
2d. Seamanship has a product that no other kind of knowledge has.
3a. & 3b. Zalmoxis has the kind of knowledge that has health as
its object just in case anything he examines is such that he
knows whether or not it has health.
4a. If Milo has the kind of knowledge that has strength as its object,
then he is able to speak truly consistently about strength.
4b. If Charmides is able to give a rational account about matters
7pertaining to swiftness, then he knows swiftness.
5a. If Herodicus has the kind of knowledge that has health as its
object, then he consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining
to health.
5b. If Milo consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to
strength, then someone (possibly Milo himself) has knowledge of
strength and Milo follows that person's advice in matters per-
taining to strength.
5c. Solon acts rightly in matters pertaining to justice just in
case there is a kind of knowledge that has justice as its object
and Solon's actions are conducive to bringing about the product
of that kind of knowledge.
5d. If Zalmoxis has medical knowledge, then Zalmoxis has the superlative
sort of medical knowledge just in case he acts in accordance with certain
causal part-whole principles to produce the product of medical knowledge.
6a. Damon knows harmony just in case any person he examines is
such that he knows whether or not that person knows harmony.
6b. Damon knows harmony just in case any person he examines is such
that he knows whether or not that person acts rightly and speaks
truly in matters pertaining to harmony.
6c. Zalmoxis knows that Herodicus knows health just in case Zalmoxis
knows that Herodicus speaks truly and acts rightly in matters
pertaining to health.
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6d. Critias knows that Socrates does not know health just in case
Critias knows that Socrates neither speaks truly nor acts
rightly in matters pertaining to health.
7a. It is legitimate for Critias to exercise power over others in
matters pertaining to justice just in case he has the kind of
knowledge that has justice as its object.
7b. It is rational for someone to accept Lysis' authority in matters
pertaining to health just in case Lysis has the kind of
knowledge that has health as its object.
Informal interpretation of predicates, relations, and constants:
Ox x is an object
Kx x is a kind of knowledge
Px x is a person
xOy x is an object of y
xKy x knows y
xHy x has y
xLy x lacks y
xEy x examines y
xK (yHz) x knows y has z
xK (yLz) x knows y lacks z
xK (yAz) x knows y consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining
to z
xK (ySz) x knows y consistently speaks truly about matters per-
taining to z
xK (yLAz) x knows y does not consistently act rightly in matters
pertaining to z
xK (yLSz) x knows y does not consistently speak truly about matters
pertaining to z
xK (yKz) x knows y knows z
xK (yLkz) x knows y does not know z
xKByz x knows y by z
t the temperate man
D the doctor
k knowledge
kk knowledge of knowledge
h health
J justice
m medicine
P politics
G goodness
E evil
A the afterlife
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Footnotes to Chapter III
I should point out that I do not claim that at the time that
he wrote the Charmides that Plato was aware of the principles I
attribute to him in this chapter. Given the present amount of evidence
we have concerning Plato's beliefs, it is unlikely that that question
may be resolved. I claim that Plato is committed to these principles
in the sense that the coherence of his views and the validity of his
arguments presupposes his acceptance of them.
2
Strictly speaking, this is not accurate. I shall argue later
that each kind of knowledge has as objects a pair of contrary qual-
ities. The abbreviation I employ here does not alter the structure
of Plato's theory. It does simplify the presentation of that theory
and eliminates a considerable amount of tedious detail in the formal
analysis of the arguments of the Charmides . Although I shall often
speak of a kind of knowledge as if it knew an object, this is of
course to be understood as an abbreviated way of saying of a person
who possesses a kind of knowledge that he knows an object. At the
end of this chapter is a list containing an example of each of the
principles I attribute to Plato.
^R.E. Allen, Plato' s Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms .
J. Brentlinger, "Incomplete Predicates and the Two-Worlcl Theory of
the Phaedo . " The latter approach is suggested by W. D. Ross, Plato* s
Theory of Ideas. See Also John Rist, Eros and Psyche , Henry Teloh,
T(Sel f-Pred'ication or Anaxagorean Causation in Plato , " and T.G.
Rosenmeyer, "Plato and Mass Words."
^It would be more accurate to use a connective that is stronger
than material implication. I have no position to argue about what
sort of entailment logic would best formulate Plato's views on con-
ceptual truths, so I shall use the truth functional connective for
purposes of simplicity and convenience. I have deviated frcm the
notation usually employed for expressions denoting relations in
order to make the meaning of the formalization of these principles
immediately intelligible to the reader. A more conventional notation
might use "Gxyz" for x knows that y has z," "Hxyz" for "x knows that
y lacks z," "Ixyz" for "x knows that y knows z," "Jxyz" for "x
knows
that y consistently acts rightly in matters pertaining to z," and
so
on for the other epistemological relations. At the end oi this
chapter is an informal interpretation of the predicates, relations,
and constants I employ in formalizing the arguments of Plato's that
I discuss in this dissertation.
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It may b© that the product of each kind of knowledge is
identical with the object of that kind of knowledge. The relation-
ship that holds in medicine, its product is health and its objects
are health and disease, may hold for each kind of knowledge.
Hintikka, 3 , argues that Plato and other Greek thinkers tended to
identify the objects and products of faculties, but stops short
of claiming that any philosopher actually accepted this identifi-
cation. It seems to me to be an open question as far as Plato's
early thought is concerned; I cannot think of any evidence which
indicates that he did not identify the objects and products of
knowledge.
^A briefer version of this principle that I shall often use
later is 3b.
(x)(y)j(Px & Oy)} j(z)|xEz^[(zHy xK(zHy))& (zLy xK(aLy) ) ] ;S (Ew) (Kw & yOw & xHw)
7
At Hippias Major 30^D-E Socrates says
...how can you know whose speech is beautiful of the
reverse - and the same applies to any action whatsoever -
when you have no knowledge of beauty?
^It ought to be noted that since persons who do not have knowledge
of some object are unable to recognize others who do have knowledge
of that object, they will not know whose authority it is rational
for them to accept.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF CHARMIDES 16?B - 1?5D
Introduction
In the previous two chapters I have presented a general introduction
to the Charmldes and developed a theory about Plato's views on knowledge
in the early dialogues* In this chapter I will present an interpre-
tation of Charmldes 167B - 17 5D. In Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter
I shall make extensive use of the theory of knowledge attributed to
Plato in Chapter III.
I choose to begin my discussion of the Charmldes at 167B because it
is the place where Socrates begins his examination of the idea that
knowledge of knowledge is a kind of knowledge that will enable its
possessor to properly order the state. Up to 166c the dialogue is
an examination of definitions that identify sophrosyne with concepts
traditionally associated with it. At l66c Critias shifts his position
from a claim that sophrosyne is knowledge of oneself to the claim that
it is the only knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges.
After a dramatic interlude there is this exchanges
Would it then, [[Socrates J said, also be a knowledge of the
absence of knowledge, if it is a knowledge of knowledge?
Of course, [Critias said.
Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be
able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in
the same way he will be able to inspect other people to
see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks
he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks
he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And
being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount
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to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know.
Or isn't this what you say?
Yes, it is, he said. (166e - I67A.
)
Socrates' questions not only nark a sharp change in the dramatic
structure and philosophical direction of the dialogue, they also
introduce a novel analysis of sophrosyne that is not to be found in
the writings of Plato's predecessors. Although the conception of
sophrosyne developed here is attributed to Critias, it is doubtful
that it had its origins with persons other than Plato and Socrates.
The personal and political importance of recognizing what we and
others do and do not know is one of the most important and original
themes of the early dialogues, and it is natural that Plato should
desire to find its epistemological foundations. Since the entire
rest of the philosophical discussion is devoted to examining knowledge
of knowledge, the concept must have had a strong attraction for Plato
and seemed to him to be of considerable importance. Consequently, the
place where Socrates begins his examination of knowledge of knowledge
is a suitable place to begin my discussion of the Charmides .
Socrates' examination may be divided into three parts. From I67B
to 169A he argues that knowledge of knowledge is not possible. From
170A to 171C he argues that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge
will not have the abilities claimed for him by Critias at 167A.
Socrates then argues that even if knowledge of knowledge existed and
had a full range of epistemological powers, including the ones he
has argued it does not have? it will still be unable to bring about the
7U
ideal state. Section 1 of this chapter is devoted to the first part
of Socrates' examination, Sections 3 and 4 to the second part, and
Sections 5 and 6 to the third part. Section 2 discusses the passage
at 169D-E, where Critias claims that the possessor of knowledge of
knowledge will know himself.
One salient difference between my treatment of the Charmides and
those that are to be found in the secondary literature on the dialogue
is that I have made extensive use of the techniques of formal logic.
This approach has a number of advantages over exclusive reliance on
traditional methods of interpretation. The first is that it consider-
ably facilitates discussion of the often debated topic of the validity
of Plato's arguments. Since it is one of my major theses that Plato's
arguments are valid, I am able to support my position by actually
presenting valid formal arguments whose conclusions are claims Socrates
asserts and whose premises are statements for which there is evidence
to believe that Plato accepted. This provides a strong rejoinder to
those commentators who have claimed that some of Plato's arguments in
this passage are fallacious.
1
Secondly, this approach lacks a good
deal of the ambiguity that most interpretaions of Plato suffer from.
When a commentator describes one of Plato's arguments in a few senten-
ces of a natural language, there are usually at least a half dozen
distinct formal reconstructions of the argument that are roughly
compatible with that description. When a commentator briefly describes
each member of a set of arguments, and then makes general claims about
that set of arguments, the task of carefully examining his interpre-
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tation of Plato becomes an elaborate enterprise in its own right. The
precision that is engendered by the techniques of formal logic is also
advantageous because it facilitates critical evaluation of the
interpretation I present. There is one passage that I know of where
my interpretation does not quite match up with what the text says
(170B11), and it sticks out like a sore thumb. The subtlety of the
difficulty is such that I probably would not have noticed it if I
had used an informal approach. Since my fomal reconstruction of each
step of Socrates' reasoning from 1?0A to 171C requires that I give a
complete representation of the premises employed and their relationships
to the claims Socrates asserts# the reader is readily able to evaluate
the extent to which my interpretation of the arguments is successful.
Finally, the techniques of formal logic considerably assist my
exposition and justification of my position on Plato's method and
purpose in the second half of the Charmides . I claim that he is
rationally examining the idea that knowledge of knowledge is a kind of
knowledge that will enable its possessor to properly order the state.
In the secondary literature on the Charmides there are numerous general
claims about the dialogue, but except for John Gould, whose views I
shall examine in the next chapter, no author makes a serious attempt
to show how his general thesis enables one to have a detailed and
comprehensive understanding of the dialogue. In Sections 3 end 4 of
this chapter I argue that each of Socrates' claims about the
epistemological power of knowledge of knowledge are consequences of a
certain way of thinking about knowledge. I am able to justify this claim
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by giving formal proofs to show how his claims follow from general
principles that articulate this way of thinking about knowledge.
I am able to provide an interpretation of the philosophical aspects
of this passage, 170A - 1?0C, and its proceeding and succeeding
passages, by attributing to Plato a collection of motives and philo-
sophical beliefs. Thus this chapter constitutes an explanation of
the material it discusses. It is unfortunately not a complete
explanation. A theory about a dialogue of Plato's would be complete
if it answered every good question a student of Plato's thought might
ask about the dialogue. Even within the limited aspects of the
Charmides I seek to explain, it will be evident to the reader that I
have not provided answers to many important questions. In a sense
this is a fortunate consequence of the methods I employ* it enables
one to have a clearer apprehension of the shortcomings of my inter-
pretation and the features of Plato's thought that stand in need of
explanation.
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Section 1: I67B ~ 169A
Charmides 16?B - I69A has been given a curious sort of treatment
in the literature: it has not been seen as having an important and
integral function in the dialogue. When it has not been virtually
ignored, the passage is treated as a joke, as irrelevant to the
purposes of the dialogue, as a tedious and pointless exercise in
analogy, and as being based upon a logical mistake or philosophical
2
misconception of Socrates. But given Plato's dramatic and philosophical
genius, we must initially regard these claims with a good deal of
skepticism. The passage ought to be approached with the presumption
that Plato believed that important philosophical issues are under
discussion, and that these issues have an essential relevance to the
dialogue as a whole.
There are a number of good reasons for accepting this presumption.
The passage is a sustained, detailed, and lengthy argument for a single
conclusion. The argument is put forward by Socrates, and the argument
is referred to several times at the end of the dialogue (172C, 175B)«
Plato very carefully tells the reader what the passage tries to show:
that it is doubtful that knowledge of knowledge is possible. With
equal care, he points out that while the passage has not proven that
knowledge of knowledge is impossible, serious problems have been
raised and we are not justified in assuming that it is possible. I
suggest that this carefulness indicates that Plato was seriously
concerned with the issues under discussion in the passage. Finally,
the issue being considered, the possibility of knowledge of knowledge,
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is immensely important for Plato. Knowledge of knowledge is
required for the ideal of moral knowledge he is trying to find in
the Charmides . The Guardians of the Republic use their knowledge of
the knowledge of non-philosophers to order the state. In the Apology
Socrates says that he is unique among the citizens of Athens because
he knows the limits of his own knowledge. Moreover, in the Charmides
,
Socrates is using his own moral knowledge to care for the soul of
Charmides. Just as the doctor cares for the body because that is
the thing in which the qualities of health and disease inhere, the man
with moral knowledge cares for the soul because it is the thing that
is just or unjust, courageous or cowardly. Given Socrates' doctrine
that virtue is knowledge, the possibility of the moral education of
one person by another is a special case of the possibility of knowledge
of knowledge. Thus, the claim that Socrates tries to refute, that
knowledge of knowledge is possible, bears upon philosophical issues
3
that are important for Plato.
In the first part of this section I shall present three different
ways of reconstructing Socrates' general argument strategy at 16?B -
169A. I should emphasize that I am not trying to set forth Socrates'
actual argument or even his actual argument strategy. I only wish to
show that each general way of interpreting the argument is such it
does not convincingly prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.
I also wish to show that Socrates does present grounds which support
that conclusion, hence he is justified in concluding that it is doubtful
that knowledge of knowledge exists. In the latter part of this section
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I shall argue that Plato had certain theoretical and factual beliefs
in virtue of which it was both natural and reasonable for him to
accept those premises which support the conclusion that knowledge
of knowledge is impossible,
Socrates* examination of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge
begins at 167B11.
1vell» Socrates said* wouldn’t the whole thing amount to
this, if what you said just now is true, that there is
one knowledge which is not of anything except itself and
the other knowledges and that this same knowledge is also
a knowledge of the absence of knowledge,
Yes, indeed, Critias said ,
Then see what an odd thing we are attempting to say, my
friend - because if you look for this same thing in other
cases, you will find, I think, that it is impossible [iSuvjs.To'V
£tV(*0
Socrates* subsequent argument will be clarified if different
senses of *<*3uv*tos ' are distinguished at the outset. One sense
corresponds roughly to our notion of conceptual impossibility, as
including and being broader than mathematical impossibility. Just as
we would argue that there cannot be a greatest number or a location
that is north of itself, Plato argues that there cannot be a greater
(and gives similar arguments for the relations of double, more,
heavier, and older) which is greater than itself and all great things.
This sort of impossibility is termed “absolutely impossible" (<a8uv*t*
77*vVT*77jm I68E ). In this sense of impossibility, Socrates is
unable to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. However
,
he suggests that someone other than himself may be able to decide if
knowledge of knowledge is possible or not. This decision would
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apparently be based upon considerations about a kind of possibility
that is distinct from the one I have termed "conceptual impossibility."
You observe then, Critias, that of the cases we have gone
through, some appear to us to be absolutely impossible,
whereas in others it is very doubtful if they could ever
apply their own faculties to themselves? And that magnitude
and number and similar things belong to the absolutely
impossible group, isn't that so?
Certainly.
But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further .
cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself -
all cases like this also produce disbelief in some, though
perhaps there are some in whom it does not. What we need,
my friend, is some great man to give an adequate interpre-
tation of this point in every detail, whether no existing
thing can by nature apply its own facility to itself but
only towards something else, or whether some can, but
others cannot. We also need him to determine whether, if
there are things that apply to themselves, the knowledge
which we call temperance is among them. (168&-169A)
In addition to the things that are absolutely impossible, Socrates
apparently rejects the possibility of reflexive loves, fears, desires,
wishes, and opinions, and strongly doubts the possibility of a reflexive
hearing, vision, motion, or heat. Whether or not he is using the same
or different senses of "possibility" in each case seems to be an
undecidable question. I shall assume that in these cases Socrates is
using "impossibility" in a vague sense that is distinct from the sense
I have termed "conceptual impossibility."
Symbolically formulated, when Socrates doubts that there is any-
thing similar to knowledge of knowledge, he doubts that anything
satisfies this sentence:
(ER) (Ex)^(Eb) (kxz) & (y)C(Ew)(kyw)>hxy] &(u) ([ (tt ) (hut) & u /x] >
81
Is there a thing which is R, bears R to everything that is R,
and does not bear R to anything that the other things that are R bear
R to? 5 "And would you say that there was a love of such a sort as
to be a love of no fine thing but of itself and the other loves?" (167E)
Is there a knowledge which knows itself and the other knowledges and
does not know what those knowledges know? (Socrates follows that part
of the definition of temperance which says that it is knowledge of
the absence of knowledge in the first two cases, mentioning a vision
of the lack of vision and a hearing of the lack of hearing, and then
drops it. This condition does not figure importantly in this passage,
and I shall omit discussion of it. It represents one of several
arguments that Socrates does not give, which, if one accepts arguments
by analogy, he could present to show that knowledge of knowledge is a
strange thing. How could one hear deafness, or be taller than the
absence of tallness?) Socrates' doubt of this principle is evident from
the fact that he considers, and has Critias reject, the existence of a
wide variety of things that might exemplify it.
There are three different ways in which Socrates' argument may be
reconstructed t as a deductive argument, an inductive argument, or an
argument by analogy. For purposes of simplicity, 1 shall say that
anything that satisfies the sentence Socrates doubts has property P. The
presentation of these argument strategies has been further simplified by
eliminating the modal terms "possible" and "impossible." The conclusion
I represent Socrates as arguing for is stronger than the conclusion he
asserts at the end of the passage. I do this because Socrates is
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considering the stronger claim in the course of his argument (cf.
168A10-13) and then concludes by saying that it is doubtful that
knowledge of knowledge exists. I interpret the dramatic structure of
the passage to be an attempt to establish the stronger claim, and the
conclusion to be an assertion of the weaker claim that has actually
been established.
The argument by analogy is
A. la) A wide variety of things do not have property P.
2a) Knowledge of knowledge is like these things.
3a) knew!edge of knowledge does not have property P.
Aside from the fact that this is an argu ment by analogy, Socrates does
not really prove the first premise. For some of the things they
consider, he does not prove or even flatly assert that they lack the
property, but only says that it is doubtful that they have it. Conse-
quently, this is a very weak argument. The argument by induction is
B. lb) A wide variety of things were examined and none of
them had property P.
2b) Knowledge of knowledge does not have property P.
Here again the premise itself has not been firmly established, and does
not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. A reasonable inference from
lb) is 3b) : it is probable that knowledge of knowledge does not have
property P. This is the conclusion Socrates ultimately asserts, and
it is supported by his premises.
Finally, the argument may be reconstructed as a deductive argument
»
C. lc) For any general'
7
property Q, if one kind of thing
has property Q, then there will be other kinds of
things that have property Q.
2c) It is not the case that any kind of thing other than
knowledge of knowledge has general property P.
3c) It is not the case that knowledge of knowledge has P
.
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This argument is valid, but both of the premises are doubtful. As
with the corresponding premise in the other arguments, 2c) has not
been firmly established, lc) has two sorts of weaknesses. From a
dramatic standpoint, Critias has claimed earlier (I65E, 166B-C)
that knowledge of knowledge has the unique general property of being
related to itself. Secondly, to use some prosaic language, it is not
obvious that there cannot be things that operate according to laws of
their own. The sun, as a heat that burns itself, and the soul, as a
thing that moves itself, might seem to Athenian readers of the dialogue
to bo plausible candidates for entities with unique powers.
The weaknesses in each of the three general argument strategies
I have presented reflect legitimate doubts one might have about Socrates'
argument in this passage. Presumably, Plato was aware of at least some
of these problems, and consequently he has Socrates deny that the
conclusion has been proven. Nevertheless, Plato must have thought
that it was natural and rational to doubt the possibility of knowledge
of knowledge. The strength of the arguments I have presented is due
to the fact that knowledge of knowledge does bear important similar-
ities to the things it is compared to, and Plato felt that he had good
reasons for rejecting the possibility of these other things.
Instantiated to the cases Socrates refers to as absolutely
impossible; the principle he doubts produces the absurdities that there
are things which are greater than themselves, double themselves, more
than themselves, heavier than themselves, and older than themselves.
8U
The correlative absurdities Socrates draws, "if it were actually
greater than itself, it would also be loss than itself," follow from
obviously true principles liket
(x)(y) if x is greater than y, then y is less than x.
Outright contradictions, not drawn by Socrates, follow from equally
obvious principles}
(x)(y) if x is greater than y, then it is not the case
that y is greater than x.
The important similarity that these relations bear to knowledge of
knowledge is that they have a dynamis in virtue of which they are
of something,
Socrates i Come on then: is this knowledge a knowledge of
something and does it have a certain faculty of being 'of
something'
?
Critias: Yes, it does.
And do we say the greater has a certain faculty of being
greater than something?
Yes, it has. (168b)
Socrates' arguments about the faculties he terms "absolutely impossible"
seem convincing to modem readers. His rejection of the possibility of
another class of faculties seems quite puzzling. He and Critias have
this exchange about psychological faculties:
And do you think that there is any desire that is a
desire for no pleasure but for itself and the other desires?
Certainly not.
Nor indeed any wish, I think, that wished for no good but
only for itself and the other wishes.
No, that would follow.
And would you say there was a love of such a sort as to be
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a love of no fin© thing but of itself and the other
loves?
No, he said, I would not.
And have you ever observed a fear that fears itself and
the other fears, but of frightful things fears not a one?
I have never observed such a thing, he said.
Or an opinion that is of itself and other opinions but
opines nothing that others opinions do?
Never. (16?E-168A)
To us at least, a discussion of these faculties seems to require a
more detailed treatment than Plato presents. It seems not only possible,
but occasionally actual, that someone could desire desires, wish for
wishes, love loves, fear fears, and have opinions about opinions. A
claim that it is impossible for someone to desire all desires surely
cannot be rejected or accepted without sane serious deliberation. However,
Plato makes his claims as if they were immediately obvious.
Except for case of opinion, which I do not have an explanation for,
I suggest that these claims do seem obviously true to Plato because
he had a different conception of psychological attitudes than we do.
I believe that Plato accepts at face value claims implicit in Socrates*
statements t
a) Every desire is a desire for some pleasure
b) Every wish is a wish for some good
c) Every love is a love for a fine thing (Cpio* )
Q
d) Every fear is a fear of a frightful thing.
Using the concepts and terminology Socrates introduces at 168B and
168D, the above statements can be seen as consequences of these psycho-
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logical principles}
a
1
) The faculty of desire is directed towards the quality of pleasure
b1 ) The faculty of wish is directed towards the quality of goodness
c
1
) The faculty of love is directed towards the quality of beauty
<3}) The faculty of fear is directed towards the quality of fright-
fulness.
My claim is that Plato believed that being directed towards these
particular qualities is an essential or defining characteristic of
these psychological attitudes. I shall use a vague term and describe
these principles as "conceptual presuppositions."
If they are conceptual presuppositions, then it is clear why
Critias readily denies the existence of a wish that wishes no good,
but only itself and the other wishes. If wishing is always widiing
for a good, then there cannot be a wish which does not wish for a good.
However, we now come to a further problem: Why cannot wishes be good,
desires pleasurable, love beautiful , and fear frightful? It surely
is not obvious that a love which loves all loves does not have as the
object of its love, only things that are beautiful. On my interpre-
tation of the argument, Socrates surely needs the premise that love
is not a beautiful thing. There is an extremely good reason for
attributing this presupposition to him} he holds it in the Symposium :
"desire and love have for their objects things or
qualities which a man does not at present possess but
which he lacks” (200E)
If the object of love is beauty, then a love which loved itself would
have to have beauty. But according to the Symposium , love must lack
the thing it loves. (It should be noted that this is presented as a
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conceptual truth. It develops from the passage in which love is said
to be love of something in the way that father is father of something.)
If Plato held a theory like this when he wrote the Charmides
,
then it is conceptually obvious that there cannot be a love which
loves itself and the other loves. But since Agathon requires an
argument to be convinced of one of the premises for this claim, why
doesn't Plato give a more detailed explanation in the Charmides ? The
reason for this is probably that it would involve too great a digression
in an already complicated dialogue.
This explains why Plato rejects the existence of the first four
psychological faculties. More importantly, it provides further
explanation for why Plato believed reflexive psychological relations
to be problematic. The Symposium passage suggests that at 167E Plato
is dealing with problems that were extremely important for him. He
believes in the cases of desire, love, and surely wish also, that the
principle at l68D,
the very thing which has its own faculty applied to
itself will have to have that nature towards which the
faculty was directed.
simply does not hold. Plato may well hold a similar view about fear.
The analysis of the desire for health at Symposium 200 can be used as
a model for an analysis of a man* s fear of disease. The man who is
diseased might be said to fear disease only in the sense that he fears
his continued possession of it in the future or that he fears a future
consequence of his having disease now. The man who does directly fear
disease is the healthy man who lacks it. Consequently, if we only fear
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things that we do not now possess, and a fear of fear must have the
quality towards which fear is directed, there cannot be a fear of fear.
Convincing evidence that Plato accepted just such an analysis at the
time he wrote the Chawnides is at Laches 198B-C:
...fear is the expectation of a future evil-or isn't
this your opinion too, Laches?
Very much so, Socrates.
You hear what we have to say, Niciass that fearful things
are future evils, and the ones inspiring hope are either
future non-evils or future goods.
Here it is clear that we can only fear things that we do not possess.
The exchange about opinion is a passage that I do not know how to
interpret. A principal difficulty is that in this case, unlike any of
the others, Plato does not say what thing ordinary opinion is directed
towards. A variety of speculative interpretations are possible if one
considers different ways of employing different interpretations of Plato's
views on opinion and its relation to knowledge in the Meno and the
Republic . Since developing such specu lations here would be lengthy,
complicated, and not directly relevant to my purposes, I shall forego a
discussion of different ways in which the passage might be interpreted.
Socrates considers perceptual relations in two passages. The first
is at 167C-D:
...Consider, for instance, if you think there could be a
kind of vision that is not the vision of the things that
the other visions are but is the vision of itself and the
other visions and also of the lack of visions, and although
it is a type of vision, it sees no color, only itself and the
other visions. Do you think there is something of this kind?
Good heavens, no, not I.
And what about a kind of hearing that hears no sound but
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hears itself* and the other hearings and non—hearings?
Not this either.
Then take all the senses together and consider if you
think there is a sense of the senses and of itself but
that senses nothing which the other senses sense.
I can’t see that there is.
At 168D Socrates states the principle
...The very thing which has its own faculty applied
to itself will have to have that nature towards which
the faculty was directed. .
.
and goes on to argue
...in the case of hearing don't w© say that hearing
is of nothing else than sound?
Yes.
Then, if it actually hears itself, it will hear the sound
which it possesses in itself? Because otherwise it
would not do any hearing.
Necessarily so.
And vision, I take it, 0 best of men, if it actually sees
itself, will have to have some color? Because vision
could certainly never see anything that has no color.
The point of the last two arguments is clear: Socrates believes
that it is absurd to believe that a vision could have a color or a
hearing could produce a sound. (Socrates does not mention another
consequence of the same argument: if hearing of hearing is hear the
other hearings, then they too will have to have a sound.) I believe
that in the first two arguments Socrates is relying on presuppositions
stated in the last two arguments: Vision can only be of a color and
hearing can only be of a sound. Hence there cannot be a vision that
sees no color or a hearing that hears no sound. These two arguments
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draw an absurdity from the third condition of the principle Socrates
doubts! (HO (Ex) {(K*) (to*,) & (y)[(Ew)(ttyv)3Kj,yJ & („) -'[(EtHxtut) &
u ^ x]3 (»)(*iuv3-nxv)j , .
and the second pair of arguments draw an absurdity from the second
condition.
Unless he is merely claiming that we do not have any reason for
supposing there there is a special faculty of perception that senses
the other senses, I do not see why Socrates immediately rejects the
possibility of a sense of the senses. The soul would seem to be a
good candidate for such an entity; it might sense itself, sense each
of the senses, not itself sense what they sense, and sense that one or
more of the senses was not functioning."^
I have little to say about the last two reflexive faculties Plato
considers*
... or in the further cases of motion moving itself and heat
burning itself—all cases like this also produce disbelief
in some, though perhaps there are some in whom it does
not. (168E)
I conjectured earlier that the self-moving motion was the soul and
the heat that burns itself was the sun.^ The second is only a guess,
but the first has seme plausibility, due to Plato's later views and
the fact that the Charmides is explicitly concerned with the well-being
of Charmides' soul.
I have argued that Plato believed that he had good reasons for
rejecting the existence of many of the reflexive faculties considered
at 167B - 169A. Since the claims that these faculties do not exist
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inductively and analogically support the claim that it is doubtful
that knowledge of knowledge exists, Plato's argument is valid. In
the next section I shall discuss Critias* argument that the possessor
of knowledge of knowledge will know himself, and in succeeding sections
discuss Socrates' examination of the benefits of knowledge of knowledge.
Section 2: 169 D-E, Does Knowledge of
Knowledge Imply Self-Knowledge?
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The most important passage of the Charmidos
, 169D-172A, considers
whether or not a particular kind of benefit is to be derived by
the possession of knowledge of knowledge. This benefit is first
described by Socrates at 168Aj
Then only the temperate man will know himself and
will be able to examine what he knows and does not
know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect
other people to see when a man does in fact know what
he knows and thinks he knows, and no one else will be
able to do this. And being temperate and temperance
and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what
one knows and does not know.
170A - 171C is strictly a consideration of whether or not the abilities
mentioned by Socrates will in fact be had by the possessor of knowledge
of knowledge. Assessing the extent to which these abilities actually
are beneficial is a distinct problem taken up in subsequent passages
of the dialogue.
In the passage quoted above Socrates gets Critias to agree that
the temperate man, (defined as the man with the knowledge that knows
itself, the other knowledges, and the absence of knowledge), and only
the temperate man, will t
1. Know himself (167A1)
2. Be able to examine what he knows and does not know
(167A2) and determine what he knows and does not
know (I67A8)
3. Be able to examine other people and determine, of the
things that they think they know, whether or not they
know them. (167A3-6)
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In the passage to bo discussed in this section, I69D-E, Socrates
apparently accepts the first claim. The following two sections of
this chapter will consider Socrates' refutations of the second claim
at 170A-D and the third claim at 170E-171C.
Following the inconclusive discussion about the possibility of
knowledge of knowledge at 167B-169A, Socrates advances the discussion
by assuming that this kind of knowledge is possible, and asks how
is it any more possible to know what one knows and
does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing
oneself and being temperate consisted in this?
169E Yes indeed, Critias] said, and your conclusion seems
to me to follow, Socrates, because if a man has a
knowledge which knows itself, he would be the very
same sort of man as the knowledge which he has.
For instance, whenever a person has speed he is
swift, and when he has beauty he is beautiful, and
when he has knowledge he is knowing. So when a
person has a knowledge which knows itself, then I
imagine he will be a person who knows himself.
It is not this point, Socrates said, on which I
am confused, that whenever someone possesses this
thing which knows itself he will know himself, but
how the person possessing it will necessarily know
what he knows and what he does not know.
The problem Socrates raises is the subject of the subsequent
argument. I want to here consider the argument by which Critias
infers that the person who has the knowledge which knows itself will
know himself and discusses why Socrates apparently accepts this
inference. I think it would be a mistake to spend a great deal of
time trying to articulate the logical structure of Critias' argument.
The traditional interpretation, which I substantially subscribe to, is
12
that Plato portrays Critias as a dilettante at sophistry. As the
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dramatic incidents of the dialogue amply danonstrate, his primary concern
is not to find out the truth about virtue, but to maintain his reputa-
tion as a man with intellectual talents. He surely does not have the
verbal or intellectual abilities had by Prodicus, Gorgias, Protagoras,
Euthydamus, and Dionysidorus. Critias' two lengthy and confusing
speeches at I63B-C and 164C-165B, and the confidence with which he
puts forth unexamined statements, are intended to contrast with the
careful step by step inquiry of Socrates. I do not suggest that we should
not examine carefully what Critias says, but I do claim that we should
not expect his assertions to have an underlying theoretical coherence
of the sort that I have attributed to Socrates' questions and statements.
Consequently I shall give a brief description of Critias' argument in which
I accuse him of committing an obvious fallacy. (In a note I have sketched
out some of the problems involved in interpreting his argument. ) I shall
not present an explanation of what he means by his premises or his conclu-
sion, since the dialogue repeatedly and explicitly shows that he does not
know the meaning of his own assertions.
Critias claims that a person who has the knowledge which knows
itself will be a person who knows himself. He relies upon a general
13
principle which sanctions the unobjectable inferences that a person
who has speed is swift, a person who has beauty is beautiful, and a
person who has knowledge is knowing. 1 suspect that Critias would
agree that a person who has the knowledge which knows health will be
in the position of knowing health. If this is the appropriate model
for his argument, then he can legitimately infer that a person who has
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the knowledge which knows itself will be in a position of knowing a
knowledge that knows itself* Since there does not seem to be anything
in the general principle, whatever it is, or in the expression
"knowledge which knows itself" about knowledge of oneself, Critias can-
not validly infer that the individual with the knowledge that knows
itself, will know himself. Indeed, it is hard to see what would lead
him to even try to draw such an inference. Perhaps he understood the
inference as something like this: A man with the self-knowing knowledge
will know himself. "Self-knowing knowledge" is an alternative way of
experssing "knowledge which knows itself" and, with a different meaning,
"self-knowledge," On this interpretation, the argument is a slippery
equivocation worthy of Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. Perhaps Critias is
being portrayed as someone who is unsuccessfully attempting to emulate
the sort of sophistry displayed in the Euthydemus . At 163D there is
the suggestion that he has unsuccessfully tried to imitate Prodicus.
After Critias' argument, Socrates says:
It is not this point, I said, on which I am confused,
that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows
itself he will know himself, (l69fi).
Strictly speaking, this does not even entail that Socrates accepts
Critias' conclusion. Someone will not be confused about a principle when
they see that it is false and know why it is false. However, the con-
text suggests that Socrates does accept Critias* conclusion without
questioning it. The purpose of his remark, that he is not confused,
is to enable him to avoid examining the conclusion and the argument in
favor of it so that he may deal with the issue he is interested in:
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whether or not the possessor of knowledge of knowledge will know
what he knows and what he does not know,"'’ The dramatic effect of
the statement is that it teases the reader. Critias* conclusion is
hardly self-evident, and it is perplexing that Socrates should readily
assent to it. At no place in the Charmides or any other dialogue is
there a detailed discussion of self-knowledge. Consequently, it is
impossible to determine with certainty what Plato thought self-
knowledge was when he wrote the Charmides . My own view is that
Plato did not have a theoretical understanding of self-knowledge at
this period of his life. Since the direct evidence on which to base
a judgement about Critias* inference is meager, I shall forego a
discussion of it. However, I do want to note that there is a reasonable
prima facie ground for doubting that Plato accepted the view that
knowledge of knowledge implies self-knowledge. There is surely more to
a person (or even to his soul; if Plato accepted the view of the author
of Alcibiades Minor , that a person is identical with his soul, then
self-knowledge would be knowledge of the soul,) than his knowledge or
ignorance, and knowledge of knowledge will not enable him to know those
things. It is of course possible to argue that Socrates is using the
experssion "know himself" in a weak way in this passage; so that it
means only that the knower of knowledge will have some knowledge of
himself. On such a reading, the inference is legitimate. As I shall
argue later, the person who has knowledge of knowledge may know that
he has that kind of knowledge, and he will know that he has or lacks
other kinds of knowledge (though he will not know what kinds of knowledge
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they are) . But. given that, self-knowledge has been introduced by
reference to the inscription at Delphi, it is Implausible to assume
that it should be given such a limited interpretation in this passage.
Thomas Rosenmeyer has argued that Plato accepted as valid
Critias" inference that the man who has the knowledge which knows
17itself will know himself. Rosenmeyer says
The suggestion to be advanced here is as follows i the
convertibility of y^uKr^ itwrouand -yvvvt.'S
£wUTr)£ shows that -yvCms
,
or better, as Socrates
puts it, ro yiyv^TKi-'V
, is not only the abstractly
conceived activity of knowing, but the totality of all
knowing, or rather the totality of all knowers-having-
knowledge. . . . in the present passage of the Charmides ,
Plato does not, whatever the reason, distinguish
sharply between the sum total of all conceivable
knowers-having-knowledge ("collective") and the act
of all knowers as distinct from their persons
("abstraction"). (P. 91)
Rosenmeyer argues that in Greek a certain class of terras, a subset
of mass words called "nexus-substantives," are multiply referential
in that they may signify one or more of the following i an abstract
entity or quality, a thing having this quality, the class of things
having this quality, and the members of the class of things having
the quality. (P. 43) He says
The area of reality signified by the mass-word is
larger and more comprehensive than modern meticu-
lousness would allow; it embraces both class and
member, both entity and group, both thing and mass,
both concrete act and abstraction. Hence knowledge
in the Charmides is both an act of knowledge and know-
ledge in the abstract, it is both the thing known and
the class of all knowers. (P. 94)
Rosenmeyer does not explicitly show how the multiply referential
character of the terms for knowledge explains why Plato accepted
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Critias' inference, but his remarks indicate how this may be done.
When Critias says that a man has knowledge of knowledge, he means at
least the following? the man has the abstract quality knowledge of
knowledge, the man knows the abstract quality knowledge, the man knows
the class of all knowers, and the man knows the members of the class
of all knowers. The last clause is the important ones since the
man is a member of the class of all knowers, he will know himself.
If Rosenmeyer' s views on the semantics of Greek are correct, there is
a sense of knowing oneself in which the inference is valid. I shall
not discuss his views on Greek* I wish only to point out that the sense
of self-knowledge Rosenmeyer proposes is similar to the weak interpre-
tation I have discussed above, and requires that we attribute a falla-
cious argument to Critias.
When Critias says that the definition of sophrosyne is the in-
scription at Delphi, the natural response is to assume that he means
self-knowledge in some deep and profound sense. Consequently, when
Critias claims that the man who has knowledge of knowledge knows
himself, he seems to be inferring that the man has some deep and pro-
found knowledge of himself. It is natural to suppose that he is doing
this, and such an inference is as fallacious on Rosenmoyer's views as
it is on my own. Since the man knows himself because he knows the
members of the class of knowers, the knowledge he has of himself in
virtue of this fact is presumably no greater than his knowledge of
other knowers. Rosenmeyer does net say what this knowledge amounts to,
and it is difficult to formulate a plausible account of what it might bo.
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If wo say that all knowers are such that tho man who has knowledge of
knowledge knows that they are knowers. we must assume that the man is
personally acquainted with every knewer in the world. Perhaps the
man's relation te the members of the class of knowers is that he can
recognize that they have knowledge if he becomes acquainted with them.
Since he is acquainted with himself, he recognizes that he has know-
18ledge. This is surely not the sort of self-knowledge referred to
by the Delphic inscription, and consequently requires that we attribute
a fallacious argument to Critias.
On the interpretation I have offered, Critias* claim that Sophrosyne
is the only knowledge which is both of the other knowledges and of
itself (l66c) is a shift from his position that it is self-knowledge
(164D). Robert Wellman has argued that the two positions are the same:
knowing oneself is one with knowing itself since 'oneself'
and 'itself' refer to knowing rather than a substantive
entity on the one hand and a body of knowledge or science
on the other. The object of knowing is identical in both
cases i the act of knowing, (p. Ill, "The Question Posed
at Charmides l65A-l66cM )
It seems to me that the principle difficulty with this view is
its claim that knowing oneself is knowing an act of knowing. Wellman* s
argument for this claim is dubious, and the position itself is open to
a serious objection. His argument consists of two premises, both of
which are plausible but do not imply his conclusion. Wellman says
the problem of searching for a suitable definition of
sophrosyne clearly becomes a question of the possibility
of knowing the mind in certain of its functional aspects.
(p. 110) ...Socrates conceived of the soul primarily as
a principle of intellectual and moral activity, (p. Ill)
These remarks suggest the plausible view that sophrosyne involves
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knowing some of the functional activities of the soul. But if we
accept this line of thought, knowing oneself would seed to be knowing
all of the functional activities of one's own soul, and the know-
ledge that is of itself and the other knowledges seems to be knowing
the knowing activities of the souls of all knowers. Even if know1-
ledge of activities can be reduced to knowledge of acts, there does
not seem to be much overlap between the two kinds of knowledge, let
alone an identity. Self-knowledge implies knowledge of activities
related to one's own opinions, emotions, and appetites; and knowledge
of knowledge implies knowing the knowing activities of other people.
Wellman's view does permit us to say that the 'oneself' and 'itself'
in knowing oneself and knowing itself refer to the same sorts of
things (acts or activities) but it does not show that they refer to the
same thing.
Secondly, for Socrates self-knowledge surely involves knowledge
of one* s own ignorance. Hence, part of what is referred to by the
'oneself* in 'knowing oneself' is ignorance. Since ignorance is not
itself an act of knowing, the objects of self-knowledge must include
things that are not acts of knowing.
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Section 3 * 170A-D
At 170A-D Socrates presents a refutation of Critias' claim that
the possession of knowledge of knowledge entails that one knows what
one knows and what one does not know. In this argument Socrates
makes a number of claims and inferences which are not justified
solely on the basis of premises he and Critias have agreed upon.
However, I shall argue that Socrates' arguments are valid, provided
certain enthymematic premises are adjoined to the premises mentioned
19in the text. These additional premises are, or are directly based
upon, the theoretical principles about the nature of knowledge that I
attributed to Plato in Chapter IV. 170A-D begins with this exchanges
Socrates: Supposing that there is a knowledge of
knowledge, will it be anything more than the ability
to divide things and say that one is knowledge and the
other is not?
Critias: No, it amounts to this. (170A7-A10)
The interpretation of the second half of the Charmides is
complicated by the fact that Socrates sometimes speaks of the different
kinds of knowledge and of other faculties as if they existed by them-
selves, and sometimes as they exist when they are possessed by persons.
In the passage quoted above he speaks of the abilities of knowledge of
knowledge, while his argument concerns the abilities of a person who
possesses knowledge of knowledge. Consequently, I shall lormulate
Socrates' statement as it applies to a person's possession of knowledge
of knowledge. I interpret the statement to mean:
If the temperate man examines a person, then if the
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person has knowledge the temperate man will know
he has knowledge, and if the person lacks
knowledge, then the temperate man will know the
person lacks knowledge.
Symbolically formulated, the claim is
This claim is a consequence of a general principle about knowledge
knowledge of knowledge, and the object of knowledge of knowledge is
knowledge (A proof is on page 111
. ) The interpretation I offer does
not include a condition that is suggested by the text: knowledge of
knowledge is only the ability to divide things and say that one is
knowledge and the other is not. It is clear that this restriction does
not apply to persons who have knowledge, since there is overwhelming
evidence that they also have productive and verbal abilities. It may
be that Plato thought that all of the abilities had by a knower are
in some way explainable solely by the fact that his faculty of knowledge
enables him to make distinctions about the objects of that faculty. This
is an extremely interesting question. Unfortunately, I do not see
how such an explanation might be constructed nor have I found any
evidence that Plato believed that an explanation of this sort might
be given. Consequently I have not offered any hypothesis to explain
the relationship between the primitive ability to make distinctions
and the other abilities Plato attributes to those who know.
that I have attributed to Plato:
on
and the assumption that the temperate man is a person^ who has
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Socrates' next statement (170A11-B3) raises two problems for
an interpretation of this passage. The first is that there are two
uexts for his statement. In Burnet's text the words for
knowledge are in the dative:
TUvrbv ouv t^rrtv itr/vTrj/^fl T£ **( uyc^voO,
' ’ » s
, /km CTtcvt tz K*i *$j£TnrT^/L\arv\!>\ Bckiuouj
Sprague translates this as:
"And is it the same thing as the science and absence
of science of health# and as the science and absence
of science of justice?"
The text of Schanz (in the Loeb edition) has the words for knowledge
in the nominative:
T'yi/TPV o u v £7T l V> Tt KM ^A/C7fljrT^j^A OV 1*1
imvT>jjur] ri K*t wcn(rT*j/AC><rv-v*} kmow j
uy (i(V0U,
Lamb translates this as:
"Now, is science or lack of science of health the same
as science or lack of science of justice?"
Burnet's text seems to be closer to the sense of the passage, since
Socrates' next statement indicates that he has intended to distinguish
knowledge of knowledge from medicine and politics. However, we are
left with perplexing definitions of medicine and politics.
Medicine is the knowledge and absence of knowledge of
health.
Politics is the knowledge and absence of knowledge of
justice.
Since Plato usually says things like
Medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges by
virtue of its definition as knowledge of health of
disease (171A).
it is surprising that he does not here use an expression like "know-
lOli
ledge of the presence and absence of health."
One plausible interpretation is to say that Plato is saying
that medicine and politics are imperfect sciences* doctors have
knowledge of some areas of health but not others. We would be
inclined to view this as true, but it is surely perplexing to suggest
that Plato thought that the knowledge which was knowledge of justice
does not have complete knowledge of justice. ("For there is no defect
or error at all that dwells in any art." Republic 342B) In any
event, Socrates' main point is clear; knowledge of knowledge is distinct
from the knowledges that know health and justice. Symbolically
formulated, his claim is
(Ex) (Kx & hQx & & (Ey)(Ky & jOy & y^kk)
On page 112 is a proof that the first conjunct of this claim follows
from the general principles that each kind of knowledge has one and
only one object and the premises that some kind of knowledge has health
as its object and health is distinct from knowledge. (The proof of
the second conjunct parallels that of the first.
)
Socrates next identifies the kinds of knowledge he has distinguish-
ed from knowledge of knowledge as medicine and politics*
One is medicine, I think, and the other politics, but
we are concerned with knowledge pure and simple.
(170B4-5)
These claims follow from the previous one by means of premises to
the effect that whatever knows health is medicine and whatever knows
justice is politics. ( (x)[(Kx & hOx)^ x - m] and (y)[(Ky & jOy) y- p) )
Socrates goes on to argue
Therefore, when a person lacks this additional knowledge
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of health and justice, but knows knowledge only»
seeing that this is the only knowledge he has,
then he will be likely, both in his own case and
that of others, to know that he has a knowledge
that is of something. (170B7-11;
In this statement Socrates claims that the temperate man will know,
of himself and other persons who have knowledge, that they have
knowledge of something. With appropriate enthymematic minor premises
and the principle about the abilities of knowledge of knowledge
introduced at 170A7, one can easily prove that the temperate man
knows that he and other people have knowledge, (see page 1x3 )
However, I am unable to deduce what the text literally says from
the theoretical principles I have attributed to Plato. The text says
that the temperate man knows that he and other people have knowledge
of something. It seems to me that here Plato is importing one of
his own theoretical views about knowledge into his theory of what
individuals know. Since Plato believes that all knowledge is knowledge
of something, he assumes that since the temperate man knows that he
and other people have knowledge, he will know that they have knowledge
of something. Unfortunately, I do not see how the theory I have
22
attributed to Plato can express this inference.
At 170B11-C& Socrates says
MAnd how will he know whatever he knows by this means
of knowledge? Because he will know the healthy by
medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious
by music, but not by temperance, and housebuilding
by that art, but not by temperance, and so on..."
The proof of these claims requires the introduction of the notion of
knowing an object by means of something into the theory that I attribute
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to Plato. This is easily done by means of the following principles
for any person p, any object x, and any kind of
knowledge y, p knows x by y if and only if x is
the object of y and p has y.
On page 11^ is a proof that Socrates' claim that the temperate man
does not know the healthy by means of knowledge of knowledge follows
from this principle and prior premises and conclusions. (The proofs
for the music and housebuilding cases are parallel.) A proof of
Socrates' general claim that the temperate man does not know by
knowledge of knowledge any object other than knowledge is on page 115 ,
Socrates and Critias then have this exchange
But by temperance, if it is merely knowledge of
knowledge, how will a person know that he knows
the healthy or that he knows housebuilding?
He won't at all.
Then the man ignorant of this won't know what he
knows, but only that he knows.
Very likely.
Then this would not be being temperate and would
not be temperances to know what one knows and does
not know, but only that one knows and does not know-
or so it seems. (170C6-D3)
In this passage Socrates argues that knowledge of knowledge is not
knowing what one knows. The formalization of the argument and the
subsequent argument about knowing what others know requires the intro-
duction of the notion of knowing what someone knows. I propose the
following principle:
(x)(y)(*)[xK(yKz)^ (Eu)(Ku & zOu & xK(yHu))]
This says that x knows that y knows z if and only if there is a
kind
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of knowledge u that has z as its object and x knows that y has u.
The temperate man knows that the doctor knows health just in case he
knows that the doctor has medical knowledge.
In this passage I understand Socrates to be claiming that although
the temperate man is able to recognize that he has particular kinds of
knowledge, his knowledge of those faculties is not sufficient to enable
him to know what those faculties are of. Since he does not know what
those particular faculties are of, he does not, in virtue of knowledge of
23knowledge, know what it is he knows.
It seems to me that the key to understanding why Socrates infers
this claim is a statement he makes in the Republic <
In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark
such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in
discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But
in the case of faculty I look to one thing only—that to
which it is related and what it effects, and it is in this
way that I come to call each one of them a faculty, and
that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes
the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to
another I call other. (477C.
)
I take it that two of the things being claimed in this passage are
being able to distinguish or identify two faculties
implies that one is able to distinguish or identify
the objects of those faculties.
being able to recognize that something is a faculty
implies that one is able to recognize that it is
related to some object and that it produces some effect.
Three ways in which someone may have knowledge of a faculty, knowing
that it is a facility, knowing that it is the same kind of faculty as
some other faculty, and knowing that it is not the same kind of
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faculty as some other faculty, require knowledge of the object
of the faculty. It seems to me that each of these three ways of
knowing a faculty is implied by knowing what kind of faculty some-
thing is. If I know that something is a faculty of medical know-
ledge, then I know it is a facility. If I know that a and b are
faculties of musical knowledge, then I know that they are distinct
faculties. Consequently, recognizing what kind of faculty something
is Implies having at least some knowledge of the objects of that
faculty. Plato's acceptance of this latter claim in the Charmides
,
at least with respect to faculties of knowledge, is evident from 1?1A,
Moreover, in the Charmides Plato holds that the kind of knowledge
required to find out what it is that some particular faculty knows,
is the knowledge of that object had by the person who possesses that
particular faculty (171B). We may paraphrase this view about how one
recognizes what particular faculties are into the recognition of some
oerson's possession of some particular faculty by this principle
This principle says that knowing that someone has, or that someone
lacks, a particular kind of knowledge implies being able to recognize
the presence or absence of the object of that kind of knowledge. The
conclusion Socrates draws at 170C7, it is not the case that the temperate
man knows that he knows the healthy, follows from this principle and
previously introduced principles and premises. (The proof is on page 116.
)
the temperate man will know that the doctor has some
knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what sort it
is, won't he have to examine what it is of?
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Socrates' other conclusion, it is not the case that the temperate
man knows that he knows housebuilding, follows by a parallel argument.)
Socrates seems to imply at 170C10 that he has proven a more general
claim: no object is such that the temperate man will know that he
knows it. Strictly speaking, this claim in its completely general
form does not follow from the principles I have attributed to Plato,
and it seems to me that we should not attribute it to Plato. At 171C
Socrates says that the temperate man is like other persons who have
knowledge} he is able to recognize when other people have the same
kind of knowledge that he has. If the temperate man or the doctor are
able to recognize when other people know knowledge or health, I do
not see why we should assume that Plato believed that they could not
recognize that they themselves know these objects. Consequently, I
attribute to Socrates the restricted conclusion that the temperate man
will not know, of any object other than knowledge, that he knows it.
The proof of this claim is on page 117 .
At 170D1-3 Socrates concludes:
Then this would not be being temperate and would not
be temperance: to know what one knows and does not know,
but it seems only that one knows and does not know.
Socrates has not argued that the temperate man will not know what he
does not know, but the claim follows from the general principles I
have used to elucidate the argument he has given. , On page 11 8 I
prove the more general claim that for every object except for know-
ledge, no one is such that the temperate man will know that they do
not know it.) In his conclusion Socrates does not deny the original
no
definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge. The conclusion
he draws presupposes this definition, since he asserts that
temperance is not knowing what one knows and does not know because
he has shown that knowledge of knowledge is not knowing what one knows
and does not know.
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Section 4: 170D - 171E
Socrates next turns to the temperate man's knowledge of other
people} does he know what they know and what they do not know? This
part of the argument is much easier to discuss* since it assumes only
that the temperate man has knowledge of knowledge and not that he has
other kinds of knowledge as well. Socrates draws his conclusion
immediately!
Nor, when another person claims to know something, will
our friend be able to find out whether he knows what
he says he knows or does not know it. But he will only
know this much it seems, that the man has some knowledge;
yes, but of what, temperance will fail to inform him.
(170D5-9)
Socrates is entitled to draw the conclusion at this point because it
follows from the general principles he employed in the argument about
the temperate man's knowledge of himself. (See page m , Section
3, and page 130 ) The subsequent passage 170E1-171C11 , is a step by
step argument for the same conclusion drawn at 170D5-7* Why does
Socrates give a detailed argument for a conclusion he has already
legitimately drawn? The answer, I suggest, is that Plato had a very
clear idea of the methods a person employs in testing another person
for knowledge, and did not have a clear conception of how a person tests
himself for knowledge.
The second argument gives a description of how a purported expert
is to be examined by so ©one other than himself. Plato presents a
concrete illustration of his theoretical views, showing that only some-
one with medical knowledge, and not the person with knowledge of knowledge,
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will be able to distinguish the genuine doctor from the pretender.
Plato presents this illustration because it is dramatically a much
more convincing argument.
There are two reasons why Plato does not give an illustrative
argument in the case of the temperate man’s knowledge of himself.
An illustrative argument would require the explicit assumption that
the temperate man also be a doctor. As I earlier argued, Plato was
committed to the very reasonable view that doctors know that they know
the healthy. Thus it would have been absurd for Plato to argue that
the temperate man did not know that he knew the healthy. However,
it would have been very difficult and tedious to argue for the true
conclusion that he does not know that he knows the healthy by means
of knowledge of knowledge. Moreover, the presentation of this argument
would have left Socrates open to the charge that he was engaged in idle
logic-chopping that had no practical importance. On Plato's view
everyone knows what they know, and Socrates could merely conclude that
the first condition of Critias' definition (the four conditions are
knowing what you know, knowing what you do not know, knowing what
others know, and knowing what others do not know) does not capture
something peculiar to one kind of knowledge.
The second reason is that it would have been very difficult to
describe how the temperate man would go about examining himself. It
is virtually a tautology to say that Plato's model for the examination
of knowledge claims is the examination of one person by another. The
dramatic structure of every early dialogue (except, perhaps, the Higpias
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Minor and the Crito ) is such that people find out things about them-
selves by being examined by Socrates. To describe the temperate
man's examination of himself would seemingly require the description
of an inner monologue (or at least something that parallels the
description of the examination at 1?1B), something foreign to Plato's
dramatic methods. (Although the Apology contains several statements
in which Socrates describes his own self-reflections.) I do not think
Plato would have been content to describe someone examining himself
unless he could give a real explanation of how and why we are able to
learn things about ourselves by thinking about ourselves. To do
this requires at least a sophisticated and complicated theory of
psychology, which I presume Plato did not have when he wrote the
Chamides . As I suggested earlier, I do not think that Plato, at this
time, had worked out a coherent conception of knowledge of the self.
Socrates begins the illustrative argument at 1?0E1 j
So neither will he be able to distinguish the man
who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the
man who really is one, nor will he be able to make this
distinction for any of the other experts. Let us
consider the matter this way . If the temperate
man or anyone else whatsoever is going to tell
the real doctor from the fake. How will he go about
it? He won't, I suppose, engage him in conversation
on the subject of medicine, because what the doctor
knows, we say, ?jls nothing but health and disease,
isn't that so?
Yes, that is the case.
But about knowledge the doctor knows nothing, because we
have allotted precisely this function to temperance alone.
Yes.
Neither will the doctor know anything about medicine since
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medicine is a knowledge.
171A True.
In the first sentence Socrates illustrates the conclusion drawn
at 170D5-7 with an example. Since the temperate man will not know
what other people know and what they do not know, he will be unable
to distinguish the genuine doctor from the person who pretends to
be a doctor. He then generalizes the claim and says that the temperate
man will be unable to distinguish the true from the false claimant
to any kind of knowledge. In his previous remarks Socrates referred
to the people who were to be examined by the temperate man as people
who "think they know" or "claim to know." Here he shifts to people
who "pretend to know. " Plato's reason for this transition is that it
is dramatically effective in showing the relevance of his theoretical
discussion to practical affairs. While Plato believes that the more
serious and important enterprise is showing people that they do not
know what they think they know, he also knows that most people do not
recognize this as a major problem. However, no one wants to be
deceived, and everyone regards the detection of deceivers, especially
in medicine, as an enterprise that would benefit the community. The
dramatic irony of this passage is fairly heavy. Critias claims to have
knowledge of knowledge. Socrates, who is pretending to be a doctor,
is showing that Critias does not know what he thinks he knows. The
last clause of the sentence states in general form Socrates' claim
about the doctor 1 The temperate man will be unable to distinguish
the genuine possessor of some kind of knowledge from the pretender.
12ii
Before discussing the subsequent claims Socrates makes in the
passage quoted, I should like to comment on two things he says in
the paragraph at 170E.
if the temperate man or anyone else whatsoever is going
to tell the real doctor from the false, how will he go
about it?
The phrase I have underlined indicates that Socrates' subsequent
remarks about how putative experts are to be examined may be understood
in a perfectly general way. They apply not only to the way in which
the temperate man ought to examine others, but also to how anyone
should go about assessing another's claim to knowledge. Socrates also
remarks,
He won't I suppose, engage him in conversation on the
subject of medicine, because what he knows, we say, is
nothing but health and disease.
I take it that this sentence tacitly claims that at least one of the
things we ought to do to assess a person's claim to knowledge is to
examine them in conversation. Socrates is claiming that it would be a
mistake to talk to the doctor about medicine, not that it would be a
mistake to examine him by talking to him. Later he says that what we
should talk to him about is what he claims to know, health and disease.
(171B3-9) (I stress this point because of Gould's vehement assertion
that claims to knowledge are assessed only by examining both word and
deed.
)
Socrates' second argument for the claim that the temperate man will
not know what other people know and do not know begins with three
claims. They are,
1. The temperate man will not engage the doctor in
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conversation about medicine, because the
doctor knows only health and disease.
2. About knowledge the doctor knows nothing,
because knowing something about knowledge
is the function of temperance alone.
3. The doctor does not know anything about
medicine, since medicine is a kind of knowledge.
The claim that the doctor knows nothing but health and
disease follows from the assumption that medicine is the only kind
of knowledge the doctor possesses, (see page 131 ) The claim that
the doctor knows nothing about knowledge follows immediately from
claim 1), ' but Socrates draws the inference from the premise that
only temperance knows knowledge. Consequently, the argument Socrates
actually uses should be based upon the premise that onl,> ! Jiowledge of
knowledge may know knowledge. This argument is presented on page 112.
Socrates next argues that the doctor knows nothing about medicine,
since medicine is a kind of knowledge. This argument is reconstructed
on page 133 .
Socrates continues his illustrative argument at 171A2-B2
However, the temperate man will know that the doctor
has some knowledge, but in order to try and grasp what
sort it is, won't he have to examine what it is of?
Because hasn't each knowledge been defined, not, not just
as knowledge, but also by that which it is of?
By that, certainly.
Now medicine is distinguished from the other knowledges
by virtue of its definition as knowledge of health and
disease.
Yes.
It follows that the man who wants to examine medicine should
look for it where it is to be found, because I don't suppose
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he will discover it where it is not to be found, do
you?
Certainly not.
Each of the claims made in this passage either exemplify or are
entailed by claims and principles previously introduced. The first
claim, tK(pHk)fjas proven in Section 3. The second claim is that if
the temperate man is to find out what kind of knowledge the doctor
has, he must find out what the objects of that kind of knowledge are.
This corresponds to a consequence of an earlier introduced principles
A necessary condition for knowing that the doctor has medical
knowledge is knowing that the doctor knows health, (see page 13U )
Socrates* third claim, each kind of knowledge has an object that
is not the object of any other kind of knowledge, follows from general
principles introduced earlier, (see page 135 ) The third claim and
premises introduced earlier entail Socrates' fourth claim: Medicine
is the only kind of knowledge that has health as its object, (see page
137 ) I understand Socrates' last claim to be a consequence of his
second and third claims s If the temperate man is to find out if the
doctor has medical knowledge, then he must find out if the doctor knows
those objects which are known only by that kind of knowledge, (see
page 138 ) The next claim Socrates makes
Then the man who conducts the examination correctly
will examine the doctor in those matters in which
he is a medical man, namely health and disease.
(171B3-5)
follows from the two previous claims. The next exchange is
And he will look into the manner of his words and actions
to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does
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is correctly done?
Necessarily.
But, without the medical art, would anyone be able to
follow up either of these things?
Certainly not. No one, in fact, could do this, it
seems, except the doctor—not even the temperate man
himself. If he could, he would be a doctor in addition
to his temperance. (171B7-C3)
I understand Socrates' statement “without the medical art, would
anyone be able to follow up either of these things?" to mean
(x)[xL.nO -(Ey)CxK(ySh) v xK(yLSh) v xK(yAh) v xK(yLAh))] .
Earlier I used this passage to justify the claim that Plato held that
knowers, and only knowers, could conduct these examinations in every
case. However, the passage also indicates that knowers are the only
persons who can conduct these examinations in any case. Given this
principle, it follows that since the temperate man does not have medical
knowledge, he will not know whether or not the doctor speaks truly or
acts rightly in matters pertaining to health. This conclusion together
with the principles
(x) (y) (z)[xK(yKz) -EE (xK(ySz) & xK(yAz)] and
(x)(y)(z)[xK(yLKz) ~ (xK(yLSz) & xK(yLAz)
]
enable us to infer the conclusion that the temperate man does not know
whether or not the doctor knows health, (see page 139 )
In his concluding paragraph Socrates says
The upshot of the matter is, then, that if temperance
is only the knowledge of knowledge and the absence of
knowledge, the temperate man will be able to distinguish
neither the doctor who knows the particulars of his
Generalizing, we have the principle
(zK(wSy) v zK(wLSy) v zK(wAy) v zK(wLAy)) zHx]
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art from the man who does not know them but pretends
or supposes he does» nor will he recognize any other
genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in his
own field, the way other craftsmen do. (171C5-11)
In addition to his conclusion about the limitations of the temperate
man's knowledge, Socrates asserts two new claims in this paragraph.
He claims that experts, and only experts will be able to recognize
each other, and claims, as a particular instance of the first claim,
that the temperate man will be able to recognize other possessors of
knowledge of knowledge. Part of Socrates* first claim,(x)(y)i(Ez)xK|BK$) 'xKy
follows from principles previously introduced. There are two ways to
prove this, and the proofs are given on pages lUO and lUl • The other
part of Socrates' first claim, (x)(y)(x)t(xKz & yKz & xEy)^xK(yKz) ], follows
from the principle 6a'.(x)(y) xKy (z)txEz^ zKy)xK(zKy),' & (sLKy3xK(zLKy) )] .
(See page ll*2 . ) This principle is equivalent to the principle intro-
duced in Chapter 3» Section 6; 6a.(x)(y) xKy r (zHxEz’CxKCzKy) vxK(zLKy))]
if one also assumes the principles Rl.(z) (y) [(ExHxK(zKy) ) 1 zKy] and
R2.(z)(y)C(Ex)(xK(zLKy)) :5 zLKy]. The evidence presented in Chapter 3
clearly supports 6a'. as well as 6a. Propositional theories of know-
ledge interpret the position Rl. and R2. represent (instantiated to
this example) as
If x knows that z knows y, then z knows y is true.
However, in the theory I have presented the object of x's knowledge is
not a true proposition, but simply y* s knowing z. Hence Rl. and R2.
should be interpreted not as claiming that knowledge implies truth,
but
that knowledge implies reality or existence. Although there are
some
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grounds for attributing HI. and R2. to Plato (which I discuss at
the end of Chapter 5), I have not attributed these principles to
him because I have not needed to use it in order to interpret the
Chamides.
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Section 5: 171D - 173D
In this section I shall present my interpretation of Charmides
171D-173D. At 171D Socrates concludes the argument in which he
proves that the temperate man will not know what he knows and does
not know and will not be able to determine if others know what they
claim to know or if they do not know what they claim to know. He
then tells Critias the beneficial consequences that would follow if
someone did in fact have these powers*
171D Then, Critias, he replied, what benefit would we get
from temperance if it is of this nature? Because if,
as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew
what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows
the former and not the latter) and were able to invest-
igate another man who was in the same situation, then
it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be
temperate. Because those of us who had temperance
would live lives free from error and so would all
171E those under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be
attempting to do things we did not understand—rather
we would find those who did understand and turn the
matter over to them—nor would we trust those over whom
we ruled to do any thing except what they would do
correctly, and this would be that of which they
possessed the knowledge. And thus, by means of temper-
ance, every household would be well-run, and every
city well-governed, and so in every case where
172A temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and
rightness in control, men so circumstanced would
necessarily fare admirably and well in their doings
and, faring well, they would be happy. Isn't this
what we mean about temperance, Critias, I said, when
we say what a good thing it would be to know what one
knows and what one does not know?
This is certainly what we mean, he said.
But now you see, I replied, that no knowledge of this
sort has put in an appearance.
I see that, he said.
Socrates’ argument in this passage is fairly straightforward.
If knowledge of knowledge has the powers Critias has attributed to
it, then its possessor will be able to determine if he and other
people, for any kind of knowledge, have that kind of knowledge.
Hence, in any area over which he has control j his life, his family,
or his state, he will be able to have every task performed by only
those people who have the appropriate kind of knowledge. If he or
another person lacks the kind of knowledge that is needed for some
purpose, he will be able to recognize the person who does have that
knowledge and appoint him to perform the work. From this Socrates
infers both that every household and city will be well-run and that
men will be happy.
It should be noted that the argument has several unquestioned
presuppositions. The first is that the temperate man will have the
economic or political power necessary to appoint the particular
experts, and that the experts will perform the tasks he appoints them
to. Secondly, Socrates presupposes that there will be people who
have knowledge in every area in which knowledge might be needed, and
that there will be as many experts as are needed in each area.
Thirdly, it presupposes that no one will interfere with the temperate
man's ordering of his life, household, and state. His activities
will not be overcome by forces from within or without. Fourthly, it
presupposes that each expert will have the material resources and
political power needed to perform his task. Finally, Socrates pre-
supposes that the activities of each expert are properly coordinated.
Work will be done at the right times and places and in the right
amounts. Tasks that directly and indirectly interlock will be prop-
erly harmonized. This last presupposition is important because it
may well be related to the "knowledge of the whole" property that
Plato believed distinguished Thracian doctors from Greek doctors.
At 172B Socrates conjectures
Well then, I said, is this the advantage of the knowledge
of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, which we are
now finding out to be temperance, that the man who has
this knowledge will learn whatever he learns more
easily, and everything will appear to him in a clearer
light since, in addition to what he learns, he will
perceive the knowledge? And he will examine others on
the subjects he himself knows in a more effective
fashion, whereas those without the knowledge will
conduct their examinations in a weaker and less
fruitful way. And are not these, my friend, the kind
172C of benefits we shall reap from temperance? Or are we
regarding it as something greater, and demanding that it
be greater than it really is?
This passage’s status as a conjecture is clear from the facts that
the suggestions in it are neither examined nor mentioned later at
the conclusion of the dialogue when Socrates sums up the course of
the argument. (175B-D). The passage serves the immediate dramatic
purpose of providing an interlude between Socrates' claim that the
rule of a powerful form of knowledge of knowledge would enable men
to fare well and be happy (172A1-4) and his own examination of that
claim. However, the role of this passage in terms of the dialogue as
a whole is much greater than just this. The purpose oi the part of
the Charmides that this conjecture occurs in is to determine the
benefit that is produced by knowledge of knowledge. One colossal
sort of benefit has been examined and rejected. At 172B Socrates
suggests two other benefits that knowledge of knowledge might
produce:
1) facility at learning and clarity of apprehension
2) facility at examining others on subjects that one
knows oneself
It is significant that these benefits should be linked with
knowledge of knowledge and temperance because the first personal
trait is distinctly Charmldes' and the second is distinctly Socrates'.
At 157D Critias tells us
Then you must know that. ...not only does Charmides have
the reputation of being the most temperate young man
of the day* but that he is second to none in every
thing else appropriate to his age.
At 159-160B Socrates and Charmides examine the definition
"temperance is a sort of quietness" by reviewing the activities that
Charmides engages in as a young man. They agree that facility in
learning is more admirable than difficulty in learning. (159D) If
Charmides is second to none in this activity, then presumably he is
someone who learns whatever he learns more easily than others.
At 171C Plato claims that anyone who possesses a certain kind
of knowledge will be able to recognize when someone else has that kind
of knowledge. At 175B he suggests
that the man who has knowledge of knowledge. . . .will
examine others on subjects he himself knows in a
more effective fashion, whereas those without the
knowledge will conduct their examinations in a
weaker and less fruitful way.
This may be interpreted in several different ways. The doctor who
also has knowledge of knowledge may
1. be superlative at testing whether or not someone
is a doctor.
2. not only be able to test whether or not someone is
a doctor in the ordinalry manner, but also be able to
conduct the examination so that it brings about
additional benefits.
3. be able to conduct examinations on the subject of
medicine which are beneficial, but are not for
the purpose of testing whether or not the examinee
has knowledge of health and disease.
or 4. be able to do all three of the above.
Given the standard views about the nature of Socratic elenchus and
the assumption that Socrates does have moral knowledge, it is clear
that he exemplifies these special abilities.
I suggest that at 172B Plato is conjecturing that knowledge
of knowledge and the absence of knowledge, not proven to be impos-
sible but proven to have no power beyond the domain of knowledge,
may be a faculty which accounts for the exceptional abilities of
both Charmides and Socrates. Both facility at learning and facility
at conducting inquiries into knowledge may be reasonably described as
knowledge of knowledge. It is not implausible to link these distinct
personal qualities with (Fui Cf-(i -tfUv’iq , since Plato remarks at
Laws 710 that j u' v 5 tivq has both a mature and an immature form.
On the interpretation of Socrates' conjecture that I have offered
the suggestions being advanced at 172B are ones that Plato would have
thought worthy of serious examination. Unfortunately, I do not know
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why these suggestions are merely put forward as conjectures* and not
critically examined and either affirmed or denied. It may be that
Plato did not take them up in the Charmides because that dialogue
was already complicated enough.
From 172C5 to 173A9 there is a genuine interlude in the argument.
Socrates hypothetically grants the two claims he has previously
challenged.
291. it is possible to know knowledge 7
&nd 2. it is possible to know what one knows and does not know.
He then says
And, having granted all these things, let us investigate
more thoroughly whether, if it is like this, it will
benefit us in any way. Because what we were saying just
now about temperance being regarded as a great benefit
(if it were like this) in the governing of households
and cities, does not seem to me, Critias, to have been
well said.
In what way, he asked.
Because, I said, we carelessly agreed that it would be
a great good for men if each of us should perform the
things he knows and should hand over what he does not
know to those others who do. (172D)
...Because truly, even if there were no doubt that
temperance is like this, it appears in no way clear
to me that it does us any good. (172E)
I would like to discuss several important dramatic aspects of this
passage. The first concerns Plato's claim that the discussion
following this passage will expose same strange features of knowledge
of knowledge.
....perhaps we have been demanding something useless.
I say this because certain odd things become clear
1U9
about temperance if it has this nature. l?2C4-6
0
*
I
You certainly say some queer things, Socrates, Gritias
said.
By the dog, I said, they seem queer to me too, and
that is why, when I became aware of this a moment
ago, I said that some strange things would come to
light. . . . 172E3-6
What Socrates means by the first remark quoted is far from clear.
I take him to be referring to the claim he is about to try and prove i
Even if temperance is knowledge of knowledge and knowing what you know
and what you do not know, it will not enable us to fare well and be
happy and hence it will be useless. I believe Plato's reason for
claiming that some strange things will come to light is that he
recognizes that he is about to deny something that seems to be quite
plausible:
1. If everyone performs only the things they know and
have others that do know perform the things that they
themselves do not know, then everyone will fare well
and be happy.
It is important to recognize that the status of 1) is different from
that of
2. Temperance is modesty.
or 3. Knowledge of knowledge is possible.
Athenian readers of the Channides might be initially surprised that
Socrates would challenge 2) , but Plato certainly does not regard the
result of Socrates' examination of that part of the traditional conception
of temperance as strange or queer. Plato expects his readers to
accept
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his premises; temperance is always admirable, modesty is sometimes
admirable and sometimes not, and then to soberly accept the logical
consequences of Socrates' argument. The result of Socrates' exam-
ination is strange only to those who have not thought out the
consequences of beliefs they already hold. In a different sense,
the discussion of 3) brings to light some strange statements. Surely
it is strange to consider whether or not there is a hearing that
hears itself, other hearings, and the lack of hearings; and also
produces a sound of its own. But part of the reason these strange
statements are made is that Critias has shifted from a definition of
temperance as knowledge of the self to the definition that claims (in
part) that temperance is the knowledge that knows itself
.
(166c) The
latter definition attributes a quality to temperance that certainly
seems strange, and it is the examination of just this point that
prompts Socrates to make the strange statements about hearing and the
other relations. Moreover, when Socrates says that it is very unlikely
that these faculties exist, it is reasonable to assume that the
sentiments of the reader are with him. He does not urge anyone to
accept paradoxical or strange consequences.
But now 1) is hardly a strange statement in itself, and it
certainly is not an equation of superficially similar concepts like
2). It is neither a conventional maxim, like "minding ones own business,"
nor is it a spur of the moment response to a twist in the argument,
like "temperance is self-knowledge." Its antecedent, even to
contemporary readers, evokes a vision of well-ordered households and
communities. (A vision to be described shortly in Socrates' dream
at 173A.) To have each person perform the tasks he knows how to
perfonn and turn over to others who know how to perform them, things
that he himself does not know, certainly seems like a good thing.
The converse of 1) , that this is a necessary condition for a state
whose members are happy and fare well, is one of the fundamental
principles of the Republic . Given Socrates' glowing description of
the state ordered by the possessor of knowledge of knowledge, it seems
natural for the reader to follow, with Critias, Socrates* earlier
(172A) claim that knowledge of knowledge will produce an admirable and
happy life.
I suggest that the passage from 172C to 173D displays, in the
person of Socrates, an intellectual parallel to Socrates' control of
his sexual passion when he catches a glimpse of Charmides' naked body.
And when Critias said that I was the person who knew
the remedy and he turned his full gaze upon me in a
manner beyond description and seemed on the point of
asking a question, and when everyone in the palaestra
surged all around us in a circle, then my noble friend,
I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite
beside myself. ( 155C)
As with the vision of Charmides after a long military campaign,
the vision of the well-ordered state after the lengthy abstract
argument elicits a passionate response from Socrates*
And with error rooted out and rightness in control,
men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably
and well in all their doings and, faring well, they
would be happy. (172A)
At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates restrains his passion
for Charmides* external beauty, and begins an examination of Charmides*
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soul. H© finds, contrary to the views of the many, that Charmides
lacks the kind of knowledge which will enable him to fare well and
be happy. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates restrains his passion
for the apparent beauty of a state ordered by knowledge of knowledge,
subjects it to an intellectual examination, and finds that it too is
wanting in the kind of knowledge that will enable it to fare well
and bring happiness to its citizens.
The parallel helps to explain a number of specific aspects of
the dramatic structure of 172C-173A. The first is his claim that
strange things are about to come to light. The strange consequence,
that the state ordered by knowledge of knowledge will not be the
ideal state, parallels the result of Socrates' examination of Charmides.
Charmides is said to by all to be foremost in temperance (157B)
,
yet
we find out that the sort of temperance he has (an immature form that
may be related to the kind of temperance discussed at Laws 710) is
not the sort that will enable him to conduct his life or his state
properly. The parallel also helps to explain this comment:
I think I am making a fool of myself, I said, but all
the same it is necessary to investigate what occurs
to us and not to proceed at random, if one is going
to have the least care for oneself. (173A)
Many people, in ancient Greece and today, would regard Socrates
as a fool for talking about abstract matters of philosophy with Charmides
and Critias, instead of trying to seduce such a sexually desirable
youth. Just as he is not satisfied by Charmides' physical beauty,
Socrates is not satisfied by the state ordered by knowledge of knowledge.
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This too may seem foolish, unless one accepts his views on the
preeminent need for moral guidance. Finally, since Socrates
believes our foremost concern should be the welfare of our souls
( Apology 30B) , his statement that we should investigate every point
that occurs to us if we have the least concern for ourselves, surely
32
suggests a parallel with 154D.
Socrates said, By Heracles, you are describing a
man without an equal—if he should happen to have one small
thing in addition.
What's that? asked Critias.
If he happens to have a well-formed soul, I said....
Critias* response to this, "He is very distinguished in that
respect too," parallels his ready acceptance of Socrates' initial
claim that the state ruled by the possessor of knowledge of knowledge
will be a state in which men fare well and are happy.
Following the dramatic interlude, Socrates presents his dream.
Listen then, I said, to my dream, to see whether it comes
through horn or through ivory. If temperance really
ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely
everything would be done according to knowledge,
neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is
not) deceive us, not would any doctor or general
or anyone else pretending to know what he does not know
escape our notice. This being the situation, wouldn't
we have greater bodily health than we do now, and
safety when we are in danger at sea or in battle, and
wouldn't we have dishes and all our clothes and shoes
and things skillfully made for us, and many other
things as well, because we would be employing true
craftsmen? And, if you will, let us agree that the
mantic art is knowledge of what is to be and that
temperance, directing her, keeps away deceivers and
sets up the true seers as prophets of the future. 1
grant that the human race, if thus equipped, would act
and live in a knowledgeable way-because temperance,
15U
vratching over it, would not allow the absence of
knowledge to creep in and become our accomplice.
But whether acting according to knowledge would
make us fare well and be happy, this we have yet
to learn, my dear Critias. (173A-D)
Save for two points, this is essentially an elaboration of
Socrates’ earlier (171D) claim that if knowledge of knowledge has the
powers the argument has shown that it does not have, then the state
b0 well-ordered in the sense that each task would be performed
only by knowledgeable agents. However, he reasserts his doubt that
in such a state men will fare well and be happy} even if there is a
kind of knowledge which is knowledge of the future and the temperate
man is able to find a person who has this kind of knowledge. (Plato's
views on knowledge by prophecy is surely as obscure subject; it is
a problem that I shall not pursue.
)
Ihe second point that should be noted is a deliberate ambiguity
in Socrate^ final clause
»
toOto ovtU*-1 S ^
He is drawing a parallel between the abilities or powers of the
participants in the dialogue and the abilities or powers of the
possessor of knowledge of knowledge. Socrates believes that he and
Critias have been unable to achieve the proper end of their discussion,
finding a kind of knowledge which has the ability to achieve the
proper ends of the community.
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Section 6* 173D - 175D
The remaining part of Socrates' inquiry, 173D6-175D8, contains
some of the most puzzling arguments in the Charmides . Some of the
arguments appear to be fallacious, and the motivation for many of
Socrates’ remarks is obscure. I do not claim to have an explanation
for many important aspects of this part of the dialogue. However,
the analysis of the Charmides that I have developed so far will
provide the basis for an interpretation which explains the general
structure and rationale of Socrates' argument and enables us to inter-
pret several apparently obscure claims.
Following Socrates' report of his dream, Critias and Socrates
have this exchange:
But on the other hand, Critias said, you will not
readily gain the prize of faring well by any other
means if you disdain knowledge.
Instruct me on just one more small point, I said, of
what is this knowledge you speak of? Is it of
shoemaking?
173E Good heavens no.
Of Bronze working, then?
Certainly not.
Then of wool or wood or some similar thing?
Of course not.
Then I said we no longer keep to the statement that
the man who lives according to knowledge is happy.
Because those who live in the ways we mentioned are nou
admitted by you to be happy, but rather you seem to
me to define the happy man as one who lives according
to knowledge about certain specific things.
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I think that we should assume that at 173D7 Critias is not
7 S
using *
€TT(T
0
vuj s " to refer specifically to knowledge of
knowledge. Otherwise, Socrates’ question, "Of what is this know-
ledge?", would have to be given the absurd interpretation "What is
knowledge of knowledge, knowledge of?" At the conclusion of the
passage quoted, Socrates claims to have refuted the statement* 1.
Anyone who lives according to knowledge is happyjby having presented
several counter examples to it. The carpenter lives according to
knowledge, and Critias, Socrates says, has admitted that such a person
is not happy. (It should be noted that Critias' admission of this
point is not recorded anywhere in the dialogue.
)
From the nature of Socrates' examples it seems clear that principle
1. should be understood in a very broad sense; perhaps something like;
la) Anyone who lives any part of his life in accordance
with any kind of knowledge at all, will be happy.
A shoemaker who used his knowledge to make shoes, and had no other
aspect of his life ruled by knowledge (that he or his ruler had)
might well counterexample la).
An alternative way of interpreting 1) is something like:
lb) Anyone who lives in such a way that every aspect
of his life is ruled by knowledge, will be happy.
Since this is, or is similar to, the claim Socrates has just said
he intends to challenge, one initially tends to read 1) with this
interpretation in mind. But this reading of 1) is doubtful for two
reasons. First, the examples Socrates enthymematically refers to,
unhappy craftsmen, would not counterexample lb) unless he also claimed
1$7
that every other aspect of their lives was somehow ruled by knowledge.
Critias' abrupt replies indicate that this latter assumption is not
being made. Secondly, Socrates goes on to say
you seem to me to define the happy man as one who
lives according to knowledge of certain specific
things. (175E8-9)
This move in the argument is most naturally understood as a narrowing
down of la). As a modification of lb) it would be pointless, since
if a life ordered by every kind of knowledge is unhappy, then it
would seem that a life according to some kinds of knowledge would be
so also.
Socrates continues by suggesting to Critias the sort of man
whose knowledge might produce happiness:
And perhaps you mean the person I mentioned a moment
ago, the man who knows what all future events will
be, namely the seer. Are you referring to this man
or some other?
Both to this one, Critias said, and another.
Which one? Socrates said, Isn't it the sort of man
who, in addition to the future, knows everything that
has been and is now and is ignorant of nothing? Let
us postulate the existence of such a man. Of this man
I think you would say that there was no one living
who was more knowledgeable.
Certainly not.
There is one additional thing I want to know: which one
of the knowledges makes him happy? Do all of them do this
equally?
No, very unequally, he said. 1?3E9-1?^A12
There are several problems in interpreting this passage. First,
since Socrates is ostensibly trying to show that a state ordered by
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knowledge of knowledge is not one in which everyone fares well
and is happy, it is puzzling that he tries to detonnine what it is
that a single person must have to make himself happy. It may be that
what is required for the happiness of a single person if* an unordered
state, might not be necessary in a well-ordered state. A second more
specific problem is that it is not at all clear exactly how much
knowledge is had by the man Socrates is talking about. Initially,
he seems to be considering a person who has only the knowledge of
the seer. At 1?4A2, Critias says that he is referring to this man
when Socrates says to him, "Are you referring to this man or some
other?" Critias also says he is referring to someone else, and does
not demur when Socrates suggests that this other person is "the sort
of man who, in addition to the future, knows everything that has been
and is now and is ignorant of nothing. " Although it does not seam
to be important, it should be noted that Critias has apparently agreed
that two kinds of people will be happy, the seer and the person who
has the seer's knowledge and also knowledge of past and present events.
Socrates, however, examines only the second case. Apparently, his
remarks are intended to apply to the first case also.
It is far from clear what is meant by the phrase "and is ignorant
of nothing." ( ku pyVSOt ) On the basis of its immediate
context, it would appear that Socrates is emphasizing that the man
Critias is referring to is ignorant of no events; past, present, or
future. However, on the basis of his subsequent remarks, Socrates
159
might be interpreted as hypothesizing that the man has every kind
of knowledge', arithmetic, medicine and so on.
there is one additional thing I want to know* which
one of the knowledges makes him happy? Do all of
them do this equally?
No, very unequally, he said.
Well, which one in particular makes him happy? The
one by which he knows which one of the things are
and have been and are to come? Will it be the one
by which he knows checker playing? ...or calculation?...
or. . . health? 174A9-174B8
As I understand it, 1?4B indicates that Socrates is assuming that
the hypothetical man has every kind of knowledge and is trying to
find out which of them brings him happiness. The conclusion of
this line of questioning is,
But the most likely case, [Socrates said, is that
by which he knows what?
By which he knows good, he said, and evil. 174B10-12
One feature of this passage that deserves comment is the
discussion of the extent to which different kinds of knowledge
contribute to the happiness of the hypothetical possessor of every
kind of knowledge. Although the remarks are vague, we may note the
following points,
1. Different kinds of knowledge make a very unequal
contribution to happiness (174A12)
2. One particular kind of knowledge is primarily or
totally responsible for happiness (174B1)
3. Some kinds of knowledge may make little or no
contribution to happiness. (174B1-5)
Some kinds of knowledge may make a significant4.
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contribution to happiness. (174B9-10)
5. Knowledge of good and evil is most likely the
kind of knowledge that produces happiness
(174B11-13)
These few remarks leave a number of interesting questions
unanswered. Is the possession of knowledge of good and evil
by itself sufficient for happiness, or must we also possess some
or all of the other kinds of knowledge? Do some kinds of knowledge
make absolutely no contribution to happiness? What is the relation-
ship between the claims about the contribution of different kinds of
knowledge to one person's happiness and the contribution that different
kinds of knowledge, when possessed by different people, might make
to the happiness of everyone in the community? One thing about this
passage that is puzzling, and that I do not know how to explain, is
that at 174-A2 Critias says that seer is happy and at 174B5 apparently
denies that this kind of knowledge will make a person happy.
Following Critias' claim that it is knowledge of good and evil
that makes a person happy, Socrates exclaims 1
You wretch, said I, all this time you've been leading
me right round in a circle and concealing from me that
it was not living according to knowledge that was
making us fare well and be happy, even if we
possessed all the knowledges put together, but that
we have to have this one knowledge of good and evil.
Because, Critias, if you consent to take away this
knowledge from the other knowledges, will medicine
any the less produce health, or cobbling produce
shoes, or the art of weaving produce clothes, or
the pilot's art any the less prevent us from dying
at sea or the general's art in war?
They will do it, just the same, he said.
But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of
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these things well and beneficially done will have
vanished if this is lacking.
You are right.
Then this knowledge, at any rate, is not temperance,
but that one of which the function is to benefit us.
And it is not a knowledge of knowledge and the
absence of knowledge but of good and evil. So that,
if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would
be something else for us. (174B10-174D7)
Socrates claims to have produced the refutation of the thesis
that living according to knowledge of knowledge will make us fare
well and be happy. Here Socrates shifts from talking about
knowledges possessed by one individual that will make or fail to make
him happy, to knowledges possessed by members of a community whose
collective use will make some or all members of the community happy. (174c)
In a superficial sense Socrates' argument in this passage is clear.
1. The kind of knowledge that benefits us=knowledge
of good and evil.
2. Knowledge of good and evil/knowledge of knowledge
and the absence of knowledge.
3. The kind of knowledge that benefits us^knowledge
of knowledge and the absence of knowledge.
In a deeper sense, it is hardly clear why Socrates thinks that
knowledge of good and evil is the one and only one kind of knowledge
that will enable people to fare well and be happy. Unlike knowledge
of knowledge, we are given no hints about how he conceives of the power
of this kind of knowledge; how it is to interact in a beneficial way
with other things. He may hold that possession of this kind of know-
ledge alone is not sufficient for a happy life or happy community.
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Presumably, kinds of knowledge of the sort mentioned at 174c are
necessary for happiness. But what is it about knowledge of good
and evil that makes it the essential condition for happiness?
One plausible suggestion is that this kind of knowledge, like
the knowledge of good doctors, has knowledge of the whole:
In keeping with this principle, they plan a regime
for the whole body with the idea of treating and
curing the part along with the whole.
... just as one
should not attempt to cure the eyes apart from the
head, nor the head apart from the body, so one
should not attempt to cure the body apart from the
soul. And this, he Zalmoxis says is why most
diseases are beyond the Greek doctors, that they
do not pay attention to the whole as they ought to
do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it
is impossible that the part should be. I56C-E]
This suggestion is fertile with possibilities. Several leading ones
are:
1 . Knowledge of good and evil can coordinate the parts
of the state to produce goodness and stave off evil.
2 . Knowledge of good and evil provides a political
extension of Zalmoxis' medical theory. Just as one
cannot cure the eyes without treating the head and
the body without treating the soul, one cannot cure
the man without treating the community of which he
is a part.
3. The medical analogy is important in another respect.
The objects of the doctor's knowledge, strictly
speaking, are only health and disease. But he uses
this knowledge to manipulate things that are not
objects of his knowledge, eyes, heads, etc. If this
is theoretically acceptable, then it is also theo-
retically acceptable for the man who has knowledge
of good and evil to use his knowledge to manipulate
things that are not objects of his knowledge, e.g.,
other peoples knowledge, to produce good and evil.
If we accept this analysis of the knowledge of good and evil,
then the rationale for final part of the argument becomes clear. If
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knowledge of good and evil has knowledge over the state in the way
that Thracian doctors have knowledge over humans
,
then, for political
purposes, knowledge of knowledge becomes superfluous. Socrates gets
Critias to admit that knowledge of knowledge has no benefit:
But why should not this 1 temperance be beneficial?
Critias} said. Because if temperance really is a
knowledge of knowledge and rules over the other
knowledges, then I suppose it would rule over this
174E knowledge of the good and would benefit us.
And would this knowledge make us healthy, I said, and
not the art of medicine? And would it perform the
tasks of the other arts rather than each of them
performing its own task? Didn't we protest solemnly
just a moment ago that it is a knowledge of know-
ledge and absence of knowledge only and of nothing
else? We did, didn't we?
It seems so, at any rate.
Then it will not be the craftsman of health?
Certainly not.
175A
Because health belonged to some other art, didn't it?
Yes, to another.
Then it will be of no use, my friend. Because we have just
awarded this work to another art, isn't that so?
Yes indeed.
Then how will temperance be useful when it is the craftsman
of no useful thing?
Apparently it won't be any use at all, Socrates.
Socrates goes on to point out that the definition of temperance as
knowledge of knowledge is thereby refuted, since temperance is a fine
thing and knowledge of knowledge has been shown to be useless. The
use
I have made of Zalmoxis’ medical theory in interpreting Socrates'
final
16U
remarks receives some support from an argument Nicias gives in the
Laches :
He [Laches
;
thinks a doctor' s knowledge of the sick
amounts to something more than being able to describe
health and disease, whereas I think their knowledge
is restricted to just this. Do you suppose, Laches,
that when a man's recovery is more to be feared than his
illness, the doctors know this? Or don't you think there
are many cases in which it would be better not to get
up from an illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that
in all cases to live is preferable? In many cases, is
it not better to die? (195C. The argument is extended
to other craftsmen at 195D. See also Gorgias 519A and
Republic h06.)
Nicias' point is that each of the particular craftsmen lacks the sort
of knowledge that would enable him to guide his actions in a morally
proper way. If the possessor of knowledge of knowledge ruled the
state, he would be able to ensure that each task was performed only
by persons who had the appropriate kind of knowledge. However, since
he would not know good and evil, he would be unable to provide the
moral guidance that is required if the craftsmen are to work in a
way that is always morally beneficial. Since such a state will frequent-
ly have the undesirable consequences Nicias refers to, it will not be
the ideal state. If Plato is relying on this point at the end of the
Charmides
,
then he is justified in rejecting knowledge of knowledge as
the ideal form of political authority. Since the point is explicitly
made in a dialogue written at the same time as the Chamides , it is
not implausible to suppose that it motivated his third set of arguments
against the idea that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge would be
able to properly order the state.
In this chapter I have argued that Charmides 167B - 174D is a
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rational inquiry into issues that are important for Plato. In the
next chapter I shall critically examine an alternative account of
the conception of knowledge in the early dialogues that is used to
give a different interpretation of the Charmides .
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Footnotes to Chapter IV
Tuckey, p, 6l, Gould, p. 39# Cohen, p. l67ff.
,
and apparently
Richard Robinson, Essays in Greek Philosophy, p, 27.
2 .
See Cohen, p. 167, Wellman, p. 112, R. K. Sprague's note to this
passage in her edition of the Charmides
, p. 81.
3
I should point out that I do not suppose that the same assumptions
made about the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge in the
Charmides were also made by Plato about the Guardians or about Socrates'
unique abilities. First, the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of
knowledge is said to know only knowledge. Secondly, Plato's views
on knowledge, and consequently on knowledge of knowledge, surely
had undergone considerable development by the time he wrote the
Republic . Thirdly, I suspect that the Charmides might have been an
unsuccessful attempt by Plato to understand Socrates' unique abilities.
Socrates was plainly capable of recognizing the ignorance of himself and
others, and the Chamides fails to find a kind of knowledge which would
explain how someone could do this.
/j. \ A \ | ^ ^
The bracketed expression is Lamb's translation for /i & wj KW
6y( s &-U ye k<v£(v, k*< Qcff* etij S
Sprague* s
"Again, that hearing or vision or, in fact, any sort
of motion should move itself, or heat bum itself,"
misleadingly suggests that hearing and vision are motions that move
themselves. This does not seem to be in the text, and it obscures
that fact that the problem with the hearing that hears itself is not
that it may be self-moving, but that it is reflexive.
problem involved in formulating this principle is that Socrates
speaks of the things he talks about both as relations and properties;
e. g. , something is both a love and a love of beauty. Since it is
clear that something is a love (and similarly for the other things
he talks about) just in case it is a love of something, I have used
relational statements such as "(Ez)(Rxz)" in lieu of predicate
statements. A somewhat more accurate but less elegant approach to
this problem is to say that Socrates doubts the principle
(EP)(E»)(Ejc){(y)[Py5(E*)(»y*)] & Px & (w)(Ptr»H**) 4 (u)t(Pu
^Tho arguments presented represent very general argument strategies.
Since each argument strategy may be exemplified by a number of different
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and plausible interpretations of Socrates' argument, and the strategies
may be combined with each other to give other plausible interpretations
of Socrates' argument, there are probably dozens of ways in which the
argument at 167B - 169A may be interpreted. Since I only wish to
make the general claims that the argument is rational and bears upon
issues that are important for Plato, I shall not try to detennine
which way of reconstructing Socrates' actual argum ent is most faith-
ful to the text.
One interesting way of interpreting the argument may be developed
from a suggestion of Richard Robinson's. (Plato' s Earlier Dialectic ,
p. 39.) We first claim that there are inductions," based upon the
initial claims about love of loves, double of doubles, hearing of
hearings, etc., to these claims:
1. It is impossible for mathematical relations to have
property P.
2. It is impossible for psychological relations to have
property P.
3. It is impossible for perceptual relations to have
property P.
4. It is improbable that members of a certain class of
physical relations (of which motion and heat are examples)
have property P.
We then claim that there is an inductive inference from 1.-4. to
A. It is improbable that anything has property P,
and then a deductive inference to
B. It is improbable that there is a kind of knowledge that
has property P.
?Some distinction between kinds of properties is essential for
this argument. Nothing besides medical knowledge is of health and
disease, and presumably Socrates would not want to infer that medical
knowledge does not have the property of being of health and disease,
(cf. Republic 454B).
S
I follow the text in ignoring the distinction between desiring
something because it is believed to be pleasurable and desiring it
because it actually is pleasurable. I do not list opinion, since its
object is not given in the text.
^The bracketed expression replaces Sprague's "...see il there
is
any one of them that. .
.
" She believes that Socrates is referring to
one of the five senses in his passage; Lamb, Jowett, and
I believe
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that Socrates is referring to a hypothetical sixth sense. Aside from
not having textual justification and not following the pattern
established by Socrates' other examples, Sprague's translation attri-
butes a straightforward contradiction to Socrates. He would, in
effect, be asking Critias if one of the five senses perceives
nothing that any of the five senses perceive.
^°At Theaetetus 185 Socrates argues for the conclusion that "the
mind contemplates some things through its own instrumentality, others
through the bodily faculties." This assuredly is not the same position
as the one rejected in the Charmides
,
but it does suggest that a
sense of the senses would not be inconceivable to Plato, and is a
possibility that might have been seriously considered.
^Harold Chemiss (Aristotle* s Criticism of Plato and the
Academy
, p. 433-437,) mentions this passage in a discussion of Plato's
later views on the soul; and the existence of the form of fire, a
"self-existent fire," is accepted at Timaeus 51 and doubted at
Parmenides 130B.
^2
See Tuckey, p. 15* North, p. 155? Vlastos 4 , p. 229.
^The inferences are unobjectionable in a prima facie sense. They
are objectionable if one holds metaphysical views which entail things
like*
x* s having beauty is compatible with x' s having more
ugliness than beauty,
or x's having beauty is compatible with x's being beautiful
in one respect and ugly in other respects.
•^I do not see how to formulate a single principle which covers
all three of these inferences, let alone an inference which uses
x has the knowledge which knows itself
as a premise. "(x)(x has l Implies x is ^ing)" covers the knowledge
example, but is not straightforwardly applicable to beauty and seems
to sanction a false inference if "speed" is substituted for .
"(x)(x has ^-ness implies x is ^)" can sanction modified versions of the
first two inferences, but I do not see how it could be applied to
the
third inference.
•^Critias' argument is in fact an irrelevant response to
Socrates'
request that he explain how the possession of knowledge of knowledge
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implies that one will know what one knows and does not know. (168D)
Since that argument is not an answer to his question, Socrates is
justified in not discussing it and insisting that Critias deal with
the issue he has raised. Since X claim that the argument is irrele-
vant to the main purposes of this passage, it might be fairly
asked why Plato should have included it in the dialogue. It serves
the dramatic purpose of showing that Socrates will not permit the
discussion to be subverted by irrelevant responses to his questions.
Secondly, I think that Plato is deliberately attempting to puzzle
the reader into recognizing that self-knowledge is itself a philo-
sophically problematical concept. Critias' argument is so facile that
one immediately doubts his conclusion, and this doubt naturally
extends to all of the remarks about self-knowledge. As it is, the
Charmides is already the most complicated of the early dialogues.
Since self-knowledge is such a difficult, complicated, and paradoxical
problem for Plato, it is probable that he did not wish to enter into
a discussion of it in this dialogue. The passage at 169E is a
way of indirectly indicating to the reader that self-knowledge, as well
as knowledge of knowledge, is a concept in need of examination.
l6
In the middle dialogues there is a well-developed account of
what a person is. Hence, if one assumes that Plato thought self-
knowledge was possible, one would have some basis on which to
construct a theory about what Plato thought self-knowledge was when
he wrote these later dialogues. The Guardians' application of
their knowledge of Goodness upon themselves is explicitly affirmed
at Republic 5^0A.
^
"Plato and Hass Words," p. 90. Rosenmeyer also claims that
Plato accepts the converse inference* a person who knows himself
also has knowledge of knowledge. Since this inference is not made
in the text, I shall forego a discussion of it.
^If this is Rosenmeyer' s view, then on different grounds he
has reached the same interpretation I have. However, he does not
attribute to the possessor of knowledge of knowledge a recognition
of his own ignorance. Rosenmeyer' s linguistic approach to Plato's
tenriinology does not (and presumably is not intended to) explain why
Socrates insists that knowledge of knowledge must also be related to
the absence of knowledge.
^I use "enthymeme" to refer to an argument that has at least one
unstated premise and " enthymematic premise" to refer to an unstated
pranise of an enthymeme.
^In subsequent arguments I shall omit the condition that says
that knowers are persons.
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t
iho oext of the latter part of this sentence is
OT( T ( cntr T*T»t tc*1 on txtrrj^ r<vA fc'Xtt, cUctv*
XV y?y VujVKOC K^i TTipi WtU TO G KtU 7?£p£ TioV hX*u»V •
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The inference is (x) (y) CxK(yHk)—> xK(E2 )£rKz.) i<rhe reason that it
cannot be introduced into the theory is that it requires that we
attribute propositional knowledge to the temperate man.
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' A very confusing problem with the argument at 170B-D is that
Socrates makes contradictory assumptions about the hypothetical
possessor of knowledge of knowledge. The assumptions* are
1) The only knowledge he possesses is knowledge of knowledge
2) He possesses kinds of knowledge (medicine, music, and
housebuilding) in addition to knowledge of knowledge.
Assumption 1) is explicitly made at 170B8. Assumption 2) is implicitly
made at 170C1: "he will know the healthy by medicine, not by temper-
ance,...." The second assumption is required for there to be any
point to the exchange at 170C6-10 j
But by temperance, if it is merely knowledge of
knowledge, how wall a person know that he knows
the healthy or that he knows housebuilding?
He won’t at all.
If assumption 2) were not made, then the claim that the person did
not know that he knows the healthy would follow simply from the fact
that he did not know the healthy, and not from the limitations of
knowledge of knowledge.
The reason these contradictory assumptions are made is that one
of Socrates' conclusions, the temperate man does not know what he
knows, is false. I shall later argue that it is reasonable to
attribute to Plato the view that everyone knows what they know. (I
do not attribute to Plato the view that everyone knows what they do
not know.) On Plato's view the doctor knows that he knows the
healthy, and he knows this not by knowledge of knowledge, but because he
has the facility of medical knowledge. If the temperate man is also
a doctor, he will know that he knows health, but he will not know it
because he has knowledge of knowledge. Socrates assumes that the
temperate man has only knowledge of knowledge and considers whether
this alone will enable him to know what he knows. I shall shortly
argue that he validly concludes that it will not. Assumption 2) is
made for dramatic plausibility and assumption 1) is made for brevity.
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Assumption 1) may be avoided if one introduces the notion of 'x knows
that y knows z by w* , but this is cumbersome and would require a
good deal of explanation to eliminate its ambiguity. Fortunately,
I have managed to reconstruct Socrates' arguments in a way that
avoids assumption 2) but does not use the pointless way of reasoning
mentioned above.
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The bracketed phrase is Jowett's translation for
Sprague's "And let's see what follows i" misleadingly suggests that
Socrates' subsequent remarks are intended to logically follow from
things he has previously said. Actually, he goes on to argue for
the same point as his previous argument, but in a different way.
25Socrates ignores three cases in making this claim. The first
is a mere oversight, since he later (171C) says that the possessor
of knowledge of knowledge will be able to recognize experts in his
own field. He also ignores two interesting cases. If someone is
totally ignorant and claims to know something, it seems that the
temperate man will know that the person does not have the kind of
knowledge he says he has. The principle sanctioning such an inference
is
(xXy)UK(yLkP (zXKzT)xK(yLz))].
In the unabbreviated version of the theory I have presented the temper-
ate man is also capable of recognizing the presence or absence of
ignorance. If a person possessed every kind of knowledge, then the
temperate man would know that he was ignorant of nothing. In this
case it would seem that he would be able to infer that the person had
any kind of knowledge he claimed to have. The principle sanctioning
this inference would be
(xXyXxK(yLfp (z)(Kz ) xK(yHa))1.
These principles may be adjoined to the theory I have presented if
one believes that Plato thought that persons would automatically make
the inferences they sanction. It should be noted that adding these
principles to the theory requires the modification of a principle that
is presently in the theory. The principle
(x)(y)f[Kx & (EzXyK(zHx) v
yK(,Lx))]3(w) w0x5(«)[yEu3(yK(uHu) v yK(ul*))] :
would need to be replaced by
(x )(y) Kx 4 [(Ez)(Ew)(yK(xHx) & Kw 4 zLw)
v
(Eu)(Ev)(yK(uEx) 4 Kv 4 zHv)] >(v) wOx MuHyEu 3 (yK(uHw) v yK(ulw))]
Several of the conclusions earlier drawn would also have to be
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modified to account for the two exceptions noted above;
(xMOx & x-/ k)’P(y)[(Ez)(KZ & yLz) Z> -tK(yKx) 3 and
(xh(Qx & x^ k)^ (y)[(E*)(Kz & yHzp -tK(yLKx)] f .
The conclusions say that for objects of knowledge not identical
with knowledge, if someone is not totally knowledgeable then the
temperate man will not know what the person knows and if someone
is not totally ignorant, then the temperate man will not know what the
person does not know.
1) (x) (jjKx^ x“ h)
2) k^h
3) DKkokt=h U.I., 1.
4) -DKk M.T., 2
., 3.
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Again, Socrates does not employ a simpler argument that is
available to him:
1) (xHdKx -} x~ h)
2) m^h
3) DKm^nurh U.I., 1.
4) -DKra M.T., 2. ,3.
28
This also requires the obviously true principle: (x)(y)(
-xLy^xHy).
29
Actually, what he earlier doubted was the existence of the
knowledge that knows itself and the other knowledges. On the theory
I have presented these are equivalent, since one can know knowledge
if and only if one has a faculty of knowledge that is directed
towards the quality of knowledge.
^But of the other hand , Critias said , you will not readily
gain the prize of faring well by any other means if you
eliminate scientific action ( . . • £ *\) to cnyA*sy|s)
(173D)
^Sprague translates the last clause as "if we are going to have
the least care for ourselves." In the text the pronoun is ' owtpu '•
^This parallel is suggested again at 173D9 where Socrates'
request "Instruct me on just one more small point," initiates an
inquiry that tries to find out what kind of knowledge produces
happiness.
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CHAPTER V
CRITIQUE CF THE VIEWS OF JOHN GOULD
Development, of Plato * s Ethics John Gould presents a theory
of moral knowledge which he believes was held by Socrates. He employs
that theory to give an interpretation of the Charmides . Gould's
reconstruction of Socrates' views is original, illuminating, and
carefully presented. In the first part of this chapter I shall examine
and criticize Gould's interpretation of Socrates' beliefs about the
nature of moral knowledge and the way in which a person's claim to
possess that knowledge is to be assessed. In the latter part of this
chapter I shall argue that Gould has incorrectly interpreted Plato's
philosophical intentions in the Chamides and has incorrectly analysed
the logical structure of the arguments in that dialogue.
Gould's presentation of his position ought to be liberally quoted:
Socrates, starting from the parallel that has often been
drawn in the history of ethics, between the moral agent and
the artist or craftsman, arrived, I believe, at the hope
that the moral agent might learn to direct his actions in
accordance with the same assured and acceptable procedures
which the artist adopts to produce his concrete works? that
is, in general terns, that he might achieve some 'technique'
of moral decision making and behavior, not so much in the
sense of a set of rules, as of an intense personal
conviction, evinced in his day to day actions, (p. x.
)
Briefly what I wish to suggest is this. In putting forward
the thesis that ± s only to, be obtained by ejrtvrjpy
,
Socrates was not asserting that necessarily results
from a personal apprehension of the nature of good and evil
(still less, of Good and Evil), but that for the achievement
of what is required is a form of moral ability com-
parable in some respects to the creative or artistic ability
of potters, shoemakers, and the like; that the kTTtvrrjjAf)
which Socrates envisaged was a form of knowing how , knowing
"that is* how to bo moral * (p. 7* The underlined words
are italicized in Gould * s book.)
...the meaning of £V<rTfy*q as Plato inherited it, was the
traditional equivalence of the word with V*). It was upon
this equivalence, already built into the fabric of
linguistic usage, that Socrates constructed his theory
of moral ability, in suggesting that the practical com-
petence of the professional craftsmen was the ideal at
which men in general should aim when faced with the
moral problems of daily life. (p. 31 .)
As we shall see, the basic meaning of several Greek words
for the concept of knowledge seems to be that of knowing
how . In any case, although I am by no means sure that the
distinction between the two modes of knowing the other
mode Is knowing that was as clear to Socrates and Plato
as the following pages may inevitably suggest, I am
convinced that the Socratic proposition that we are now
discussing is far better understood in the light of the
earlier usage, going back to Homer and beyond, than in
the misleading light of a later attachment to intellectual
or contemplative theories of the mind, which stem mainly
from the subsequent work of Plato and Aristotle, (p. 7.)
In his Introduction, Gould issues a warning to the reader
»
...the purpose of the first chapter is to rediscover the
meaning of Socrates' dictuwithat 'Virtue (*pfcT*) ) is know-
ledge (Ln<TTr)ftt) )*• Now the word 'knowledge,' in current
English, most commonly denotes awareness of facts $ I „
cannot believe that this was what the Greek word
meant for Socrates. I have used here Professor Ryle's
careful distinction between 'knowing how ' and* knowing
that' { but this distinction or dichotomy is already
at least inherent in the meaning of 'know,' whereas an
examination of the evidence shows that the two, to us
different, meanings were at one in the Greek word. Thus
in attempting to redress the balance of interpretation,
I am forced into a reconstruction of Socrates' ideas which
still, I am well aware, contains an ineradicable element
of distortion, (p. xii.
)
The problem seems to be this* Gould provides a great deal of evidence
to show that there is in Greek a traditional equivalence between
argues that both are more closely
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paralleled in English by 'knowing how' than by 'knowing that.'
But, the English expression 'knowing how' is not an exact
equivalent to either of the Greek expressions. WncrTtjJtffy does
occasionally at least denote 'knowing that' (Gould cites several
instances in writers prior to Plato) and there are many instances of
'knowing how' in English which are not comparable to the knowledge of
a craftsman, (for example, knowing how to tie a necktie). Of the knowing
how and knowing that distinction, Gould remarks, "It has been used as
a tool of investigation, a heuristic method employed to fit together
the pieces of the Platonic jig-saw puzzle into a new picture. We
can hardly be surprised if it does not fit exactly." (p. 30 )
This is a very murky subject. Fortunately, Gould's theory can
be assessed without going deeply into the relationship between Ancient
Greek and Modern English. Gould's primary purpose in arguing that
£.77( VT is not equivalent to 'knowing that' is a psychological
one. Gould believes that modern readers impose an intellectualist
conception of knowledge,'*' such as that attacked by Ryle in The Concept
of Mind
,
upon the texts of early Greek philosophy. Gould uses linguistic
evidence to discredit this interpretation of Socrates' thought and to
suggest to the modern reader that some sort of non-intellectualistic
conception of knowledge is more appropriate. With these claims I have
no quarrel. What I argue is that Gould's replacement for the "official
theory" is not faithful to the textual evidence. Gould's suggestion
is not that the Socratic conception of is equivalent to an
English speaker's conception of knowing how, but that it is based upon
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tho — v/) of the Athenian craftsmen. 2 This claim may be examined
independently of Gould's criticisms of traditional commentary upon
the subject. I believe that this general thesis is correct, in the
sense that Plato had the same theoretical model for moral knowledge
as he had for practical knowledge. However, Gould interprets
crr(rr^/A^ as being a certain kind of ability, and I understand it
as being a faculty ) that has a pair of qualities as its
objects. The person who has a particular faculty of knowledge may well
have a number of practical abilities, but I believe that we should also
attribute to him certain verbal and cognitive abilities as well.
My principal objections to Gould's interpretation of the early
dialogues are to his position on the way in which claims to possess
knowledge, especially moral knowledge, are justified. He states his
position on page 20,
...knowing how has not the objective status of knowing
that
,
where this implies awareness of existing facts.
There is only one way in which a man's claim to know how
to act can be accepted or rejected, and that is by
inspection of the observable actions of such a man and
those actions themselves can only be accepted or rejected.
There seems to be no question in these early dialogues of
looking for an objective justification for moral behavior
i
the assumption appears to be that moral behavior (the phrase
is not heavily 'loaded') justifies itself, and that the
problem is how to achieve it. Whether or not this is
accepted, there can be no doubt that €ff(rrj^i is to be
evinced in action: it is not some separate state of mind.
There is nothing so far to suggest that £TT( t) is in any
way to be understood either as contemplation of moral truth
or as 'the appreciation of universal science.' It
represents rather a moral assurance, perhaps without
objective justification, but sufficient to make action
follow. Its existence is to be ascertained by inspection
of the actions themselves, not by some feat of mental
surgery, designed to discover whether 'knowledge' is really
'present.
'
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On the basis of Gould's remarks in the first passage quoted, I believe
that we may attribute the following three positions to him a
1. Socrates did not seek objective justification for
moral behavior.
2. Socrates believed that moral behavior justifies itself.
3* Socrates believed that moral, knowledge was evinced in
a person's actions, and not in the person’s state of
mind.
On the basis of the last sentence quoted I believe that we should also
attribute to Gould the position that
4. Socrates believed that a person's claim to moral
knowledge could only be ascertained by examining the
person's actions, and not by examining his state of
mind. (I assume that the latter phrase is what is
meant by "some feat of mental surgery.")
One of the most damaging texts for Gould's general theory, and for
claims 2.
, 3« » and 4. , in particular, is the Euthyphro . In that
dialogue Euthyphro gives Socrates a full description of his action,
the prosecution of his father, and the circumstances surrounding that
action. Socrates, upon hearing the description, still considers it
to be an open question as to whether or not Euthyphro has acted
knowledgeably.
And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you
understand divine things and piety and impiety so accu-
rately that, in a case such as you have stated, you can
bring your father to justice without fear that you
yourself may be doing something impious? (4e)
When Euthyphro cites his action to support his claim to be knowledgeable,
Socrates emphatically rejects this as being sufficient to determine the
issue.
What I asked you, my friend; was, What is Piety? and
you have not explained it to my satisfaction. You only
tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting
your father for murder, is a pious act. (6d)
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In a third passage, Socrates says that an examination of the action
itself is not sufficient to prove that Euthyphro is knowledgeable.
Gome, then, my dear Euthyphro, please enlighten me on
this point. What proof have you that all the gods think
that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the
master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from
his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn
from the religious authorities what he should do, dies
unjustly? How do you know that it is just for a son to
indict his father and to prosecute him for murder of such
a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the
gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of
yours is just; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease
singing your praises for wisdom. (9a)
Further evidence against Gould's theory is in the Apology where
Socrates describes himself examining individuals in conversation, and
not as examining the actions of these individuals.
I went to a man who was reputed to be wise, thinking that
there, if anywhere, I should prove the answer wrong, and
meaning to point out to the oracle its mistake, and to say,
"You said that I was the wisest of men, but this man is
wiser than I am. " So I examined the man - I need not tell
you his name, he was a politician - but this was the result,
Athenians. When I conversed with him I came to see that,
though a great many persons, and most of all himself, thought
that he was wise, yet he was not wise. Then I tried to
prove to him that he was not wise, though he fancied that
he was. By doing so I made him indignant, and many of the
bystanders. So when I went away, I thought to myself, "I
am wiser than this man; neither of us knows anything worth
knowing, ... (21C. The same point may be found in Socrates'
description of his conversations at Hippias Minor , 3&9D.
)
That an individual's knowledge lies in something apart from their
actions and products is also shown at Apology 22B and Ion 532C.
After the politicians, I went to thepoets, tragic,
dithyrambic, and others, thinking that there I should
find myself manifestly more ignorant than they. So I
took up the poems on which i thought that they had spent
most pains, and asked them what they meant, hoping at the
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same time to learn something from than. I am
ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends, but I
must say it. Almost any one of the bystanders could
have talked about the works of these poets better
than the poets themselves.
... it is plain to everyone that not from art and
knowledge comes your power to speak concerning Homer.
If it were an art that gave you power, then you could
speak about all the other poets as well.
Far from believing that moral behavior justifies itself, in the
^**lfc*Q Socrates justifies his own moral behavior by an appeal to
general moral principles. He says
I am still what I always have been - a man who still will
accept no argument but that which on reflection I
find to be the truest. (46c)
His action is based upon principles such as
We should set the highest value, not on living, but on living
well. (48B)
We ought never to act unjustly. (49B)
A man ought to carry out his just agreements. (49E)
and It is impious to use violence against your father or your
mother; and much more impious to use violence against
your country. ( 51 C)
The assessment of the first claim is difficult. What counts as
objective justification? Following the TcXv^ analogy thesis, the claim
seems plainly false. If we ask a shoemaker why he tans his leather in
a certain way, and he replies that his teacher told him to do it this
way, that he had always done it this way in the past with excellent
results, and he then uses the leather to make a beautiful pair of sandals
it seems plain that his behavior is perfectly justified. If Socrates
sought to justify moral behavior in the same manner, then he sought
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objective justification. When Gould speaks of justification, however,
his models are mathematical claims ("there can be no 'axiomatization'
in ethics," p. 19) and a comparison of a knowing that claim with the
facts!
knowing how has not the objective status of knowing
that, where this implies awareness of existing facts.
(P. 20)
Gould denies the view that Socrates sought the definitive, universal
truth, and holds that
Philosophy is achievement of certainty, and certainty, as
Socrates meant it, is the inward agreement of one with
another's views, only to be achieved in *ad hominem'
conversation, only to be expressed in action, (p. 23)
I think that it is true that Socrates did seek some sort of "inward
agreement," the Crito being a perfect example of this. What I question
is that this is all Socrates sought.
One way to justify our behavior is to appeal to the sanction of
an expert. The taking of medicine is justified if done so on the
recommendation of a doctor. In the Crito, Socrates claims to seek
the same sort of justification for his own moral behavior.
Socrates! Does a man who is in training, and who is serious about
it, pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion
of all men, or only of the one man who is a doctor or
a trainer?
Crito: He pays attention only to the opinion of the one man.
Socrates! Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise
of this one man, not of the multitude?
Crito i Clearly.
Then he must act and exercise, and eat and drink in what'
ever way the one man who is his director, and under-
Socrates !
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stands the matter, tells him; not as others tell him?
Crito: that is so.
Socrates i And, Crito, to be brief, is it not the same in
everything? And, therefore, in questions of justice
and injustice, and of the base and the honorable,
and of good and evil, which we are now examining,
ought we follow the opinion of the many and fear
that, o? the opinion of the one man who understands
these matters (if we can find him), and feel more
shame and fear before him than before all other
men? For if we do not follow him, we shall corrupt
and maim that part of us which, we used to say, is
improved by justice and disabled by injustice. ( 4?B-D)
Socrates i Then, my good friend, we must not think so much of what
the many will say of us; we must think of what the one
man who understands justice and injustice, and of what
truth herself will say of us. (48a)
It seems to me that if we are acting with objective justification in
the first case Socrates cites, then we are also acting with objective
justification in the second. Since Socrates is seeking to follow the
opinion of this one (albeit hypothetical) man, then he is seeking
objective justification for his action.
There is a further aspect of Gould's theory that I shall discuss
briefly. Gould says
/
*
From the standpoint of external justification, ,
as we might expect, may be paralleled by the English phrase
'morally certain,' defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as 'so sure that one is morally justified in acting upon
the conviction. '... An excellent commentary on Plato's
conception of certainty (and its claim to be 'truth') may
be found in a passage of Kierkegaard's Journals : 'What is
truth but to live for an idea? Ultimately everything must
rest upon a postulate; but the moment it is no longer
outside (a man), and he lives in it, then and only then
does it cease to be a postulate for him. * Considered
from the point of view of an outside observer this
represents the essence of Socratic gift VT^JU*} * from
within it is the conviction of knowing how to act. (p. 21)
) /
... now appears as an inward and decisively
personal moral conviction (analogous perhaps, though we
must be aware of being misled by the connotations of the
word, to the Christian 'faith' ). It is personal, as
knowing how inevitably is; inward because it is not the
subsuming of the individual into a universal and objective
principle.
. . .Though conviction, it is
conviction based on a genuine presence of intelligent
ability, (p. 24)
I am not clear as to exactly what Gould's claim that the Socratic
f IS certainty or conviction amounts to. It may be that
Socrates thought that the person who had moral knowledge would have
these qualities, but I do not think that he would have regarded them
as essential features of this knowledge. In the early dialogues there
is a marked contrast between the treatment accorded to Ion, Hippias,
and Euthyphro, and that given to Crito, Laches, and Nicias. The
former display much more certainty and conviction than the latter,
and Socrates accords much more respect to the more circumspect
conversationalists. If Socrates has such certainty about his beliefs,
or has the certainty about the correctness of his actions that the
experienced craftsman does, then why in the Crito does he carefully
re-examine his "former arguments"? (46b) The evidence indicates that
Socrates placed no special emphasis on certainty and conviction.
Having examined some aspects of Gould's theory about Socrates'
views on moral knowledge, I shall now examine the way in which Gould
uses that theory to interpret the Charmides . Gould argues that Plato's
own study of moral knowledge began with an examination of Socrates'
teachings.
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One of the most significant indications of the meaning
of
~ as Plato inherited it, was the traditional
equivalence of that word withrtXv^
. It was upon this
equivalence, already built into the fabric of linguistic
usage, that Socrates constructed his theory of moral
ability, in suggesting that the practical competence of
professional craftsmen was the ideal at which men in
general should aim when faced with the moral problems
of daily life. But we find, already in the early
dialogues, certain doubts about the limits within
which this analogy could be applied, (p. 31)
Gould argues the Charmides
, Hippias Minor , and Book I of the Republic
,
are Plato's demonstrations of the limitations of Socrates' analogy. I
shall argue that Gould is wrong in claiming that "the main purpose
of the Chaimides is to mark off those respects in which the
analogy cannot be literally applied to the field of moral decisions."
(p. 38 ) In previous chapters I have developed an alternative inter-
pretation which I believe is more comprehensive, accurate, and detailed.
In this chapter I shall argue that Gould's general thesis about the
Charmides leads him to misinterpret the particular passages of the
dialogue that he discusses.
Gould begins his analysis of the Chamides by providing an inter-
pretation of Socrates' objections to Critias' third definition,^.
•
ff>ovvv Y\
is self-knowledge. (164D) He says
Socrates' first objection turns on the fact that if this
form of Lntvri} Mn is assumed to be akin to the other forms,
it is unique in having no scpy <vv' (concrete product). Critias
replies to this that Socrates is on the wrong track a 'the
nature of this knowledge is not the same as that of the other
forms.' (165s) There is, we now see, a limit to the
validity of the analogy between Tw ; and productive
techniques.... It is the first hint, the first of many,
that we are at last brought up against the inherent
limitations of a specific professional skill, and
therefore of the analogy between moral skill and such
techniques. The first distinction indicates that
moral skill has no tangible product, such as the
production of buildings or health, (p. 38)
The text for Socrates* objection is
Yes, I'm thinking, said Socrates
. Well, if knowing is what
temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of knowledge
y
ij
j s-ftd must be of something, isn't that so?
Yes - of oneself, Critias said.
Then medicine, too, I said, is a knowledge and is of health?
Certainly.
Now, I said, if you should ask me, If medicine is knowledge
of health, what benefit does it confer upon us and what does
it produce?, I would answer that it conferred no small
benefit. Because health is a fine result for us, if you
agree that this is what it produces.
I agree.
And if you should ask me about housebuilding, which is
knowledge of building houses, and ask what I
say it produces 1 I would say that it produces houses, and
so on with the other arts.fv/^wv you ought to
give an answer on behalf of temperance, since you say it
is a knowledge of self, in case you should be asked, Critias,
since you say temperance as a knowledge of self, what fine
result does it produce which is worthy of the name? Come
along, tell me.
But, Socrates, he said, you are not conducting the investi-
gation in the right way. This knowledge does not have the
same nature as the rest, any more than they have the same
nature as each other, but you are carrying on the investi-
gation as though they were all the same. For instance, he
said, in the arts 7x X*/qs,,of calculation and geometry, tell
me what is the product corresponding to the house in the
case of housebuilding and the cloak in the case of weaving
and so on - one could give many instances from many arts.
You ought to point out to me a similar product in these
cases, but you won't be able to do it.
185
And I said, You are right.... (I65C-I66A)
There are two x-rays in which Gould's interpretation of Socrates'
argument might be formulated. The first is based upon the just quoted
claim that the analogy is between and the productive
techniques" and the second is based upon the subsequent claim that
"behind all these conclusive disproofs lies the premise that VtiJ
is analogous, exactly and in all respects, to the other techniques."
(p. 38)
A. 1. Temperance is a moral skill.
2. Moral skills are just like the productive arts.
3. Every productive art has a fine result.
B. 1. Temperance is a moral skill.
2. Moral skills are just like the arts.
3. Every art produces a fine result.
A contradiction will follow from both of these arguments if Socrates'
challenge to name the fine result produced by temperance cannot be met,^
I shall argue that neither A. nor B. accurately represents Socrates'
argument. Critias replies to Socrates' challenge by claiming that seme
non-productive arts do not have a fine result. Since this claim is
compatible with all of the premises of A. , and Socrates accepts the
claim as an objection to his argument, A. cannot be an accurate inter-
pretation of his argument. Critias' claim is incompatible with one
of the premises of B. j but the rejected premise is 3- , not 2. , which
is the premise Gould claims is being disproven. Consequently, Gould
has not shown that the purpose of this passage is to challenge an
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analogy between moral skills and practical arts. Moreover, it seetas
to me that there is no need to assume that this analogy is being
used as an ©nthymame in this passage. The argument may be formulated
with just two premises*
1. Temperance is a kind of knowledge.
2. Each kind of knowledge has a fine result.
Nevertheless, Gould's interpretation is attractive in that it provides
an answer (a negative answer) to the question left hanging, "Does
temperance produce a fine result?" It seems to me grossly implausible
to suggest that Plato believed that moral knowledge did not have a fine
result, and I shall give an argument based upon the dramatic structure
of the dialogue to show that Plato did not intend the reader to accept
Critias* negative answer to this question.
First, Plato knew that the Athenian reader, before reading the
Charmides, would uncritically regard temperance as a desirable personal
quality. This attitude towards temperance is reinforced by Socrates'
control over his sexual passion at 155D*
And when Critias said that I was the person who knew the
remedy and he turned his full gaze upon me in a manner
beyond description and seemed on the point of asking
a question, and when everyone in the palaestra surged
all around us in a circle, then, my noble friend, I saw
inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quit®
beside myself. And it occured to me that Cydias was
the wisest love-poet when he gave advice on the subject
of beautiful boys and said that "the fawn should beware
lest, while taking a look at the lion, he should
provide part of the lion's dinner," because I felt as
if I had been snapped up by such a creature. All the
same, when he asked me if I knew the headache remedy
,
I managed somehow to answer that I did.
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And by Critias' description of Chaimides,
Let me tell you, though, that Chanaides not only outstrips
his contemporaries in beauty of form but also in this very
thing for which you say you have the charm; it was
temperance wasn't it?
Yes, indeed it was, I said.
Then you must know that not only does he have the
reputation of being the most temperate young man
of the day, but that he is second to none in every-
thing else appropriate to his age. (157D)
The ostensible purpose of the dialogue is for Socrates to pro-
duce temperance in the soul of Chanmides and thus cure his head-
aches. The method employed is based upon the medical theory of the
Thracian kind Zalmoxisi
...the soul is the source both of bodily health and
bodily disease for the whole man, and these flow from
the soul in the same way that the eyes are affected by
the head. So it is necessary first and foremost to
cure the soul if the parts of the head and of the rest
of the body are to be healthy. And the soul, he said,
my dear friend, is cured by means of certain charms,
and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a
result of such words that temperance arises in the soul,
and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it
is easy to provide health both for the head and for
the rest of the body. (156E-157A)
Here it is not only implied that temperance is desirable, but Socrates
also explains the fine results that follow from its possession.
Finally, prior to 165E we are told seven times in the dialogue that
temperance is admirable (159C, 159D (twice), l60C (twice), and 160ti
(twice). (See also 158B) It is used as a major premise in rejecting
Charmides' first two attempts to define temperance.), three times
that temperate men are good (160E (twice), l6lA)» and Critias first
definition, temperance is doing good things (I63E) is rejected on
grounds unrelated to temperance's goodness.
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Now, when Critias is unable to say what fine result temperance
has, and indicates that it does not have one, I submit the Athenian
reader would just be damn puzzled. In the medical theory of Zalmoxis
Plato has provided a plausible solution to this puzzle; temperance
produces health in the soul which in turn engenders health in the
body. In effect, the very question Critias does not answer is, “If
all the knowledges are like medicine, which produces the fine result
of health, then if temperance is a knowledge, what fine result does
it produce?"
It seems to me that Plato's dramatic intent is to pose a puzzle
for the reader, and have the reader solve it with an answer Plato
has previously provided. This answer, moreover, conforms to one of
the traditional meanings of 0 < f • •• v . , (North, pp. 46, 95* 153-5
in reference to the Charmides , Tuckey, p. 5» ) 1 conclude that
Gould's interpretation of Socrates' first objection is incompatible with
the text, and with the logical and dramatical structure of the passage.
Gould argues that 166A-169A provides further support for his
interpretation *
Has it then some object of attention external to
itself, as numbers in the case of arithmetic?
No, Critias replies; here again we have come upon a
distinguishing mark of trie ^ / v; : 'your inquiry
has brought you up against the very thing which marks
^
off self-control from every other skill ? r\ • ' , )
*
•
(166B) Socrates accordingly points out that there is
no other mental activity which is self-regarding. Yet
its apparent uniqueness is not allowed to rule out this
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theory of the nature of v $pvu\a i 'It will
certainly be strange if it exists after all, but we
should not yet insist that it does not exist. We
must still pursue the inquiry into whether it does.
'
(169A) This remark is characteristic of the Charmides.
Throughout the dialogue apparently conclusive disproofs
of the theory that p is a form of skilled
mental activity are set aside* this in itself should
make it clear that the main purpose of the work is
to mark off those respects in which the Tic K v
analogy cannot be literally applied to the field of
moral decisions. For, behind all these conclusive
disproofs, lies the premise that <?/, jv is
analogous, exactly and in all respects
,
to the other
techniques, (p. 3°)
Without going into a detailed analysis of Socrates questions
about the possibility of a reflexive kind of knowledge, we can see that
the analogy is not at stake in this passage. Socrates compares
knowledge of knowledge to vision, hearing, a sense of the senses,
desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, being greater than, being the double
of, being more than, being heavier than, being older than, being a
magnitude, being a number, motion, and heat. Since none of these are
forms of practical knowledge, it is clear that Socrates is not here
trying to distinguish knowledge of knowledge from the knowledge of the
craftsmen.
Having reached an inconclusive result in the examination of the
possibility of - as Critias has defined it, Socrates next
considers whether or not it is beneficial. Gould's interpretation of
the ensuing discussion is that
Once again the argument turns upon the assumption that
ffWpovwv
M
on 611 fours with th® other varieties of
technical ability. On this assumption it proves to be
useless, (p. 39)
]n the Charmides, as we have seen, the conclusion stands
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that -Jus? (> v^ , if w© regard it as some
specific form of technical skill and apply the
analogy quite literally, will be entirely useless.
It should, I think, be abundantly clear that the
implication we should discover in this is that the
analogy between the techniques and morality cannot
be applied to the letter, at least in the respects
which we have seen discussed in the Gharmides
. (p. 41)
Here again a cursory examination of the passage in question, 1?0A-
17&A, indicates that the analogy is not under examination.
What is shown to be useless in this passage is not
,
but what Critias has defined as: knowledge of
knowledge. Plato points this out twice after Socrates has concluded
his arguments:
I don't suppose that the thing we have agreed to be the
finest of all would have turned out to be useless if I
had been of any use in making a good search. But now
we have got the worst of it in every way and are unable
to discover which one of existing things the lawgiver gave
this name, temperance. (175B. See also 175D-E. The
discussion about the possibility of a reflexive kind of
knowledge concludes at 169A-C with Socrates expressing
reservations about Critias' identification of >.
and knowledge of knowledge.)
Secondly, one of the things that knowledge of knowledge is compared to
is knowledge of justice (170B), which is not a form of practical
knowledge. This would be a pointless comparison if the analogy
were being questioned. Thirdly, a major part of Socrates' argument
shows that the possessor of knowledge of knowledge is like the
possessors of other kinds of knowledge in that he is unable to
recognize if someone has a kind of knowledge he lacks, and can only
recognize someone who has the same kind of knowledge he has. (1?1C)
It is difficult to see why Plato would explicitly point this out, if
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his major purpose in this passage is to show that knowledge of know-
ledge is unlike other kinds of knowledge.
I believe that we should conclude that Gould's theory about
Socrates' conception of knowledge is seriously incomplete and
that his interpretation of the Gharmides is not correct. Since there
are difficulties with my own theories on both of these subjects, I
have considerable sympathy for Gould's admission that his attempt to
"reconstruct Socrates' ideas. .. contains an ineradicable element of
distortion." The considerable value of Gould's book lies in the fact
that he did attempt to theoretically reconstruct and explain the ideas
that are present in the dialogues, and did not merely comment and
exposit upon the texts.
It is appropriate at this place to compare Gould's position with
my own. Gould has been frequently criticized for his claim that the
conception of knowkrige in the early dialogues is only that of knowing
4
how, and not propositional knowledge, knowing that. However, as
Gould's critics have pointed out, he is certainly right in claiming that
some sort of knowing how is part of Plato's conception of knowledge in
these dialogues, and it would be well to indicate how I have captured
this feature of Plato's views.
I argued in Chapter III, Section 5 * that Plato held that a
necessary condition for knowing a certain object is consistently acting
rightly in matters pertaining to that object. ' The few contemporary
philosophers who have discussed our conception of knowing how have
generally agreed that in some sense it involves being able
to do the
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relevant tasks, and the principle I attributed to Plato in Chapter
III captures this.
The criticism that Gould has neglected the propositional aspect
of Plato's early views on knowledge has been forcefully argued by
Gregory Vlastosi
Try the "know how" sense in this sentence and see what
you can make of it* "to fear death is nothing but to
think oneself wise while one is not; for it is think one
knows the unknown" (Ajo. 29A). And there is more at
issue here than mere linguistics. Think of the doctrine
Socrates is expounding. If "virtue is knowledge" meant
that "for the achievement of arete what is required is a
form of ability," Socrates would be saying here that
people fear death only because they do not have the
ability not to fear it, and what could be more trivial
than that? Or, to continue the citation from Gould,
"ability, comparable in some respects to the creative
or artistic ability of potters, shoemakers, and the
like;" the analogy with the practical arts, if dragged
in here, would imply that the reason we fear death is
that we have not acquired skill in meeting it, and what
could be farther from Socrates' thought? What Socrates
wants us to understand is that we have mistaken beliefs ,
we think we know death to be a great evil, greater than
disgrace, if so much as know our ignorance, our fear of
death would leave us. There is no getting away from
"intellectualism" here.
It is also difficult to see how Gould's interpretation may be fruit-
fully applied to Socrates' examination of the epistemological powers
of knowledge of knowledge in the Charmides . Gould's approach can be
applied in a general way by saying that the temperate man does not
have the ability to distinguish genuine doctors from pretenders, while
doctors do have this ability. But on Gould's approach this is all
we are permitted to say of these people, we cannot say of two persons,
"a knows that b knows health." The Charmides amply demonstrates
that
Plato thought that such knowledge was possible, and Gould's
interpre-
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tation does not account for this.
It may be thought that the passage from the Apology is a problem
for my own views, but the theory I have presented may easily be
adapted to provide an intuitively natural interpretation for Socrates’
statement. First, it is necessary to quote a larger portion of the
passage from which Vlastos* quotation is taken,
For to fear death, my friends, is only to think ourselves
wise without really being wise, for it is to think we
know what we do not know. For no one knows whether death
may not be the greatest good that can happen to a man.
But men fear it as if they knew quite well that it was
the greatest of evils. ( Apology 29A. See also 40B-42A.
)
Here Socrates is arguing that none of the persons present knows
whether or not death (actually, given his subsequent remarks, he
seems to be referring to the afterlife) is a great evil or a great
good. His reason for this claim seems to be that none of the persons
present has experienced the afterlife. Earlier I argued that the
sufficient conditions for someone's knowing that something has a
certain quality, x knows y has z, are
1. y has z
2. x examines y
3. x has the faculty of knowledge that has z as its object.
I did not argue that these were necessary conditions for knowledge because
I did not need to do so in order to interpret the Charmides and because
there is little direct textual evidence to justify the attribution of
this position to Plato. However, the Apology passage suggests
that 2.
is a necessary condition for knowledge. If this is correct, we
may
interpret the argument Socrates gives there as
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1. If any person knows that something has or lacks
some quality, then that person has examined that
thing.
2. No person present has examined the afterlife.
3. No one present knows whether or not the afterlife
is good or evil.
Thus the passage that presents a problem for Gould' s position may
easily be assimilated into the theory 1 have presented. It is a
perfectly reasonable (it is also formally valid, see the last page
of this chapter, ) argument that no one knows whether or not the
afterlife is good or evil since no one has examined it.
It Is also worthwhile to consider if the other two sufficient
conditions for knowledge may also be assumed to be necessary condi-
tions. Passages such as
...If anyone should ask you, "Gorgias, is there such a
thing as a false belief and a true|>^6>q.!S J belief?" I
Csocrates imagine that you would say that there is.
Yes.
Well then, is there both a false and a truet*^
knowledge?
Certainly not. (Gorgias , 454D.
)
and
Socrates*! If someone knows the way to Larisa, or where
you will, and goes there and guides others, will he not
guide rightly and well?
Certainly.
Well, what of one who has never been there, and does not
know the way? but if he has right opinion as to the way,
won't he also guide rightly?
Certainly.
And so long as he has right opinion about that which the
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other has knowledge, he will be quite as good a
guide as the one who knows, although he does not know,
but only thinks, what is true[; ^
.. (Meno 97A-B.
)
and the absence of evidence to the contrary have suggested to Plato's
commentators that in the early dialogues he held the view that know-
ledge implies truth. This is usually understood to mean that objects
of knowledge are true propositions. However, in the theory that I
have developed I have argued that for Plato knowledge is either a
relation between persons and qualities or a relation that obtains
between persons, things in general, and qualities. On this view the
objects of knowledge do not have truth values, they simply are.
Hence we may attribute to Plato the principle
R3. (x)(y)[(Ex)(zK(xHy)) O xHy] c^
" y!A, 9, " may mean "real" as well as "true," this is entirely
compatible with the passages in the Gorgias and the Meno. Moreover,
it enables us to give a much less paradoxical interpretation of the
9
Meno passage than the propositional interpretation is committed to.
There the example of knowledge Socrates discusses is "someone knows
the way to Larisa. " At least in a prima facie sense it seems that
the object of this person's knowledge is the way to Larisa, not a
proposition or conjunction of propositions. Consequently the objects
of his knowledge can only be construed as having a truth value if we
impose onto the text some reduction schema for explaining "knows the
way" expressions in terms of "knows that" expressions. (Except for
one sense of "knowing how," Hintikka proposes that such reduction
schemas for each epistemological tem may be given in 1;.) However,
such an imposition is unnecessary if we assume that Plato held
that
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knowledge implies the existence or reality of what is known,
rather than the truth of what is known.
Finally, the theory I have attributed to Plato would gain a
considerable amount of internal cohesion if it is also reasonable
to attribute to him the principle (x) (y) [(Ez ) (xK(zHy) P(Ew) (Kw & yOw A xHw)3.
For example, does knowing that someone has health imply that one has
the faculty of medical knowledge? The chief difficulty involved in
attributing this view to Plato is not that there is countervailing
evidence (as far as I can tell there is none), but that it seems to
us to be so implausible that it is difficult to believe that Plato
held it. It does not seem to us that one has to be a doctor in
order to know that a man who is foaming at the mouth and whose skin
is covered with red blotches is diseased. However, if Plato held that
knowing implies being able to give a rational explanation and also
held that other faculties, such as opinion, had less reliable powers
of recognition, then it does not seem so implausible to attribute this
view to him.
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1
.
(x) (y) [ (Ez) (xK(yHz) v xK(yLz))} xEy
]
2 . - (Ex) (Px & xE A )
3. Pb C.P. asmp t
.
4. (x)-(Px & xE a ) Q.N. ,2
.
5. (x)(Px3~xEA ) DeM . , Imp .
,
6 . Pb (? -b E a U . I . , 5 .
7. -bE A M . P . , 3 . , 6 .
8. (Ez) (bK( AH z
)
v bK
(
ALz ) )
y
b E a U . I . , 1
.
9. -(Ez) (bK ( A IIz ) v b KA Lz )
)
M . T
. ,
7
.
,
8 .
10
.
(z) (-bK
(
AH z & - bK
(
ALz )
)
Q .N
. ,
DeM.
,
11 . -bK
(
AHG ) & -bK( A L G ) U . I . , 10 .
12. -bK
(
AH e ) & -bK( AL E ) U . I . , 10 .
13. -bK ( AHq) & ~-bK ( AL g ) & -bK( AH E ) & -bK ( AL E ) Conj.,11,12.
14 Pb 0 (-bK( AHG ) & -bK( AL G ) & -bK( AH E ) & -bK( AL E ))
C.P .S .P
.
,3-13.
15. (x)[PxP(-bK( AH G ) & -bK
(
aLg ) & -bK( AH E ) &
-b K
(
AL E ) )
]
U.G.S.P. ,3-14.
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Footnotes to Chapter V
Gould's statement of this theory ought to be quoted in full.
Hy first task, however, is to give an account of the
'official theory,' as we might term it, of what is
meant by saying thattffcrtf ±s a matter of
.
Moral virtue, Socrates is supposed to have claimed, is
to be achieved only by an understanding of the moral
truths of the universe, that is by an intellectual in-
sight into the nature of right and wrong. It is
presumed that he believed that knowledge of moral facts
involved morally correct behavior and conversely, that
wrongdoing is caused by intellectual ignorance of the
same moral facts. According to this view, the situa-
tion of the moral man behaving morally is for Socrates
somewhat the same as the explanation we often put
forward of a chess player playing an intelligent game
of chess i he is able to act as he does, because in his
mind, he knows 'the rules of the game,' because he
possesses the theoretical equipment required for
correct practice. The\7UF7s}/*$ denotes the success-
ful conclusion of a process of ethical theorizing,
necessarily prior to morally acceptable behavior* the
sense of Cnevi'j/M) is cognitive or, to adopt Professor
Ryle's terminology, some form of knowing that , (p. 4)
2
In his book Eros and Psyche John Rist presents a number of
criticisms of Gould1 s view. Unfortunately, many of Rist's criticisms
are vitiated by a neglect of this distinction. Gould would be in
complete agreement with Rist's claim that "the truer^X k is
morally obliged in so far as he is a TtXvvna.# to look to the
good of the object of his "H-*v I the man who merely 'knows how*
is under no such obligation." (p. 119# Eros and Psyche ) and would
argue that it does not refute the view that he actually attributes
to Socrates. Rist correctly criticizes Gould's theory for failing
to explain the fact that in the early dialogues knowledge is
conceived of as having an object, but these criticisms are unfor-
tunately embedded in an attempt to show that "'knowing that' is,
in the mind of the Platonic Socrates, prior to 'knowing how"'.
(p. 137)
^tq formally derive a contradiction the second premises must be
read as claiming that moral skills are productive arts, or, equivalently,
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that moral skills have every property shared by all the productive
arts. If A. and B. are to be understood merely as arguments by
analogy, contradictions do not follow from the premise^ of A. and B.
and the claim that temperance does not have a fine result. On
this interpretation of Gould's analysis of the argument, the intent
of Socrates' objection is not to refute premise 2, but to raise
a doubt about it.
^Vlastes [4 , Hintikka [X » Runciman, Rist.
^1 also argued (Chapter III, Section 4) that knowers are able
to utter true statements consistently about the objects of their
knowledge. The passages cited in support of that claim seem to
indicate that being able to speak rightly is also a part of what we
might say is Plato's conception of knowing how. This is a respect
in which our conception of knowing how does not match up with Plato’s;
since we would say that someone who properly repaired automobiles
with consistency knew how to do so, even if he uttered many false
statements about the proper functioning of automobiles. Gould falsely
claims that for Plato knowing how is evinced only in action (p. 20);
it may be that he has been misled by imposing our own conception of
knowing how onto the early dialogues.
8
Ryle, Brown, Scheffler, Hintikka 1 . Scheffler (p. 93) points
out that knowing how cannot simply be explained in terms of being able,
since a person may know how to drive a car even if his arm is broken.
As the passage I cited from the Hippias Minor (see Introduction to
Chapter III) indicates, this does not pose a problem for the inter-
pretation of Plato's views.
7Vlastes
.
41, p. 228. Hintikka, 2l» p. 3 » and Runciman, p. 12,
accept this criticism. I think that Gould's critics are right in
claiming that the passage from the Apology is damaging to Gould's
position, but the passage does not show that his general approach
is erroneous. Gould says
I am concerned, not with problems of authorship, but with
the original intention of a number of passages whose unity
of conception is not likely to be denied, (p. 3 )
If the conception of knowledge is different that that of the dialogues
proper, a defender of Gould's approach could argue that the Apology is
a report of Socrates' beliefs and that the dialogues reflect Plato s own
views. He would then argue that no evidence has been presented which
would show that the knowing how conception of knowledge is not the view
of the early dialogues.
8
In the cases of simple direct objects, we should employ a predicate
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signifying that the object is real or exists:
(x )[(Ey ) (yKxP Rx].
^Vlastas ( SP* footnote 1) claims that the sort of knowledge
under consideration in the Meno is propositional knowledge. He presents
a very interesting and detailed interpretation of Socrates' discussion
with the slave boy, but does not discuss Socrates' example at 9?A.
CHAPTER VI
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CONCLUSION
I have tried to contribute to our understanding of Plato's thought
by presenting a theory about his earliest views on knowledge and an
interpretation of the philosophical inquiry in the second half of
the Charmides . My general thesis is that it is a rational examina-
tion of the idea that knowledge of knowledge is a kind of knowledge
that will enable its possessor to properly order the state. Contrary
to the views of some commentators, I claimed that Charmides I67B -
I69A is a sound investigation of an issue that is important for
the purposes of the dialogue and for Plato's political thought. I
argued that Plato believed that he had good reasons for denying the
existence of a wide variety of reflexive faculties, and that these
grounds provided a legitimate non-deductive basis for doubting the
existence of knowledge of knowledge. At Charmides 1?0A - 171C
Socrates argues that the possession of knowledge of knowledge does
not entail knowing what oneself and others do and do not know. I
claimed that Socrates' arguments were natural consequences of a certain
way of thinking about knowledges. This claim was supported by repre-
senting Plato's epistemological framework by a number of general
principles, and presenting a series of formally valid arguments which
had these principles as enthymematic premises and each step of Socrates'
reasoning as conclusions.
At 171D - 173D the reader finds out what has been the principal
motivation for Plato's inquiry. Socrates twice describes the political
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benefits that would follow if knowledge of knowledge did exist and
did entail that its possessor had the ability to determine what he
and others did and did not know. Such a person would be able to
ensure that each task of importance to the state would be performed
only by persons who had the appropriate kind of knowledge. Although
this seems to be a considerable benefit, at 173D - 1?5D Socrates
argues that it is not sufficient to bring about an ideal state. His
reason is that this can only be done by the kind of knowledge that
has good and evil as its objects. A passage in the Laches may help us
to understand Plato* s motives for presenting this latter argument.
At Laches 195 Nicias argues that the knowledge of a doctor is limited
to health and disease? it does not include the proper objects of fear.
His argument presumes that a doctor may use his skills to keep a person
alive when it is better to let the person die. It would seem that a
state of the sort Socrates describes at Charmides 1?1D - 173D, where
each task is performed only by those who know, will lack the moral
guidance needed to prevent the sort of consequences Nicias alludes to.
It is evident from Gorgias 519A that Plato believed that other particular
kinds of knowledge might be inappropriately deployed; "With no regard
for self-control or justice they stuffed our state with harbors and
docks and walls. ..." Since there is no guarantee that the activities
of knowers in a state ruled by knowledge of knowledge will be properly
regulated, Plato is justified in claiming that knowledge of knowledge
is not the ideal form of political knowledge.
It is appropriate to consider here Plato's later views on the three
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features of knowledge of knowledge discussed in the Charmides : its
possibility, epistemological powers, and political authority. There
are several good reasons for believing that he thought that knowledge
of knowledge was possible at the tine that he wrote the Republic
.
ihe first is a rouark made in Book X about a person who reports that
he has met someone who knows every craft,
our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow,
who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand
man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the
belief that he is all-wise, because of his own inability
to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance,
and imitation. (598D. See also Phages. 247D.
)
Presumably, if some persons may be criticized for being unable to
distinguish the presence or absence of knowledge, it is possible for
some persons to have this ability. Secondly, in the Republic Socrates
considers the suggestion that the Good, an object of knowledge, might
be identified with knowledge. (505) He rejects this suggestion, but
not on the grounds that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. The third
and most obvious reason for supposing that Plato believed that knowledge
of knowledge was possible at the time that he wrote the Republic is that
it is evident that the Guardians will have it. The proper ordering of
the state requires that the Guardians produce knowledge, distinguish
it from ignorance, and recognize which persons have which kinds of
knowledge. Since the hypothetical possessor of knowledge of knowledge
in the Charmides lacks at least the latter quality, it is worth con-
sidering how he differs from the Guardians.
The crucial assumption in the Charmides is that the temperate
man knows only knowledge? he is unable to recognize which persons know
or do not know other objects of knowledge because he himself does
not know those objects* It would be easy to argue that the Guardians
are able to recognize what they and others do and do not know because
they are acquainted with every form, but I have been unable to find
a passage in the Republic where Plato explicitly asserts this claim.
Plato does assert that the Guardians have a passion for every sort
of knowledge, but when he speaks of what they know, apart from
mathematics, he tends to refer to moral and aesthetic forms exclusively.
Since it is not explicitly asserted that the Guardians know the forms
of Health and Bed, it does not seem to me that we should assume that
they are able to distinguish between carpenters and doctors in the
manner suggested by the Charmides . However, it does seem that the
Guardians will be able to recognize what kinds of knowledge persons
have in virtue of their knowledge of aesthetic and moral forms. At
601D Plato says
Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of
every implement, living thing, and action refer solely
to the use for which each is made or by nature intended?
Since the Guardians are able to distinguish these virtues wherever
they might occur, it is clear that they will be able to distinguish
well made products from results produced by ignorant persons. If the
Guardians are to be able to use this knowledge as a criterion to
distinguish which persons know which things, they must also be capable
of recognizing what kind of thing the products are instances of and
which persons produced them. The latter sort of epistemological relation
is presupposed in the Chamides , since the examiners are assumed to know
20?
who is uttering the words and committing the actions they are exam-
ining; and there is no evidence that Plato has given up this pre-
supposition in the Republic
. (For my purposes I am ignoring the
problem of how it is possible for the Guardians to have any know-
ledge of the world of Becoming. Plato does say that the Guardians
will be able to recognize each instance of beauty; and I am here
considering whether or not they will have similar abilities towards
instances of things such as musical knowledge. ) In the cases of things
that are manufactured or cared for, Plato seems to assume in both the
early and middle dialogues that non-experts are able to recognize what
they are instances of. Thus the Guardians will be able to recognize
that some things are both beautiful and beds or ugly and horses. Since
there is ample evidence that Plato holds that only knowers can consist-
ently produce beautiful products, the Guardians will be able to
recognize which persons have the knowledge that produces those products.
It is somewhat more difficult to see how this suggestion about how the
Guardians are able to recognize experts may be applied to doctors,
since in the Gorgias Plato says that non-experts are unable to recognize
in every case when someone is healthy. If the Guardians are unable to
distinguish healthy individuals from diseased individuals, then it
is difficult to see how they will be able to recognize which persons
are able to produce health. I suggest that this difficulty may be
overcome if we suppose that the Guardians know that health is a necessary
condition for beauty and disease is a sufficient condition for ugliness.
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If this supposition is granted, we may assume that Guardians may
examine a collection of medical patients, determine the extent to
which their abilities to perform the functions proper to them have
been restored, and thus determine whether or not the person who has
treated them has medical knowledge.
If this is a tenable interpretation of the Guardians' knowledge of
knowledge, we can see that two of the positions of the Charmides have
been given up. The first is the position that experts may be recog-
nized only by persons who know the same things that they do. The
second is that the Guardians' ability to know what they and others
do and do not know relies upon methods suggested in the Laches and
Gorgias
,
examining a person's products; and not the methods stipulated
in the Charmides
,
examining a person's speech and actions. (It ought
to be noted that my suggestion about the Guardians' abilities does
not preclude the use of the methods of the Charmides . If they are
able to recognize that someone's speech and actions are beautiful
and recognize what matters the person is concerned with, then it
seems that they will know that the person has knowledge of those matters.)
Plato's early view that the ideal kind of political knowledge is
knowledge of the good and not knowledge of knowledge is clearly held in
the Republic . At 508E the Good is said to be distinct from knowledge
and at 540A Plato says that the Guardians are required to "turn upward
the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light
on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it
as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and
themselves throughout the rest of their lives.
"
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